From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id E825AC0015E for ; Tue, 1 Aug 2023 14:13:45 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S234486AbjHAONo (ORCPT ); Tue, 1 Aug 2023 10:13:44 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:38500 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S234468AbjHAONe (ORCPT ); Tue, 1 Aug 2023 10:13:34 -0400 Received: from dfw.source.kernel.org (dfw.source.kernel.org [IPv6:2604:1380:4641:c500::1]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 2958C269F; Tue, 1 Aug 2023 07:13:30 -0700 (PDT) Received: from smtp.kernel.org (relay.kernel.org [52.25.139.140]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature RSA-PSS (2048 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by dfw.source.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id A4E9D615C9; Tue, 1 Aug 2023 14:13:29 +0000 (UTC) Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id C215FC433C7; Tue, 1 Aug 2023 14:13:23 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1690899209; bh=NTBwd29Dbu+ECP276LsKiM8HBDKaR00BKAB6CRCf3bE=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:References:In-Reply-To:From; b=abqS+G0uERa7fIKrH4hSw9IDBy+zR3n2e2RncQqAqkzlG6NQHu8J5iIFlkwrB657I oJQ0+vDyHimf0Zzmz13ZMAyco3wCnDXoFSci37voDkjQr4SVseAsIyVJ06v3CG1ZKX wA4zk4L/vjGB4EVHMfxhGACjxWZzRWGs+AESTu3SAB7pEpFPTu5QyCSKsYrmv6ocyz STvBOLI5/v9lmw1IkmkGMiZootxRVm5BrSrS3Z8ppbrLm97hcIZG9bJiqDSG26raqx VegkDKaNPneU+4IvGTtTT2RITGdJC90YBsdQ0YM0USvoHqq9xrcZJCf7t4mwUrCzhT F9wsepVvvxiMA== Date: Tue, 1 Aug 2023 15:13:20 +0100 From: Will Deacon To: Mark Brown Cc: Catalin Marinas , Jonathan Corbet , Andrew Morton , Marc Zyngier , Oliver Upton , James Morse , Suzuki K Poulose , Arnd Bergmann , Oleg Nesterov , Eric Biederman , Kees Cook , Shuah Khan , "Rick P. Edgecombe" , Deepak Gupta , Ard Biesheuvel , Szabolcs Nagy , "H.J. Lu" , Paul Walmsley , Palmer Dabbelt , Albert Ou , linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, kvmarm@lists.linux.dev, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 00/36] arm64/gcs: Provide support for GCS in userspace Message-ID: <20230801141319.GC26253@willie-the-truck> References: <20230731-arm64-gcs-v3-0-cddf9f980d98@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20230731-arm64-gcs-v3-0-cddf9f980d98@kernel.org> User-Agent: Mutt/1.10.1 (2018-07-13) Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Mon, Jul 31, 2023 at 02:43:09PM +0100, Mark Brown wrote: > The arm64 Guarded Control Stack (GCS) feature provides support for > hardware protected stacks of return addresses, intended to provide > hardening against return oriented programming (ROP) attacks and to make > it easier to gather call stacks for applications such as profiling. Why is this better than Clang's software shadow stack implementation? It would be nice to see some justification behind adding all this, rather than it being an architectural tick-box exercise. Will