From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4A512C04A6A for ; Wed, 9 Aug 2023 14:05:38 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S233102AbjHIOFh (ORCPT ); Wed, 9 Aug 2023 10:05:37 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:50204 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S229722AbjHIOFf (ORCPT ); Wed, 9 Aug 2023 10:05:35 -0400 Received: from dfw.source.kernel.org (dfw.source.kernel.org [139.178.84.217]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 27E5C1FCC for ; Wed, 9 Aug 2023 07:05:35 -0700 (PDT) Received: from smtp.kernel.org (relay.kernel.org [52.25.139.140]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature RSA-PSS (2048 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by dfw.source.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id BBD1A62FDC for ; Wed, 9 Aug 2023 14:05:34 +0000 (UTC) Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 5E4AEC433C8; Wed, 9 Aug 2023 14:05:33 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1691589934; bh=C4vGr9VtQ1uJZ1AEXz3WxHMpY3hLIOJDo+mTGMKQeJg=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:References:In-Reply-To:From; b=IRS+cZPwvkKV+8bca4C1LLK2tmCojpzDB4Ip4t7A+qZ7wDMplRv3TwyfY5WwIvaj+ lAwpzLlufCQJnGT4z46peHy1lfbCICNv+XikWaeYHxPD37O+DS272hxGqDwvJU/PnE L7XpmjAqvHO+RBMfq85PFJTzRw1iYmm5TjYYdoGO33bb4PhUunjvdCoWsCggEueplE cP7M0i7blFe4I3hrYEJWLnpambzQSxZikkGu+HWs16wmaG3TpBmeQ5+E2DhaT4LQoQ SZTjqE4IlXmp55z13/PxqId91Rfyoz53Av+T66B2yCylXcXlnM4WtuqcPGdwQm8m6i H6FJNgDwovy8Q== Date: Wed, 9 Aug 2023 10:05:30 -0400 From: Josh Poimboeuf To: Peter Zijlstra Cc: x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, David.Kaplan@amd.com, Andrew.Cooper3@citrix.com, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Subject: Re: [RFC][PATCH 11/17] x86/cpu: Remove all SRSO interface nonsense Message-ID: <20230809140530.bijq3asl26d2pu7u@treble> References: <20230809071218.000335006@infradead.org> <20230809072201.192502969@infradead.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20230809072201.192502969@infradead.org> Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Wed, Aug 09, 2023 at 09:12:29AM +0200, Peter Zijlstra wrote: > @@ -2607,26 +2447,26 @@ static ssize_t srbds_show_state(char *bu > static ssize_t retbleed_show_state(char *buf) > { > if (retbleed_mitigation == RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET || > + retbleed_mitigation == RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET_SRSO || > + retbleed_mitigation == RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET_SRSO_ALIAS || > retbleed_mitigation == RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB) { These retbleed_show_state() changes probably belong in that other patch which adds the retbleed= cmdline options. > + > if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_AMD && > boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_HYGON) > return sysfs_emit(buf, "Vulnerable: untrained return thunk / IBPB on non-AMD based uarch\n"); > > - return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s; SMT %s\n", retbleed_strings[retbleed_mitigation], > + return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s; SMT %s%s\n", retbleed_strings[retbleed_mitigation], > !sched_smt_active() ? "disabled" : > spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT || > spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED ? > - "enabled with STIBP protection" : "vulnerable"); > - } > + "enabled with STIBP protection" : "vulnerable", > + cpu_has_ibpb_brtype_microcode() ? "" : ", no SRSO microcode"); Hm? What does missing microcode have to do with SMT? -- Josh