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From: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
To: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
	Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	tony.luck@intel.com, ak@linux.intel.com,
	tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
	Alyssa Milburn <alyssa.milburn@linux.intel.com>,
	Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>,
	antonio.gomez.iglesias@linux.intel.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH  6/6] KVM: VMX: Move VERW closer to VMentry for MDS mitigation
Date: Fri, 20 Oct 2023 17:46:33 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20231021004633.ymughma7zijosku5@desk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <ZTMFS8I2s8EroSNe@google.com>

On Fri, Oct 20, 2023 at 03:55:07PM -0700, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> On Fri, Oct 20, 2023, Pawan Gupta wrote:
> > During VMentry VERW is executed to mitigate MDS. After VERW, any memory
> > access like register push onto stack may put host data in MDS affected
> > CPU buffers. A guest can then use MDS to sample host data.
> > 
> > Although likelihood of secrets surviving in registers at current VERW
> > callsite is less, but it can't be ruled out. Harden the MDS mitigation
> > by moving the VERW mitigation late in VMentry path.
> > 
> > Note that VERW for MMIO Stale Data mitigation is unchanged because of
> > the complexity of per-guest conditional VERW which is not easy to handle
> > that late in asm with no GPRs available. If the CPU is also affected by
> > MDS, VERW is unconditionally executed late in asm regardless of guest
> > having MMIO access.
> > 
> > Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
> > ---
> >  arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S |  9 +++++++++
> >  arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c     | 10 +++++++---
> >  2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
> > 
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S
> > index be275a0410a8..efa716cf4727 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S
> > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S
> > @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
> >  /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
> >  #include <linux/linkage.h>
> >  #include <asm/asm.h>
> > +#include <asm/segment.h>
> >  #include <asm/bitsperlong.h>
> >  #include <asm/kvm_vcpu_regs.h>
> >  #include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
> > @@ -31,6 +32,8 @@
> >  #define VCPU_R15	__VCPU_REGS_R15 * WORD_SIZE
> >  #endif
> >  
> > +#define GUEST_CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS		USER_CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS
> > +
> >  .macro VMX_DO_EVENT_IRQOFF call_insn call_target
> >  	/*
> >  	 * Unconditionally create a stack frame, getting the correct RSP on the
> > @@ -177,10 +180,16 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__vmx_vcpu_run)
> >   * the 'vmx_vmexit' label below.
> >   */
> >  .Lvmresume:
> > +	/* Mitigate CPU data sampling attacks .e.g. MDS */
> > +	GUEST_CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS
> 
> I have a very hard time believing that it's worth duplicating the mitigation
> for VMRESUME vs. VMLAUNCH just to land it after a Jcc.

VERW modifies the flags, so it either needs to be after Jcc or we
push/pop flags that adds 2 extra memory operations. Please let me know
if there is a better option.

> Also, would it'd be better to put the NOP first?  Or even better, out of line?
> It'd be quite hilarious if the CPU pulled a stupid and speculated on the operand
> of the NOP, i.e. if the user/guest controlled RAX allowed for pulling in data
> after the VERW.

I did confirm with CPU architects that NOP operand won't be
dereferenced, even speculatively. But yes, even if it did, moving NOP
first does take care of it.

  reply	other threads:[~2023-10-21  0:46 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 42+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-10-20 20:44 [PATCH 0/6] Delay VERW Pawan Gupta
2023-10-20 20:44 ` [PATCH 1/6] x86/bugs: Add asm helpers for executing VERW Pawan Gupta
2023-10-20 23:13   ` Sean Christopherson
2023-10-21  1:00     ` Pawan Gupta
2023-10-20 23:55   ` [RESEND][PATCH " Andrew Cooper
2023-10-21  1:18     ` Pawan Gupta
2023-10-21  1:33       ` Andrew Cooper
2023-10-21  2:21         ` Pawan Gupta
2023-10-23 18:08           ` Josh Poimboeuf
2023-10-23 19:09             ` Pawan Gupta
2023-10-25  6:28     ` Pawan Gupta
2023-10-25  7:22       ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-10-25  7:52         ` Andrew Cooper
2023-10-25  8:02           ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-10-25 15:27         ` Pawan Gupta
     [not found]   ` <6439a094-23a6-4de3-aa41-bd033163e044@citrix.com>
2023-10-22 16:16     ` [PATCH " Peter Zijlstra
2023-10-20 20:45 ` [PATCH 2/6] x86/entry_64: Add VERW just before userspace transition Pawan Gupta
2023-10-23 18:22   ` Josh Poimboeuf
2023-10-23 19:13     ` Pawan Gupta
2023-10-23 19:17     ` Dave Hansen
2023-10-23 18:35   ` Josh Poimboeuf
2023-10-23 21:04     ` Pawan Gupta
2023-10-23 21:47       ` Josh Poimboeuf
2023-10-23 22:30         ` Pawan Gupta
2023-10-23 22:45           ` Dave Hansen
2023-10-24  0:00             ` Pawan Gupta
2023-10-20 20:45 ` [PATCH 3/6] x86/entry_32: " Pawan Gupta
2023-10-20 23:49   ` Andi Kleen
2023-10-21  1:28     ` Pawan Gupta
2023-10-20 20:45 ` [PATCH 4/6] x86/bugs: Use ALTERNATIVE() instead of mds_user_clear static key Pawan Gupta
2023-10-23 18:48   ` Josh Poimboeuf
2023-10-23 21:09     ` Pawan Gupta
2023-10-20 20:45 ` [PATCH 5/6] x86/bugs: Cleanup mds_user_clear Pawan Gupta
2023-10-23  8:51   ` Nikolay Borisov
2023-10-23 16:06     ` Pawan Gupta
2023-10-20 20:45 ` [PATCH 6/6] KVM: VMX: Move VERW closer to VMentry for MDS mitigation Pawan Gupta
2023-10-20 22:55   ` Sean Christopherson
2023-10-21  0:46     ` Pawan Gupta [this message]
2023-10-23 14:58       ` Sean Christopherson
2023-10-23 17:05         ` Pawan Gupta
2023-10-23 18:56   ` Josh Poimboeuf
2023-10-23 21:17     ` Pawan Gupta

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