From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2412DC4332F for ; Mon, 30 Oct 2023 08:27:33 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S232086AbjJ3I1d (ORCPT ); Mon, 30 Oct 2023 04:27:33 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:42712 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S232084AbjJ3I12 (ORCPT ); Mon, 30 Oct 2023 04:27:28 -0400 Received: from mgamail.intel.com (mgamail.intel.com [134.134.136.65]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id AD38FDB for ; Mon, 30 Oct 2023 01:27:25 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=intel.com; i=@intel.com; q=dns/txt; s=Intel; t=1698654445; x=1730190445; h=date:from:to:cc:subject:message-id:references: mime-version:in-reply-to; bh=828OvXrs9PdoWGIXIPb2TnTbIBNCk6E4CQqB1JZEUSU=; b=kJ04ANZCD+C67QSaIKUzZjeUFzrzojMfow0lfQzhy4ZI+8hD482U6QLy P7lHs5AmwqbBi9khS422OVNphiJE0CTfjGaZ4/eOL549XeijOFup1K6so o99N7MMBtNFr2lTjXmnzv702GMDQz+W77Mgal66VmxDQGZzV351ATFiGU 9IZc76K24fJpVzalmvhxP92gNzeR6LNqj6TSqEAKqPxuWdWSnTNq2otYl 5s6zq21qALRlWa8mr2tNzjsGjKoZ0/HNoay7CAOhJ8El2totJi8rhr5pU WVFdcjtnPbUHJdTcZKDG8OyZ5zOTVvsf06n6GeDUYK5HGyOmwaxkiJem4 g==; X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6600,9927,10878"; a="391895167" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="6.03,263,1694761200"; d="scan'208";a="391895167" Received: from orviesa001.jf.intel.com ([10.64.159.141]) by orsmga103.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 30 Oct 2023 01:27:21 -0700 X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="6.03,263,1694761200"; d="scan'208";a="7889715" Received: from barumuga-mobl1.ger.corp.intel.com (HELO box.shutemov.name) ([10.252.50.119]) by smtpauth.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 30 Oct 2023 01:27:18 -0700 Received: by box.shutemov.name (Postfix, from userid 1000) id 888AE10A2B2; Mon, 30 Oct 2023 11:27:14 +0300 (+03) Date: Mon, 30 Oct 2023 11:27:14 +0300 From: kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com To: Rick Edgecombe Cc: x86@kernel.org, tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, hpa@zytor.com, luto@kernel.org, peterz@infradead.org, elena.reshetova@intel.com, isaku.yamahata@intel.com, seanjc@google.com, Michael Kelley , thomas.lendacky@amd.com, decui@microsoft.com, sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] x86/mm/cpa: Warn if set_memory_XXcrypted() fails Message-ID: <20231030082714.pbma2bg2p354cuft@box.shutemov.name> References: <20231027214744.1742056-1-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20231027214744.1742056-1-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Fri, Oct 27, 2023 at 02:47:44PM -0700, Rick Edgecombe wrote: > On TDX it is possible for the untrusted host to cause > set_memory_encrypted() or set_memory_decrypted() to fail such that an > error is returned and the resulting memory is shared. Callers need to take > care to handle these errors to avoid returning decrypted (shared) memory to > the page allocator, which could lead to functional or security issues. > In terms of security, the problematic case is guest PTEs mapping the > shared alias GFNs, since the VMM has control of the shared mapping in the > EPT/NPT. > > Such conversion errors may herald future system instability, but are > temporarily survivable with proper handling in the caller. The kernel > traditionally makes every effort to keep running, but it is expected that > some coco guests may prefer to play it safe security-wise, and panic in > this case. To accommodate both cases, warn when the arch breakouts for > converting memory at the VMM layer return an error to CPA. Security focused > users can rely on panic_on_warn to defend against bugs in the callers. Some > VMMs are not known to behave in the troublesome way, so users that would > like to terminate on any unusual behavior by the VMM around this will be > covered as well. > > Since the arch breakouts host the logic for handling coco implementation > specific errors, an error returned from them means that the set_memory() > call is out of options for handling the error internally. Make this the > condition to warn about. > > It is possible that very rarely these functions could fail due to guest > memory pressure (in the case of failing to allocate a huge page when > splitting a page table). Don't warn in this case because it is a lot less > likely to indicate an attack by the host and it is not clear which > set_memory() calls should get the same treatment. That corner should be > addressed by future work that considers the more general problem and not > just papers over a single set_memory() variant. > > Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky > Reviewed-by: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan > Suggested-by: Michael Kelley (LINUX) > Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe Tha patch looks good: Reviewed-by: Kirill A. Shutemov It intended to get upstream alongside with the caller fixes to leak memory on failure, right? Maybe get it into one patchset? -- Kiryl Shutsemau / Kirill A. Shutemov