From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 39B90C4167B for ; Tue, 5 Dec 2023 19:57:17 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S232245AbjLET5J (ORCPT ); Tue, 5 Dec 2023 14:57:09 -0500 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:49228 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S230162AbjLET5H (ORCPT ); Tue, 5 Dec 2023 14:57:07 -0500 Received: from mail.alien8.de (mail.alien8.de [IPv6:2a01:4f9:3051:3f93::2]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 75E74C9; Tue, 5 Dec 2023 11:57:13 -0800 (PST) Received: from localhost (localhost.localdomain [127.0.0.1]) by mail.alien8.de (SuperMail on ZX Spectrum 128k) with ESMTP id F08AF40E01AD; Tue, 5 Dec 2023 19:57:10 +0000 (UTC) X-Virus-Scanned: Debian amavisd-new at mail.alien8.de Authentication-Results: mail.alien8.de (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (4096-bit key) header.d=alien8.de Received: from mail.alien8.de ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (mail.alien8.de [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10026) with ESMTP id yUI_HMj3NT8T; Tue, 5 Dec 2023 19:57:09 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=alien8.de; s=alien8; t=1701806228; bh=0ed9OPSTfc1dN0NWcDDbS/2OlgMY/T1QuKWh5NkbUgg=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:References:In-Reply-To:From; b=OT/1DqtSzk7faj98jQBTLdFpMrsESxnG5QwmxeJTud1hoYYcnN2KAqMM9awCZaJP5 24Vui5SNtjuwlBCAm9ExcTolTnEmC3Fnd7gLOYWeVCKJzeaNYemx45zNUjCt7+C2ku W8wSEErOV8qSNAZQ0dAWnSSKbNpGARghUvPPs9xVgmk2ThN2ErXXYTFZqbC05yoltP 0+GWfryX/e7wDN9nFUPizJ64TbE2TBg54GP31fhxdrNkGLLBlWgyfuKofMG1npua9W aJmOrBRxHRApGIN0j+0d6Jdu0t5YhLRhy62iu6ERkIEbNKasC1xF5YNFqoKYL3T7em hwz5J3VKUGfGjuyeZQJ2hnK8KVGfWm0H7vRt6WMvd8Ufj2Nsruj9tinM1fKQbaYIvs 2dcREWAejYsXoVojQtOyK63jxRYUJvAhEjVGCLz+L7wZ3nCY6HyKg7OEcl8lRpc7Fe oHtmeubTzm9t6jYtkKpq1UxZrk3MmSsX0CjmbawlawH/oZAIWLF4AHU5T5Kxinkoev Z9EpHkdzincnuzF6+qYwKhbim9iHzaLtx3S9KlyZPQU1ppWCZwpURrZY9HJvftQbOI CqtWZ3SFmBYCrXHAqoSHy5pcmz0/jYc9c4MBk70PTqWj4VEgbmdsH/t0vlLmvc4OB0 Jb9xojiRyELUIvBIDmzxYWVE= Received: from zn.tnic (pd95304da.dip0.t-ipconnect.de [217.83.4.218]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange ECDHE (P-256) server-signature ECDSA (P-256) server-digest SHA256) (No client certificate requested) by mail.alien8.de (SuperMail on ZX Spectrum 128k) with ESMTPSA id 6BB7740E014B; Tue, 5 Dec 2023 19:56:42 +0000 (UTC) Date: Tue, 5 Dec 2023 20:56:37 +0100 From: Borislav Petkov To: "Huang, Kai" Cc: "kvm@vger.kernel.org" , "sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com" , "Hansen, Dave" , "david@redhat.com" , "bagasdotme@gmail.com" , "Luck, Tony" , "ak@linux.intel.com" , "kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com" , "seanjc@google.com" , "mingo@redhat.com" , "pbonzini@redhat.com" , "tglx@linutronix.de" , "Yamahata, Isaku" , "linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" , "nik.borisov@suse.com" , "hpa@zytor.com" , "peterz@infradead.org" , "sagis@google.com" , "imammedo@redhat.com" , "Gao, Chao" , "rafael@kernel.org" , "Brown, Len" , "Huang, Ying" , "Williams, Dan J" , "x86@kernel.org" Subject: Re: [PATCH v15 22/23] x86/mce: Improve error log of kernel space TDX #MC due to erratum Message-ID: <20231205195637.GHZW+Add3H/gSefAVM@fat_crate.local> References: <9e80873fac878aa5d697cbcd4d456d01e1009d1f.1699527082.git.kai.huang@intel.com> <20231205142517.GBZW8yzVDEKIVTthSx@fat_crate.local> <0db3de96d324710cef469040d88002db429c47e6.camel@intel.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <0db3de96d324710cef469040d88002db429c47e6.camel@intel.com> Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Tue, Dec 05, 2023 at 07:41:41PM +0000, Huang, Kai wrote: > -static const char *mce_memory_info(struct mce *m) > +static const char *mce_dump_aux_info(struct mce *m) > { > - if (!m || !mce_is_memory_error(m) || !mce_usable_address(m)) > - return NULL; > - > /* > - * Certain initial generations of TDX-capable CPUs have an > - * erratum. A kernel non-temporal partial write to TDX private > - * memory poisons that memory, and a subsequent read of that > - * memory triggers #MC. > - * > - * However such #MC caused by software cannot be distinguished > - * from the real hardware #MC. Just print additional message > - * to show such #MC may be result of the CPU erratum. > + * Confidential computing platforms such as TDX platforms > + * may occur MCE due to incorrect access to confidential > + * memory. Print additional information for such error. > */ > - if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_TDX_PW_MCE)) > + if (!m || !mce_is_memory_error(m) || !mce_usable_address(m)) > return NULL; What's the point of doing this on !TDX? None. > - return !tdx_is_private_mem(m->addr) ? NULL : > - "TDX private memory error. Possible kernel bug."; > + if (platform_tdx_enabled()) So is this the "host is TDX" check? Not a X86_FEATURE flag but something homegrown. And Kirill is trying to switch the CC_ATTRs to X86_FEATURE_ flags for SEV but here you guys are using something homegrown. why not a X86_FEATURE_ flag? The CC_ATTR things are for guests, I guess, but the host feature checks should be X86_FEATURE_ flags things. Hmmm. -- Regards/Gruss, Boris. https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette