From: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
To: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>,
Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>,
James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>,
Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>, Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, kvmarm@lists.linux.dev,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org,
Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH RFC v2 11/22] KVM: arm64: Make SMPRI_EL1 RES0 for SME guests
Date: Fri, 22 Dec 2023 16:21:19 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20231222-kvm-arm64-sme-v2-11-da226cb180bb@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20231222-kvm-arm64-sme-v2-0-da226cb180bb@kernel.org>
SME priorities are entirely implementation defined and Linux currently has
no support for SME priorities so we do not expose them to SME capable
guests, reporting SMIDR_EL1.SMPS as 0. This means that on a host which
supports SME priorities we need to trap writes to SMPRI_EL1 and make the
whole register RES0. For a guest that does not support SME at all the
register should instead be undefined.
If the host does not support SME priorities we could disable the trap but
since there is no reason to access SMPRI_EL1 on a system that does not
support priorities it seems more trouble than it is worth to detect and
handle this eventuality, especially given the lack of SME priority support
in the host and potential user confusion that may result if we report that
the feature is detected but do not provide any interface for it.
With the current specification and host implementation we could disable
read traps for all guests since we initialise SMPRI_EL1.Priority to 0
but for robustness when we do start implementing host support for
priorities or if more fields are added just leave the traps enabled.
Once we have physical implementations that implement SME priorities and an
understanding of how their use impacts the system we can consider exposing
the feature to guests in some form but this will require substantial study.
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
---
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/hyp/switch.h | 5 +++++
arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c | 14 +++++++++++++-
2 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/hyp/switch.h b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/hyp/switch.h
index 72982e752972..0cf4770b9d70 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/hyp/switch.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/hyp/switch.h
@@ -93,6 +93,11 @@ static inline void __activate_traps_hfgxtr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
ctxt_sys_reg(hctxt, HFGWTR_EL2) = read_sysreg_s(SYS_HFGWTR_EL2);
if (cpus_have_final_cap(ARM64_SME)) {
+ /*
+ * We hide priorities from guests so need to trap
+ * access to SMPRI_EL1 in order to map it to RES0
+ * even if the guest has SME.
+ */
tmp = HFGxTR_EL2_nSMPRI_EL1_MASK;
if (!vcpu_has_sme(vcpu))
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c
index a33ad12dc3ab..b618bcab526e 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c
@@ -351,6 +351,18 @@ static bool access_gic_sre(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
return true;
}
+static bool access_res0(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+ struct sys_reg_params *p,
+ const struct sys_reg_desc *r)
+{
+ if (p->is_write)
+ return ignore_write(vcpu, p);
+
+ p->regval = 0;
+
+ return true;
+}
+
static bool trap_raz_wi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
struct sys_reg_params *p,
const struct sys_reg_desc *r)
@@ -2224,7 +2236,7 @@ static const struct sys_reg_desc sys_reg_descs[] = {
{ SYS_DESC(SYS_ZCR_EL1), NULL, reset_val, ZCR_EL1, 0, .visibility = sve_visibility },
{ SYS_DESC(SYS_TRFCR_EL1), undef_access },
- { SYS_DESC(SYS_SMPRI_EL1), undef_access },
+ { SYS_DESC(SYS_SMPRI_EL1), .access = access_res0, .visibility = sme_visibility },
{ SYS_DESC(SYS_SMCR_EL1), NULL, reset_val, SMCR_EL1, 0, .visibility = sme_visibility },
{ SYS_DESC(SYS_TTBR0_EL1), access_vm_reg, reset_unknown, TTBR0_EL1 },
{ SYS_DESC(SYS_TTBR1_EL1), access_vm_reg, reset_unknown, TTBR1_EL1 },
--
2.30.2
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-12-22 16:22 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 23+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-12-22 16:21 [PATCH RFC v2 00/22] KVM: arm64: Implement support for SME in non-protected guests Mark Brown
2023-12-22 16:21 ` [PATCH RFC v2 01/22] KVM: arm64: Document why we trap SVE access from the host Mark Brown
2023-12-22 16:21 ` [PATCH RFC v2 02/22] arm64/fpsimd: Make SVE<->FPSIMD rewriting available to KVM Mark Brown
2023-12-22 16:21 ` [PATCH RFC v2 03/22] KVM: arm64: Move SVE state access macros after feature test macros Mark Brown
2023-12-22 16:21 ` [PATCH RFC v2 04/22] KVM: arm64: Store vector lengths in an array Mark Brown
2023-12-22 16:21 ` [PATCH RFC v2 05/22] KVM: arm64: Document the KVM ABI for SME Mark Brown
2023-12-22 16:21 ` [PATCH RFC v2 06/22] KVM: arm64: Make FFR restore optional in __sve_restore_state() Mark Brown
2023-12-22 16:21 ` [PATCH RFC v2 07/22] KVM: arm64: Define guest flags for SME Mark Brown
2023-12-22 16:21 ` [PATCH RFC v2 08/22] KVM: arm64: Rename SVE finalization constants to be more general Mark Brown
2023-12-22 16:21 ` [PATCH RFC v2 09/22] KVM: arm64: Basic SME system register descriptions Mark Brown
2023-12-22 16:21 ` [PATCH RFC v2 10/22] KVM: arm64: Add support for TPIDR2_EL0 Mark Brown
2023-12-22 16:21 ` Mark Brown [this message]
2023-12-22 16:21 ` [PATCH RFC v2 12/22] KVM: arm64: Make SVCR a normal system register Mark Brown
2023-12-22 16:21 ` [PATCH RFC v2 13/22] KVM: arm64: Context switch SME state for guest Mark Brown
2023-12-22 16:21 ` [PATCH RFC v2 14/22] KVM: arm64: Manage and handle SME traps Mark Brown
2023-12-22 16:21 ` [PATCH RFC v2 15/22] KVM: arm64: Implement SME vector length configuration Mark Brown
2023-12-22 16:21 ` [PATCH RFC v2 16/22] KVM: arm64: Rename sve_state_reg_region Mark Brown
2023-12-22 16:21 ` [PATCH RFC v2 17/22] KVM: arm64: Support userspace access to streaming mode SVE registers Mark Brown
2023-12-22 16:21 ` [PATCH RFC v2 18/22] KVM: arm64: Expose ZA to userspace Mark Brown
2023-12-22 16:21 ` [PATCH RFC v2 19/22] KVM: arm64: Provide userspace access to ZT0 Mark Brown
2023-12-22 16:21 ` [PATCH RFC v2 20/22] KVM: arm64: Support SME version configuration via ID registers Mark Brown
2023-12-22 16:21 ` [PATCH RFC v2 21/22] KVM: arm64: Provide userspace ABI for enabling SME Mark Brown
2023-12-22 16:21 ` [PATCH RFC v2 22/22] KVM: arm64: selftests: Add SME system registers to get-reg-list Mark Brown
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