From: "Petr Tesařík" <petr@tesarici.cz>
To: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Petr Tesarik <petrtesarik@huaweicloud.com>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
"maintainer:X86 ARCHITECTURE (32-BIT AND 64-BIT)"
<x86@kernel.org>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>, Xin Li <xin3.li@intel.com>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
"Masami Hiramatsu (Google)" <mhiramat@kernel.org>,
Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@intel.com>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>,
Ze Gao <zegao2021@gmail.com>,
"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>,
Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>,
David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>,
Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>, Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca>,
Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>,
"Mike Rapoport (IBM)" <rppt@kernel.org>,
Tina Zhang <tina.zhang@intel.com>,
Jacob Pan <jacob.jun.pan@linux.intel.com>,
"open list:DOCUMENTATION" <linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>,
open list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com>,
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
Petr Tesarik <petr.tesarik1@huawei-partners.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC 0/8] PGP key parser using SandBox Mode
Date: Fri, 16 Feb 2024 17:08:05 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240216170805.0d0decd5@meshulam.tesarici.cz> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <c65eb8f1-2903-4043-a3ab-945d880043b5@intel.com>
On Fri, 16 Feb 2024 07:38:30 -0800
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> wrote:
> On 2/16/24 07:24, Petr Tesarik wrote:
> > While I started working on my development branch to illustrate how
> > SandBox Mode could be enhanced to allow dynamic memory allocation and
> > other features necessary to convert some existing code, my colleague
> > Roberto Sassu set out and adapted a PGP key parser to run in a sandbox.
> >
> > Disclaimer:
> >
> > The code had to be rearranged in order to avoid memory allocations
> > and crypto operations in the sandbox. The code might contain errors.
>
> I'm confused by this. The kernel doesn't (appear to) have a PGP parser
> today. So are you saying that it *should* have one and it's only
> feasible if its confined in a sandbox?
I'm sorry if this is confusing. Yes, your understanding is correct.
This patch series demonstrates that SBM (even in the initial version
that was submitted) allows to write a PGP parser which can survive
memory safety bugs withoug compromising the rest of the kernel.
> A much more powerful example would be to take something that the kernel
> has already and put it in a sandbox. That would show us how difficult
> it is to sandbox something versus just doing it _normally_ in the kernel.
That's what I have also tested as a PoC with an earlier version of my
patch series and a few quick hacks on top. As it happens, that code
on top needs to be adapted for the current patch series, so I cannot
post it just yet. Please, stay tuned.
> As it stands, I fear this was just the largest chunk of sandbox code
> that was laying around and it seemed like a good idea to just chuck
> ~1400 lines of code over the wall at a huge cc list.
You asked for some real-world scenarios, and this should be one.
Another is on the way, but see above why it takes a bit of time.
I am not trying to claim I'm the smartest person on this planet. I can
accept it if there is a fundamental flaw in my approach. Yet, I'd be
glad if somebody can make me a favor and at least hint at what exactly
is the issue with it. I have to admit this thing is still not quite
clear to me. I would be sad if I couldn't learn from this experience.
Petr T
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-02-16 16:08 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 61+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-02-14 11:35 [PATCH v1 0/8] x86_64 SandBox Mode arch hooks Petr Tesarik
2024-02-14 11:35 ` [PATCH v1 1/8] sbm: x86: page table " Petr Tesarik
2024-02-14 11:35 ` [PATCH v1 2/8] sbm: x86: execute target function on sandbox mode stack Petr Tesarik
2024-02-14 11:35 ` [PATCH v1 3/8] sbm: x86: map system data structures into the sandbox Petr Tesarik
2024-02-14 11:35 ` [PATCH v1 4/8] sbm: x86: allocate and map an exception stack Petr Tesarik
2024-02-14 11:35 ` [PATCH v1 5/8] sbm: x86: handle sandbox mode faults Petr Tesarik
2024-02-14 11:35 ` [PATCH v1 6/8] sbm: x86: switch to sandbox mode pages in arch_sbm_exec() Petr Tesarik
2024-02-14 11:35 ` [PATCH v1 7/8] sbm: documentation of the x86-64 SandBox Mode implementation Petr Tesarik
2024-02-14 18:37 ` Xin Li
2024-02-14 19:16 ` Petr Tesařík
2024-02-14 11:35 ` [PATCH v1 8/8] sbm: x86: lazy TLB flushing Petr Tesarik
2024-02-14 14:52 ` [PATCH v1 0/8] x86_64 SandBox Mode arch hooks Dave Hansen
2024-02-14 15:28 ` H. Peter Anvin
2024-02-14 16:41 ` Petr Tesařík
2024-02-14 17:29 ` H. Peter Anvin
2024-02-14 19:14 ` Petr Tesařík
2024-02-14 18:14 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2024-02-14 18:32 ` Petr Tesařík
2024-02-14 19:19 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2024-02-14 19:35 ` Petr Tesařík
2024-02-14 18:22 ` Petr Tesařík
2024-02-14 18:42 ` Dave Hansen
2024-02-14 19:33 ` Petr Tesařík
2024-02-14 20:16 ` Dave Hansen
2024-02-16 15:24 ` [RFC 0/8] PGP key parser using SandBox Mode Petr Tesarik
2024-02-16 15:24 ` [RFC 1/8] mpi: Introduce mpi_key_length() Petr Tesarik
2024-02-16 15:24 ` [RFC 2/8] rsa: add parser of raw format Petr Tesarik
2024-02-16 15:24 ` [RFC 3/8] PGPLIB: PGP definitions (RFC 4880) Petr Tesarik
2024-02-16 15:24 ` [RFC 4/8] PGPLIB: Basic packet parser Petr Tesarik
2024-02-16 15:24 ` [RFC 5/8] PGPLIB: Signature parser Petr Tesarik
2024-02-16 15:24 ` [RFC 6/8] KEYS: PGP data parser Petr Tesarik
2024-02-16 16:44 ` Matthew Wilcox
2024-02-16 16:53 ` Roberto Sassu
2024-02-16 17:08 ` H. Peter Anvin
2024-02-16 17:13 ` Roberto Sassu
2024-02-20 10:55 ` Petr Tesarik
2024-02-21 14:02 ` H. Peter Anvin
2024-02-22 7:53 ` Petr Tesařík
2024-02-16 18:44 ` Matthew Wilcox
2024-02-16 19:54 ` Roberto Sassu
2024-02-28 17:58 ` Roberto Sassu
2024-02-16 15:24 ` [RFC 7/8] KEYS: Run PGP key parser in a sandbox Petr Tesarik
2024-02-16 15:24 ` [RFC 8/8] KEYS: Add intentional fault injection Petr Tesarik
2024-02-16 15:38 ` [RFC 0/8] PGP key parser using SandBox Mode Dave Hansen
2024-02-16 16:08 ` Petr Tesařík [this message]
2024-02-16 17:21 ` Jonathan Corbet
2024-02-16 18:24 ` Roberto Sassu
2024-02-22 13:12 ` [RFC 0/5] PoC: convert AppArmor parser to " Petr Tesarik
2024-02-22 13:12 ` [RFC 1/5] sbm: x86: fix SBM error entry path Petr Tesarik
2024-02-22 13:12 ` [RFC 2/5] sbm: enhance buffer mapping API Petr Tesarik
2024-02-22 13:12 ` [RFC 3/5] sbm: x86: infrastructure to fix up sandbox faults Petr Tesarik
2024-02-22 13:12 ` [RFC 4/5] sbm: fix up calls to dynamic memory allocators Petr Tesarik
2024-02-22 15:51 ` Dave Hansen
2024-02-22 17:57 ` Petr Tesařík
2024-02-22 18:03 ` Dave Hansen
2024-02-22 13:12 ` [RFC 5/5] apparmor: parse profiles in sandbox mode Petr Tesarik
2024-02-14 18:52 ` [PATCH v1 0/8] x86_64 SandBox Mode arch hooks Xin Li
2024-02-15 6:59 ` Petr Tesařík
2024-02-15 8:16 ` H. Peter Anvin
2024-02-15 9:30 ` Petr Tesařík
2024-02-15 9:37 ` Roberto Sassu
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