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From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com,pbonzini@redhat.com,tglx@linutronix.de,x86@kernel.org,bp@alien8.de,Dave
	Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Subject: [RFC][PATCH 11/34] x86/cpu/intel: Prepare MKTME for "address configuration" infrastructure
Date: Thu, 22 Feb 2024 10:39:41 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240222183941.7CB634A5@davehans-spike.ostc.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240222183926.517AFCD2@davehans-spike.ostc.intel.com>


From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>

Intel also does memory encryption and also fiddles with the physical
address bits.  This is currently called for *each* CPU, but practically
only done on the boot CPU because of 'mktme_status'.

Move it from the "each CPU" ->c_init() function to ->c_bsp_init() where
the whole thing only gets called once ever.  This also necessitates moving
detect_tme() and its entourage around in the file.

Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
---

 b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c |  174 +++++++++++++++++++++---------------------
 1 file changed, 87 insertions(+), 87 deletions(-)

diff -puN arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c~intel-move-TME-detection arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c~intel-move-TME-detection	2024-02-22 10:08:53.820663775 -0800
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c	2024-02-22 10:08:53.824663932 -0800
@@ -324,9 +324,96 @@ static void early_init_intel(struct cpui
 		detect_ht_early(c);
 }
 
+#define MSR_IA32_TME_ACTIVATE		0x982
+
+/* Helpers to access TME_ACTIVATE MSR */
+#define TME_ACTIVATE_LOCKED(x)		(x & 0x1)
+#define TME_ACTIVATE_ENABLED(x)		(x & 0x2)
+
+#define TME_ACTIVATE_POLICY(x)		((x >> 4) & 0xf)	/* Bits 7:4 */
+#define TME_ACTIVATE_POLICY_AES_XTS_128	0
+
+#define TME_ACTIVATE_KEYID_BITS(x)	((x >> 32) & 0xf)	/* Bits 35:32 */
+
+#define TME_ACTIVATE_CRYPTO_ALGS(x)	((x >> 48) & 0xffff)	/* Bits 63:48 */
+#define TME_ACTIVATE_CRYPTO_AES_XTS_128	1
+
+/* Values for mktme_status (SW only construct) */
+#define MKTME_ENABLED			0
+#define MKTME_DISABLED			1
+#define MKTME_UNINITIALIZED		2
+static int mktme_status = MKTME_UNINITIALIZED;
+
+static void detect_tme(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+	u64 tme_activate, tme_policy, tme_crypto_algs;
+	int keyid_bits = 0, nr_keyids = 0;
+	static u64 tme_activate_cpu0 = 0;
+
+	rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_TME_ACTIVATE, tme_activate);
+
+	if (mktme_status != MKTME_UNINITIALIZED) {
+		if (tme_activate != tme_activate_cpu0) {
+			/* Broken BIOS? */
+			pr_err_once("x86/tme: configuration is inconsistent between CPUs\n");
+			pr_err_once("x86/tme: MKTME is not usable\n");
+			mktme_status = MKTME_DISABLED;
+
+			/* Proceed. We may need to exclude bits from x86_phys_bits. */
+		}
+	} else {
+		tme_activate_cpu0 = tme_activate;
+	}
+
+	if (!TME_ACTIVATE_LOCKED(tme_activate) || !TME_ACTIVATE_ENABLED(tme_activate)) {
+		pr_info_once("x86/tme: not enabled by BIOS\n");
+		mktme_status = MKTME_DISABLED;
+		return;
+	}
+
+	if (mktme_status != MKTME_UNINITIALIZED)
+		goto detect_keyid_bits;
+
+	pr_info("x86/tme: enabled by BIOS\n");
+
+	tme_policy = TME_ACTIVATE_POLICY(tme_activate);
+	if (tme_policy != TME_ACTIVATE_POLICY_AES_XTS_128)
+		pr_warn("x86/tme: Unknown policy is active: %#llx\n", tme_policy);
+
+	tme_crypto_algs = TME_ACTIVATE_CRYPTO_ALGS(tme_activate);
+	if (!(tme_crypto_algs & TME_ACTIVATE_CRYPTO_AES_XTS_128)) {
+		pr_err("x86/mktme: No known encryption algorithm is supported: %#llx\n",
+				tme_crypto_algs);
+		mktme_status = MKTME_DISABLED;
+	}
+detect_keyid_bits:
+	keyid_bits = TME_ACTIVATE_KEYID_BITS(tme_activate);
+	nr_keyids = (1UL << keyid_bits) - 1;
+	if (nr_keyids) {
+		pr_info_once("x86/mktme: enabled by BIOS\n");
+		pr_info_once("x86/mktme: %d KeyIDs available\n", nr_keyids);
+	} else {
+		pr_info_once("x86/mktme: disabled by BIOS\n");
+	}
+
+	if (mktme_status == MKTME_UNINITIALIZED) {
+		/* MKTME is usable */
+		mktme_status = MKTME_ENABLED;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * KeyID bits effectively lower the number of physical address
+	 * bits.  Update cpuinfo_x86::x86_phys_bits accordingly.
+	 */
+	c->x86_phys_bits -= keyid_bits;
+}
+
 static void bsp_init_intel(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 {
 	resctrl_cpu_detect(c);
+
+	if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_TME))
+		detect_tme(c);
 }
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
@@ -482,90 +569,6 @@ static void srat_detect_node(struct cpui
 #endif
 }
 
-#define MSR_IA32_TME_ACTIVATE		0x982
-
-/* Helpers to access TME_ACTIVATE MSR */
-#define TME_ACTIVATE_LOCKED(x)		(x & 0x1)
-#define TME_ACTIVATE_ENABLED(x)		(x & 0x2)
-
-#define TME_ACTIVATE_POLICY(x)		((x >> 4) & 0xf)	/* Bits 7:4 */
-#define TME_ACTIVATE_POLICY_AES_XTS_128	0
-
-#define TME_ACTIVATE_KEYID_BITS(x)	((x >> 32) & 0xf)	/* Bits 35:32 */
-
-#define TME_ACTIVATE_CRYPTO_ALGS(x)	((x >> 48) & 0xffff)	/* Bits 63:48 */
-#define TME_ACTIVATE_CRYPTO_AES_XTS_128	1
-
-/* Values for mktme_status (SW only construct) */
-#define MKTME_ENABLED			0
-#define MKTME_DISABLED			1
-#define MKTME_UNINITIALIZED		2
-static int mktme_status = MKTME_UNINITIALIZED;
-
-static void detect_tme(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
-{
-	u64 tme_activate, tme_policy, tme_crypto_algs;
-	int keyid_bits = 0, nr_keyids = 0;
-	static u64 tme_activate_cpu0 = 0;
-
-	rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_TME_ACTIVATE, tme_activate);
-
-	if (mktme_status != MKTME_UNINITIALIZED) {
-		if (tme_activate != tme_activate_cpu0) {
-			/* Broken BIOS? */
-			pr_err_once("x86/tme: configuration is inconsistent between CPUs\n");
-			pr_err_once("x86/tme: MKTME is not usable\n");
-			mktme_status = MKTME_DISABLED;
-
-			/* Proceed. We may need to exclude bits from x86_phys_bits. */
-		}
-	} else {
-		tme_activate_cpu0 = tme_activate;
-	}
-
-	if (!TME_ACTIVATE_LOCKED(tme_activate) || !TME_ACTIVATE_ENABLED(tme_activate)) {
-		pr_info_once("x86/tme: not enabled by BIOS\n");
-		mktme_status = MKTME_DISABLED;
-		return;
-	}
-
-	if (mktme_status != MKTME_UNINITIALIZED)
-		goto detect_keyid_bits;
-
-	pr_info("x86/tme: enabled by BIOS\n");
-
-	tme_policy = TME_ACTIVATE_POLICY(tme_activate);
-	if (tme_policy != TME_ACTIVATE_POLICY_AES_XTS_128)
-		pr_warn("x86/tme: Unknown policy is active: %#llx\n", tme_policy);
-
-	tme_crypto_algs = TME_ACTIVATE_CRYPTO_ALGS(tme_activate);
-	if (!(tme_crypto_algs & TME_ACTIVATE_CRYPTO_AES_XTS_128)) {
-		pr_err("x86/mktme: No known encryption algorithm is supported: %#llx\n",
-				tme_crypto_algs);
-		mktme_status = MKTME_DISABLED;
-	}
-detect_keyid_bits:
-	keyid_bits = TME_ACTIVATE_KEYID_BITS(tme_activate);
-	nr_keyids = (1UL << keyid_bits) - 1;
-	if (nr_keyids) {
-		pr_info_once("x86/mktme: enabled by BIOS\n");
-		pr_info_once("x86/mktme: %d KeyIDs available\n", nr_keyids);
-	} else {
-		pr_info_once("x86/mktme: disabled by BIOS\n");
-	}
-
-	if (mktme_status == MKTME_UNINITIALIZED) {
-		/* MKTME is usable */
-		mktme_status = MKTME_ENABLED;
-	}
-
-	/*
-	 * KeyID bits effectively lower the number of physical address
-	 * bits.  Update cpuinfo_x86::x86_phys_bits accordingly.
-	 */
-	c->x86_phys_bits -= keyid_bits;
-}
-
 static void init_cpuid_fault(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 {
 	u64 msr;
@@ -702,9 +705,6 @@ static void init_intel(struct cpuinfo_x8
 
 	init_ia32_feat_ctl(c);
 
-	if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_TME))
-		detect_tme(c);
-
 	init_intel_misc_features(c);
 
 	split_lock_init();
_

  parent reply	other threads:[~2024-02-22 18:39 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 54+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-02-22 18:39 [RFC][PATCH 00/34] [RFC] x86: Rework system-wide configuration masquerading as per-cpu data Dave Hansen
2024-02-22 18:39 ` [RFC][PATCH 01/34] x86/xen: Explain why calling get_cpu_cap() so early is a hack Dave Hansen
2024-03-07 16:27   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-02-22 18:39 ` [RFC][PATCH 02/34] x86/xen: Remove early "debug" physical address lookups Dave Hansen
2024-03-07 17:01   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-03-11 13:16   ` Jürgen Groß
2024-02-22 18:39 ` [RFC][PATCH 03/34] x86/pci: Assume that clflush size is always provided Dave Hansen
2024-03-08  8:57   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-02-22 18:39 ` [RFC][PATCH 04/34] x86/mm: Introduce physical address limit helper Dave Hansen
2024-02-27 11:05   ` Huang, Kai
2024-02-22 18:39 ` [RFC][PATCH 05/34] x86/cpu: Move /proc per-cpu ->x86_phys_bits reference to global one Dave Hansen
2024-02-27 11:05   ` Huang, Kai
2024-02-22 18:39 ` [RFC][PATCH 06/34] x86/boot: Use consistent value for iomem_resource.end Dave Hansen
2024-02-27 10:59   ` Huang, Kai
2024-02-28 14:22     ` Zhang, Rui
2024-02-22 18:39 ` [RFC][PATCH 07/34] x86/mm: Introduce virtual address space limit helper Dave Hansen
2024-02-27 11:09   ` Huang, Kai
2024-02-22 18:39 ` [RFC][PATCH 08/34] x86/cpu: Add CLFLUSH size helper Dave Hansen
2024-02-22 18:39 ` [RFC][PATCH 09/34] x86/cpu: Introduce address configuration structure Dave Hansen
2024-02-27 23:47   ` Huang, Kai
2024-02-28 17:29     ` Dave Hansen
2024-02-22 18:39 ` [RFC][PATCH 10/34] x86/cpu/amd: Use new "address configuration" infrastructure Dave Hansen
2024-02-22 18:39 ` Dave Hansen [this message]
2024-02-23 11:33   ` [RFC][PATCH 11/34] x86/cpu/intel: Prepare MKTME for " Kirill A. Shutemov
2024-02-23 16:22     ` Dave Hansen
2024-02-26 12:14       ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2024-02-27 21:48         ` Huang, Kai
2024-02-28 15:20           ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2024-02-28 16:57             ` Dave Hansen
2024-02-22 18:39 ` [RFC][PATCH 12/34] x86/cpu/intel: Actually use "address configuration" infrastructure for MKTME Dave Hansen
2024-02-23 11:41   ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2024-02-23 16:16     ` Dave Hansen
2024-02-22 18:39 ` [RFC][PATCH 13/34] x86/boot: Use address reduction config to handle erratum Dave Hansen
2024-02-22 18:39 ` [RFC][PATCH 14/34] x86/cpu: Remove default physical address space settings Dave Hansen
2024-02-22 18:39 ` [RFC][PATCH 15/34] x86/cpu: Remove default x86_phys_bits assignment Dave Hansen
2024-02-22 18:39 ` [RFC][PATCH 16/34] x86/cpu: Move physical address limit out of cpuinfo_x86 Dave Hansen
2024-02-22 18:39 ` [RFC][PATCH 17/34] x86/cpu: Move virtual " Dave Hansen
2024-02-22 18:39 ` [RFC][PATCH 18/34] x86/cpu/centaur: Move cache alignment override to BSP init Dave Hansen
2024-02-22 18:39 ` [RFC][PATCH 19/34] x86/cpu: Introduce cache alignment multiplier Dave Hansen
2024-02-22 18:39 ` [RFC][PATCH 20/34] x86/cpu: Remove superfluous cache alignment assignments Dave Hansen
2024-02-22 18:39 ` [RFC][PATCH 21/34] x86/cpu: Consolidate CLFLUSH size setting Dave Hansen
2024-02-22 18:39 ` [RFC][PATCH 22/34] x86/cpu: Move CLFLUSH size into global config Dave Hansen
2024-02-22 18:39 ` [RFC][PATCH 23/34] x86/cpu: Move cache alignment configuration to global struct Dave Hansen
2024-02-22 18:39 ` [RFC][PATCH 24/34] x86/cpu: Establish 'min_cache_bits' configuration Dave Hansen
2024-02-22 18:39 ` [RFC][PATCH 25/34] x86/cpu: Move cache bits to global config Dave Hansen
2024-02-22 18:40 ` [RFC][PATCH 26/34] x86/cpu: Zap superfluous get_cpu_address_sizes() Dave Hansen
2024-02-22 18:40 ` [RFC][PATCH 27/34] x86/cpu: Enforce read-only x86_config state (lightly) Dave Hansen
2024-02-22 18:40 ` [RFC][PATCH 28/34] x86/cpu: Return sane defaults for early x86_config reads Dave Hansen
2024-02-22 18:40 ` [RFC][PATCH 29/34] x86/xen: Remove extra get_cpu_address_sizes() call Dave Hansen
2024-02-22 18:40 ` [RFC][PATCH 30/34] x86/cpu/centaur: Mark BSP init function as __init Dave Hansen
2024-02-22 18:40 ` [RFC][PATCH 31/34] x86/cpu/intel: " Dave Hansen
2024-02-22 18:40 ` [RFC][PATCH 32/34] x86/cpu/amd: Move memory encryption detection Dave Hansen
2024-02-22 18:40 ` [RFC][PATCH 33/34] x86/cpu: Make get_cpu_address_sizes() static and __init Dave Hansen
2024-02-22 18:40 ` [RFC][PATCH 34/34] x86/cpu: Mark new boot CPU and config structures appropriately Dave Hansen

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