From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 0FECD168B09 for ; Thu, 18 Apr 2024 14:52:21 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1713451942; cv=none; b=uX3vQ2GDdzV/kSjceZN9uqJzgachP5kkO43lrcmnTSJvKCxtcWaKTYowM22lm2xXJxyA9aHiocFlE5y56i7Fl9F+XcgvOK0NAon5u3X1w2Bau2DNrm0pEsWedFYOfeFa/PEzlrSIF7dE0YRSEXHhpNfFRWoXsPA7FCjW2oAdFdc= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1713451942; c=relaxed/simple; bh=A+cUEwAlZpCbvMQdXF4AdOevwufNJf8HRmR93gA0KxQ=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:Message-ID:References:MIME-Version: Content-Type:Content-Disposition:In-Reply-To; b=Le63eyLmAcpxInMXEgIAMqSLXB8nE0SChRp3EZvSwb9PPP9gpWj3eOUGmfnVtzWGXGl8Dw80Ft/49xe0umeGhtlAzFIcA/LaAbs8EIFp0RxXnzxtVZThD6UQ6hkK9igKVaHmy3fC5d/JuguHmulVpIkHndEV63lEPYBmr6lQl9s= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b=GixqRVaZ; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b="GixqRVaZ" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 45922C113CC; Thu, 18 Apr 2024 14:52:21 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1713451941; bh=A+cUEwAlZpCbvMQdXF4AdOevwufNJf8HRmR93gA0KxQ=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:References:In-Reply-To:From; b=GixqRVaZNPP9D6+J7QM0kWsxFqs7gG74IrQMaeNaEZtn2jaq8VWK8Vp4e9TkZYyF5 cTxT8CxllNeW7vOsCevsG4TQpARDKYNi/PBKwFBKxmqMX7297yJ43LBj+WZFvIU03z gGiBGwxZbhau3FvswHy3eqXW4N3DufJcn4zKmqH8= Date: Thu, 18 Apr 2024 16:52:18 +0200 From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: Jean Delvare Cc: cve@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: CVE-2024-26827: i2c: qcom-geni: Correct I2C TRE sequence Message-ID: <2024041858-frostily-sedation-600a@gregkh> References: <2024041703-CVE-2024-26827-67c1@gregkh> <2024041842-handrail-distaste-259b@gregkh> <9e15807be09695bbc35070b558e387237a00c988.camel@suse.de> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <9e15807be09695bbc35070b558e387237a00c988.camel@suse.de> On Thu, Apr 18, 2024 at 04:44:33PM +0200, Jean Delvare wrote: > On Thu, 2024-04-18 at 15:05 +0200, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote: > > On Thu, Apr 18, 2024 at 02:56:33PM +0200, Jean Delvare wrote: > > > Hi Greg, > > > > > > On Wed, 2024-04-17 at 11:44 +0200, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote: > > > > Description > > > > =========== > > > > > > > > In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: > > > > > > > > i2c: qcom-geni: Correct I2C TRE sequence > > > > > > > > For i2c read operation in GSI mode, we are getting timeout > > > > due to malformed TRE basically incorrect TRE sequence > > > > in gpi(drivers/dma/qcom/gpi.c) driver. > > > > (...) > > > > > > I was assigned the task to backport this security fix to the SUSE > > > kernels. However, from the description, I fail to see how this fix > > > qualifies as a security fix. I can't find the reason why a CVE was > > > assigned to the issue. > > > > > > What is the considered attack vector? Or if there is no attack vector, > > > what consequence does this bug have, which would put the system > > > security at stake? > > > > We reviewed this commit as fitting the fact that timeouts due to > > malformed messages would fit into the definition of "vulnerability" in > > the CVE world as it would cause a system to incure "negative impact to > > confidentiality, integrity, or availability". > > If the timeout could be triggered on purpose, then I would agree, as > this could possibly be used for a denial-of-service type of attack. But > this isn't the case here. > > All we have is a failure to read data from a random I2C device due to > an incorrect programming of the I2C controller. Simple lack of > functionality. Thanks for the explaination and looking into it. > > If as the i2c maintainer, you don't think this would be the case, we > > will be glad to revoke this CVE and just mark it down as a "normal > > bugfix". > > Yes, please. Now rejected, thanks for letting us know. greg k-h