From: "Bojun Zhu" <zhubojun.zbj@antgroup.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org,
jarkko@kernel.org, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com
Cc: reinette.chatre@intel.com, "刘双(轩屹)" <ls123674@antgroup.com>,
"Bojun Zhu" <zhubojun.zbj@antgroup.com>
Subject: [RFC PATCH v3 1/1] x86/sgx: Explicitly give up the CPU in EDMM's ioctl() to avoid softlockup
Date: Wed, 15 May 2024 14:55:21 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240515065521.67908-2-zhubojun.zbj@antgroup.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240515065521.67908-1-zhubojun.zbj@antgroup.com>
EDMM's ioctl()s support batch operations, which may be
time-consuming. Try to explicitly give up the CPU as the prefix
operation at the every begin of "for loop" in
sgx_enclave_{ modify_types | restrict_permissions | remove_pages}
to give other tasks a chance to run, and avoid softlockup warning.
Additionally perform pending signals check as the prefix operation,
and introduce sgx_check_signal_and_resched(),
which wraps all the checks.
The following has been observed on Linux v6.9-rc5 with kernel
preemptions disabled(by configuring "PREEMPT_NONE=y"), when kernel
is requested to restrict page permissions of a large number of EPC pages.
------------[ cut here ]------------
watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#45 stuck for 22s!
...
RIP: 0010:sgx_enclave_restrict_permissions+0xba/0x1f0
...
Call Trace:
sgx_ioctl
__x64_sys_ioctl
x64_sys_call
do_syscall_64
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe
------------[ end trace ]------------
Signed-off-by: Bojun Zhu <zhubojun.zbj@antgroup.com>
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c | 40 +++++++++++++++++++++++----------
1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c
index b65ab214bdf5..6199f483143e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c
@@ -365,6 +365,20 @@ static int sgx_validate_offset_length(struct sgx_encl *encl,
return 0;
}
+/*
+ * Check signals and invoke scheduler. Return true for a pending signal.
+ */
+static bool sgx_check_signal_and_resched(void)
+{
+ if (signal_pending(current))
+ return true;
+
+ if (need_resched())
+ cond_resched();
+
+ return false;
+}
+
/**
* sgx_ioc_enclave_add_pages() - The handler for %SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES
* @encl: an enclave pointer
@@ -409,7 +423,7 @@ static long sgx_ioc_enclave_add_pages(struct sgx_encl *encl, void __user *arg)
struct sgx_enclave_add_pages add_arg;
struct sgx_secinfo secinfo;
unsigned long c;
- int ret;
+ int ret = -ERESTARTSYS;
if (!test_bit(SGX_ENCL_CREATED, &encl->flags) ||
test_bit(SGX_ENCL_INITIALIZED, &encl->flags))
@@ -432,15 +446,8 @@ static long sgx_ioc_enclave_add_pages(struct sgx_encl *encl, void __user *arg)
return -EINVAL;
for (c = 0 ; c < add_arg.length; c += PAGE_SIZE) {
- if (signal_pending(current)) {
- if (!c)
- ret = -ERESTARTSYS;
-
+ if (sgx_check_signal_and_resched())
break;
- }
-
- if (need_resched())
- cond_resched();
ret = sgx_encl_add_page(encl, add_arg.src + c, add_arg.offset + c,
&secinfo, add_arg.flags);
@@ -740,12 +747,15 @@ sgx_enclave_restrict_permissions(struct sgx_encl *encl,
unsigned long addr;
unsigned long c;
void *epc_virt;
- int ret;
+ int ret = -ERESTARTSYS;
memset(&secinfo, 0, sizeof(secinfo));
secinfo.flags = modp->permissions & SGX_SECINFO_PERMISSION_MASK;
for (c = 0 ; c < modp->length; c += PAGE_SIZE) {
+ if (sgx_check_signal_and_resched())
+ goto out;
+
addr = encl->base + modp->offset + c;
sgx_reclaim_direct();
@@ -898,7 +908,7 @@ static long sgx_enclave_modify_types(struct sgx_encl *encl,
unsigned long addr;
unsigned long c;
void *epc_virt;
- int ret;
+ int ret = -ERESTARTSYS;
page_type = modt->page_type & SGX_PAGE_TYPE_MASK;
@@ -913,6 +923,9 @@ static long sgx_enclave_modify_types(struct sgx_encl *encl,
secinfo.flags = page_type << 8;
for (c = 0 ; c < modt->length; c += PAGE_SIZE) {
+ if (sgx_check_signal_and_resched())
+ goto out;
+
addr = encl->base + modt->offset + c;
sgx_reclaim_direct();
@@ -1095,12 +1108,15 @@ static long sgx_encl_remove_pages(struct sgx_encl *encl,
unsigned long addr;
unsigned long c;
void *epc_virt;
- int ret;
+ int ret = -ERESTARTSYS;
memset(&secinfo, 0, sizeof(secinfo));
secinfo.flags = SGX_SECINFO_R | SGX_SECINFO_W | SGX_SECINFO_X;
for (c = 0 ; c < params->length; c += PAGE_SIZE) {
+ if (sgx_check_signal_and_resched())
+ goto out;
+
addr = encl->base + params->offset + c;
sgx_reclaim_direct();
--
2.25.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-05-15 7:28 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-05-15 6:55 [RFC PATCH v3 0/1] " Bojun Zhu
2024-05-15 6:55 ` Bojun Zhu [this message]
2024-05-15 12:06 ` [RFC PATCH v3 1/1] " Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-05-15 21:55 ` Haitao Huang
2024-05-15 22:29 ` Haitao Huang
2024-05-16 8:26 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-05-16 8:24 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
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