From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 1D6051AD4BF; Tue, 18 Jun 2024 13:20:46 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1718716846; cv=none; b=BBCCOEktjwXKM043JB8REIzknqVnMLqmLfrmhMOdth6hPmyHRVX0h5mrs/Jv9UCtN58ecItwMrayoMp00e+ZwKuc99/X1DXIKOpdx5SyD9eTdrpg8zcPc6xT/bdToc/46vVds+P5lAyXWYo6KOEJDRxDUV+ByqP39jqDrSf+j4w= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1718716846; c=relaxed/simple; bh=Qp7CM6iG5kz1apRwYVuMOrXU7YUSRpdnOK+KIpu+IfM=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:Message-ID:References:MIME-Version: Content-Type:Content-Disposition:In-Reply-To; b=DfHkpEFZ2DoNXpGcUlnbeRIqWkHBaRGa52LnB6X0iHaD5A63yG3uJ+gfAdeKS8bTd0ZKq4/pFlzqaIG9Jiv5jGqLQd+fC8Bi2SufhhoFVjuPn2MMQIavcsy8CPs1bxZ822RWvVJYVWOsFbLLXNT0OaX5wKlLcP1nwnu2Sg8Mysc= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b=pWXtEdL+; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b="pWXtEdL+" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 9E428C4AF1D; Tue, 18 Jun 2024 13:20:45 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1718716846; bh=Qp7CM6iG5kz1apRwYVuMOrXU7YUSRpdnOK+KIpu+IfM=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:References:In-Reply-To:From; b=pWXtEdL+ROtNJD/V6HrgwGTvypKlp5/8Z9Ww4dubowcTM1sOxGEJI8mwcqarzIno8 1SFtTuAO2HBgsRHbtN7sAl49xiFTT+HvSTrJZ1ehK+jflnhcUot9f4NPykjLwrzSxr I37DKzh71NN0P8l8y+0uLtUuXGdRTHGJ3d6YVLTg= Date: Tue, 18 Jun 2024 15:09:28 +0200 From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: Kees Cook Cc: Gabriel Krisman Bertazi , linux-cve-announce@vger.kernel.org, cve@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: CVE-2023-52685: pstore: ram_core: fix possible overflow in persistent_ram_init_ecc() Message-ID: <2024061823-employer-stylist-2505@gregkh> References: <2024051752-CVE-2023-52685-64c5@gregkh> <87jzjeojwp.fsf@mailhost.krisman.be> <2024052811-cornfield-monday-8bb9@gregkh> <202406171413.DE595AF@keescook> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <202406171413.DE595AF@keescook> On Mon, Jun 17, 2024 at 02:17:49PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote: > On Tue, May 28, 2024 at 09:01:13PM +0200, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote: > > On Mon, May 27, 2024 at 08:32:54PM -0400, Gabriel Krisman Bertazi wrote: > > > Greg Kroah-Hartman writes: > > > > > > > Description > > > > =========== > > > > > > > > In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: > > > > > > > > pstore: ram_core: fix possible overflow in persistent_ram_init_ecc() > > > > > > > > In persistent_ram_init_ecc(), on 64-bit arches DIV_ROUND_UP() will return > > > > 64-bit value since persistent_ram_zone::buffer_size has type size_t which > > > > is derived from the 64-bit *unsigned long*, while the ecc_blocks variable > > > > this value gets assigned to has (always 32-bit) *int* type. Even if that > > > > value fits into *int* type, an overflow is still possible when calculating > > > > the size_t typed ecc_total variable further below since there's no cast to > > > > any 64-bit type before multiplication. Declaring the ecc_blocks variable > > > > as *size_t* should fix this mess... > > > > > > > > Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with the SVACE static > > > > analysis tool. > > > > > > Hi Greg, > > > > > > [Cc'ing Kees, who is listed as the pstore maintainer] > > > > > > I want to dispute this CVE. The overflow is in the module > > > initialization path, and can only happen at boot time or if the module > > > is loaded with specific parameters or due to specific acpi/device tree > > > data. Either way, it would require root privileges to trigger. > > > > Normally root privileges isn't the issue, as many containers allow root > > to do things (including loading modules, crazy systems...) > > > > Anyway, I'll defer to Kees as to if this should be revoked or not. > > It's a module parameter or device tree value that is at most INT_MAX or > UINT_MAX respectively. Also, it is bounds checked against the buffer > itself: > if (ecc_total >= prz->buffer_size) { > > So even if it wrapped around and got "too small", there's no damage to > be had here. > > The worst case is that the ramoops info goes missing because pstore > refuses to do anything with the bad value, but pstore can be disabled > way more easily than that, by design. > > So, no, I don't think this is CVE worthy. I took the patch because it's > reasonable to try to get the math right and provide better error > reporting. Now rejected, thanks. greg k-h