From: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.cz>
To: cve@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-cve-announce@vger.kernel.org,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Subject: Re: CVE-2024-41067: btrfs: scrub: handle RST lookup error correctly
Date: Mon, 29 Jul 2024 22:55:03 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240729205503.GT17473@twin.jikos.cz> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <2024072907-CVE-2024-41067-bc18@gregkh>
On Mon, Jul 29, 2024 at 04:58:13PM +0200, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> Description
> ===========
>
> In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
>
> btrfs: scrub: handle RST lookup error correctly
>
> [BUG]
> When running btrfs/060 with forced RST feature, it would crash the
> following ASSERT() inside scrub_read_endio():
>
> ASSERT(sector_nr < stripe->nr_sectors);
>
> Before that, we would have tree dump from
> btrfs_get_raid_extent_offset(), as we failed to find the RST entry for
> the range.
>
> [CAUSE]
> Inside scrub_submit_extent_sector_read() every time we allocated a new
> bbio we immediately called btrfs_map_block() to make sure there was some
> RST range covering the scrub target.
>
> But if btrfs_map_block() fails, we immediately call endio for the bbio,
> while the bbio is newly allocated, it's completely empty.
>
> Then inside scrub_read_endio(), we go through the bvecs to find
> the sector number (as bi_sector is no longer reliable if the bio is
> submitted to lower layers).
>
> And since the bio is empty, such bvecs iteration would not find any
> sector matching the sector, and return sector_nr == stripe->nr_sectors,
> triggering the ASSERT().
>
> [FIX]
> Instead of calling btrfs_map_block() after allocating a new bbio, call
> btrfs_map_block() first.
>
> Since our only objective of calling btrfs_map_block() is only to update
> stripe_len, there is really no need to do that after btrfs_alloc_bio().
>
> This new timing would avoid the problem of handling empty bbio
> completely, and in fact fixes a possible race window for the old code,
> where if the submission thread is the only owner of the pending_io, the
> scrub would never finish (since we didn't decrease the pending_io
> counter).
>
> Although the root cause of RST lookup failure still needs to be
> addressed.
>
> The Linux kernel CVE team has assigned CVE-2024-41067 to this issue.
Please drop the CVE. It's a fix for feature that's still in development
and is not enabled on production kernels (requires CONFIG_BTRFS_DEBUG).
There was even a recent on-disk format change (mkfs required), this is
not really for environments where security matters. Thanks.
next parent reply other threads:[~2024-07-29 20:55 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <2024072907-CVE-2024-41067-bc18@gregkh>
2024-07-29 20:55 ` David Sterba [this message]
2024-07-30 4:53 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2024-07-31 14:34 ` David Sterba
2024-07-31 14:49 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
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