From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
To: torvalds@linux-foundation.org
Cc: x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Subject: [GIT PULL] x86/tdx for 6.13-rc1
Date: Tue, 19 Nov 2024 17:32:43 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20241120013243.831531-1-dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> (raw)
Hi Linus,
Please pull some x86/tdx changes for 6.13-rc1. These essentially
refine some interactions between TDX guests and VMMs.
The first leverages a new TDX module feature to runtime disable the
ability for a VM to inject #VE exceptions. Before this feature, there
was only a static on/off switch and the guest had to panic if it was
configured in a bad state.
The second lets the guest opt in to be able to access the topology
CPUID leaves. Before this, accesses to those leaves would #VE.
For both of these, it would have been nicest to just change the
default behavior, but some pesky "other" OSes evidently need to retain
the legacy behavior.
--
The following changes since commit 59b723cd2adbac2a34fc8e12c74ae26ae45bf230:
Linux 6.12-rc6 (2024-11-03 14:05:52 -1000)
are available in the Git repository at:
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip.git tags/x86_tdx_for_6.13-rc1
for you to fetch changes up to 7ae15e2f69bad06527668b478dff7c099ad2e6ae:
x86/tdx: Enable CPU topology enumeration (2024-11-07 10:27:45 -0800)
----------------------------------------------------------------
- Add new infrastructure for reading TDX metadata
- Use the newly-available metadata to:
- Disable potentially nasty #VE exceptions
- Get more complete CPU topology information from the VMM
----------------------------------------------------------------
Kirill A. Shutemov (4):
x86/tdx: Introduce wrappers to read and write TD metadata
x86/tdx: Rename tdx_parse_tdinfo() to tdx_setup()
x86/tdx: Dynamically disable SEPT violations from causing #VEs
x86/tdx: Enable CPU topology enumeration
arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c | 138 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
arch/x86/include/asm/shared/tdx.h | 13 +++-
2 files changed, 128 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
next reply other threads:[~2024-11-20 1:32 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-11-20 1:32 Dave Hansen [this message]
2024-11-22 22:32 ` pr-tracker-bot
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20241120013243.831531-1-dave.hansen@linux.intel.com \
--to=dave.hansen@linux.intel.com \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=torvalds@linux-foundation.org \
--cc=x86@kernel.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox
all inboxes | Powered by JetHome®