From: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
To: Borislav Petkov <bp@kernel.org>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>, X86 ML <x86@kernel.org>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>,
KVM <kvm@vger.kernel.org>, LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
"Borislav Petkov (AMD)" <bp@alien8.de>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 1/4] x86/bugs: Add SRSO_USER_KERNEL_NO support
Date: Mon, 9 Dec 2024 22:53:31 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20241210065331.ojnespi77no7kfqf@jpoimboe> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20241202120416.6054-2-bp@kernel.org>
On Mon, Dec 02, 2024 at 01:04:13PM +0100, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
> @@ -2615,6 +2615,11 @@ static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void)
> break;
>
> case SRSO_CMD_SAFE_RET:
> + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SRSO_USER_KERNEL_NO)) {
> + pr_notice("CPU user/kernel transitions protected, falling back to IBPB-on-VMEXIT\n");
> + goto ibpb_on_vmexit;
The presence of SRSO_USER_KERNEL_NO should indeed change the default,
but if the user requests "safe_ret" specifically, shouldn't we give it
to them? That would be more consistent with how we handle requested
mitigations.
Also it doesn't really make sense to add a printk here as the mitigation
will be printed at the end of the function.
--
Josh
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-12-10 6:53 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 68+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-12-02 12:04 [PATCH v2 0/4] x86/bugs: Adjust SRSO mitigation to new features Borislav Petkov
2024-12-02 12:04 ` [PATCH v2 1/4] x86/bugs: Add SRSO_USER_KERNEL_NO support Borislav Petkov
2024-12-10 6:53 ` Josh Poimboeuf [this message]
2024-12-10 15:37 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-12-11 7:53 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2024-12-11 20:38 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-12-11 22:35 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-12-16 17:21 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-12-30 17:02 ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for Borislav Petkov (AMD)
2024-12-02 12:04 ` [PATCH v2 2/4] KVM: x86: Advertise SRSO_USER_KERNEL_NO to userspace Borislav Petkov
2024-12-30 17:02 ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for Borislav Petkov (AMD)
2024-12-02 12:04 ` [PATCH v2 3/4] x86/bugs: KVM: Add support for SRSO_MSR_FIX Borislav Petkov
2024-12-11 22:27 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-12-16 17:31 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-12-16 18:51 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-12-17 9:34 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-12-30 11:14 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-08 13:38 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-01-08 15:49 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-08 17:18 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-01-08 18:14 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-08 18:37 ` Jim Mattson
2025-01-08 19:14 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-08 19:43 ` Jim Mattson
2025-01-08 19:45 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-11 12:52 ` [PATCH] " Borislav Petkov
2025-01-17 18:56 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-01-18 15:26 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-23 16:25 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-01-23 17:01 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-23 18:04 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-01-24 12:58 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-02-11 19:19 ` Jim Mattson
2025-02-11 20:51 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-02-13 10:53 ` Patrick Bellasi
2025-02-13 13:44 ` Patrick Bellasi
2025-02-13 14:28 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-02-13 17:50 ` Patrick Bellasi
2025-02-14 20:10 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-02-15 0:57 ` Yosry Ahmed
2025-02-15 9:15 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-02-17 5:47 ` Yosry Ahmed
2025-02-17 15:26 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-02-15 12:53 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-02-17 5:59 ` Yosry Ahmed
2025-02-17 16:07 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-02-17 19:56 ` Yosry Ahmed
2025-02-17 20:20 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-02-17 20:32 ` Yosry Ahmed
2025-02-18 11:13 ` [PATCH final?] " Borislav Petkov
2025-02-18 14:42 ` Patrick Bellasi
2025-02-18 15:34 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-04-29 13:25 ` x86/bugs: KVM: Add support for SRSO_MSR_FIX, back for moar Borislav Petkov
2025-04-30 23:33 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-05-01 0:42 ` Michael Larabel
2025-05-01 8:19 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-05-01 16:56 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-05-05 15:25 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-05-05 15:40 ` Kaplan, David
2025-05-05 15:47 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-05-05 16:30 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-05-05 16:42 ` Kaplan, David
2025-05-05 18:03 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-05-05 18:25 ` Kaplan, David
2024-12-02 12:04 ` [PATCH v2 4/4] Documentation/kernel-parameters: Fix a typo in kvm.enable_virt_at_load text Borislav Petkov
2024-12-30 17:21 ` [tip: x86/cleanups] " tip-bot2 for Borislav Petkov (AMD)
2024-12-03 14:30 ` [PATCH v2 0/4] x86/bugs: Adjust SRSO mitigation to new features Nikolay Borisov
2025-02-26 14:32 ` [tip: x86/bugs] x86/bugs: KVM: Add support for SRSO_MSR_FIX tip-bot2 for Borislav Petkov
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20241210065331.ojnespi77no7kfqf@jpoimboe \
--to=jpoimboe@redhat.com \
--cc=bp@alien8.de \
--cc=bp@kernel.org \
--cc=kvm@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com \
--cc=pbonzini@redhat.com \
--cc=seanjc@google.com \
--cc=x86@kernel.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox
all inboxes | Powered by JetHome®