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From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
To: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	 Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Subject: [GIT PULL] KVM: x86: Fixes for 6.13-rcN
Date: Thu, 19 Dec 2024 18:00:05 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20241220020005.3526402-1-seanjc@google.com> (raw)

I'm a moron and initially based this on kvm/next, and didn't notice until the
diffstat for the pull request was absurdly large.  As a result, all commits
were *just* rebased, like 5 minutes ago.

I smoke tested the branch, but didn't do anywhere near my usual level of testing.
I'm sending it now, because I suspect it'll be far easier on you to get this
today, and because we've probably got bigger problems if these don't work on
kvm/master.

*sigh*

The following changes since commit 7d4050728c83aa63828494ad0f4d0eb4faf5f97a:

  Merge tag 'vfs-6.13-rc1.fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/vfs (2024-11-27 08:11:46 -0800)

are available in the Git repository at:

  https://github.com/kvm-x86/linux.git tags/kvm-x86-fixes-6.13-rcN

for you to fetch changes up to 386d69f9f29b0814881fa4f92ac7b8dfa9b4f44a:

  KVM: x86/mmu: Treat TDP MMU faults as spurious if access is already allowed (2024-12-19 17:47:52 -0800)

----------------------------------------------------------------
KVM x86 fixes for 6.13:

 - Disable AVIC on SNP-enabled systems that don't allow writes to the virtual
   APIC page, as such hosts will hit unexpected RMP #PFs in the host when
   running VMs of any flavor.

 - Fix a WARN in the hypercall completion path due to KVM trying to determine
   if a guest with protected register state is in 64-bit mode (KVM's ABI is to
   assume such guests only make hypercalls in 64-bit mode).

 - Allow the guest to write to supported bits in MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG to fix a
   regression with Windows guests, and because KVM's read-only behavior appears
   to be entirely made up.

 - Treat TDP MMU faults as spurious if the faulting access is allowed given the
   existing SPTE.  This fixes a benign WARN (other than the WARN itself) due to
   unexpectedly replacing a writable SPTE with a read-only SPTE.

----------------------------------------------------------------
Sean Christopherson (3):
      KVM: x86: Play nice with protected guests in complete_hypercall_exit()
      KVM: SVM: Allow guest writes to set MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG bits
      KVM: x86/mmu: Treat TDP MMU faults as spurious if access is already allowed

Suravee Suthikulpanit (1):
      KVM: SVM: Disable AVIC on SNP-enabled system without HvInUseWrAllowed feature

 arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h |  1 +
 arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c             | 12 ------------
 arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h            | 17 +++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c         |  5 +++++
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/avic.c            |  6 ++++++
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c             |  9 ---------
 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c                 |  2 +-
 7 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)

                 reply	other threads:[~2024-12-20  2:00 UTC|newest]

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