From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 5E8E24689; Sat, 11 Jan 2025 00:45:33 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1736556334; cv=none; b=tEVATLBbAtXJwGQsNo/0zjw1naDS24LHykn1zTbBQlL3siXEDF5TgBDhLQ2Umm8UtBMfUPgDec3cSwD87FnHuPNwFwWrhxgeK4ixMKWbqXjBJJklLMipzm40NtP4B95WI0AHC4xH9iyz6SWwEIny9Vq1fl5gEOIyoZ5ucycI18A= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1736556334; c=relaxed/simple; bh=TbVcNLHS+ntm0ELp6PZq+CJ4y3znHfMLmaJiBqo2fYw=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:Message-Id:In-Reply-To:References: Mime-Version:Content-Type; b=KJlm8ceTqonPFqEgNv4j6m7wJ1OY+KlF02s/wxJCKmAlutRyfL78Dbtu7YPSuqO1DrtOLE5s5dp7sgzUdYhN8FQ38qrhw1vQ5oD7FXh9TOJKH6IFDkaWoqplXXnCtP3nItggqmfSQMEp3ydV6/a8Lib8jzo+kzDb0Fe3nNH656o= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linux-foundation.org header.i=@linux-foundation.org header.b=s1g/Bwlt; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linux-foundation.org header.i=@linux-foundation.org header.b="s1g/Bwlt" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 95035C4CED6; Sat, 11 Jan 2025 00:45:33 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=linux-foundation.org; s=korg; t=1736556333; bh=TbVcNLHS+ntm0ELp6PZq+CJ4y3znHfMLmaJiBqo2fYw=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=s1g/BwltNKLo89VJZN8Z/mYNiOyQawI3ikdv8bqdTtJF8Ow+1GIb3/RiH+LHsapzG Vqc3723rtA9/XXPiO+Zw1ev+MVzTx8+crxOQy2UyIkHqaG8kYXP/K3/r6hMKr6zzGY eoD6OzNZDytdmNqXRQfDG5ZqRDYZJRvJ1Ki77Uxc= Date: Fri, 10 Jan 2025 16:45:33 -0800 From: Andrew Morton To: Cc: , , , , , Subject: Re: [PATCH v5] ksm: add ksm involvement information for each process Message-Id: <20250110164533.996d4ec5b82f58198cd36b74@linux-foundation.org> In-Reply-To: <20250110174034304QOb8eDoqtFkp3_t8mqnqc@zte.com.cn> References: <20250110174034304QOb8eDoqtFkp3_t8mqnqc@zte.com.cn> X-Mailer: Sylpheed 3.8.0beta1 (GTK+ 2.24.33; x86_64-pc-linux-gnu) Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit On Fri, 10 Jan 2025 17:40:34 +0800 (CST) wrote: > From: xu xin > > In /proc//ksm_stat, Add two extra ksm involvement items including > KSM_mergeable and KSM_merge_any. It helps administrators to > better know the system's KSM behavior at process level. > > ksm_merge_any: yes/no > whether the process'mm is added by prctl() into the candidate list > of KSM or not, and fully enabled at process level. > > ksm_mergeable: yes/no > whether any VMAs of the process'mm are currently applicable to KSM. > > Purpose > ======= > These two items are just to improve the observability of KSM at process > level, so that users can know if a certain process has enable KSM. > > For example, if without these two items, when we look at > /proc//ksm_stat and there's no merging pages found, We are not sure > whether it is because KSM was not enabled or because KSM did not > successfully merge any pages. > > Althrough "mg" in /proc//smaps indicate VM_MERGEABLE, it's opaque > and not very obvious for non professionals. Thanks, seems useful enough to me. > + 3.14 /proc/ Subject: Documentation/filesystems/proc.rst: fix possessive form of "process" Date: Fri Jan 10 04:38:41 PM PST 2025 The possessive form of "process" is "process's". Fix up various misdirected attempts at this. Also reflow some paragraphs. Cc: David Hildenbrand Cc: Wang Yaxin Cc: xu xin Cc: Yang Yang Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton --- Documentation/filesystems/proc.rst | 36 +++++++++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) --- a/Documentation/filesystems/proc.rst~documentation-filesystems-procrst-fix-possessive-form-of-process +++ a/Documentation/filesystems/proc.rst @@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ fixes/update part 1.1 Stefani Seibold < 3.11 /proc//patch_state - Livepatch patch operation state 3.12 /proc//arch_status - Task architecture specific information 3.13 /proc//fd - List of symlinks to open files - 3.14 /proc//fd for fast access. ------------------------------------------------------- -3.14 /proc// will be fully invisible to other users. It doesn't mean that it hides a fact whether a process with a specific pid value exists (it can be learned by other means, e.g. -by "kill -0 $PID"), but it hides process' uid and gid, which may be learned by +by "kill -0 $PID"), but it hides process's uid and gid, which may be learned by stat()'ing /proc// otherwise. It greatly complicates an intruder's task of gathering information about running processes, whether some daemon runs with elevated privileges, whether other user runs some sensitive program, whether _