From: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
To: Mateusz Guzik <mjguzik@gmail.com>
Cc: luto@amacapital.net, wad@chromium.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] seccomp: avoid the lock trip in seccomp_filter_release in common case
Date: Mon, 10 Feb 2025 14:57:52 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <202502101454.DE164D34@keescook> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250210210541.867037-1-mjguzik@gmail.com>
On Mon, Feb 10, 2025 at 10:05:41PM +0100, Mateusz Guzik wrote:
> Vast majority of threads don't have any seccomp filters, all while the
> lock taken here is shared between all threads in given process and
> frequently used.
>
> Signed-off-by: Mateusz Guzik <mjguzik@gmail.com>
> ---
>
> Here is a splat from parallel thread creation/destruction within onep
> rocess:
>
> bpftrace -e 'kprobe:__pv_queued_spin_lock_slowpath { @[kstack()] = count(); }'
>
> [snip]
> @[
> __pv_queued_spin_lock_slowpath+5
> _raw_spin_lock_irq+42
> seccomp_filter_release+32
> do_exit+286
> __x64_sys_exit+27
> x64_sys_call+4703
> do_syscall_64+82
> entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+118
> ]: 475601
> @[
> __pv_queued_spin_lock_slowpath+5
> _raw_spin_lock_irq+42
> acct_collect+77
> do_exit+1380
> __x64_sys_exit+27
> x64_sys_call+4703
> do_syscall_64+82
> entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+118
> ]: 478335
> @[
> __pv_queued_spin_lock_slowpath+5
> _raw_spin_lock_irq+42
> sigprocmask+106
> __x64_sys_rt_sigprocmask+121
> do_syscall_64+82
> entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+118
> ]: 1825572
>
> There are more spots which take the same lock, with seccomp being top 3.
>
> I could not be bothered to bench before/after, but I can do it if you
> insist. The fact that this codepath is a factor can be seen above.
>
> This is a minor patch, I'm not going to insist on it.
>
> To my reading seccomp only ever gets populated for current, so this
> should be perfectly safe to test on exit without any synchronisation.
Unfortunately, this is not true. SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC may operate
on non-current. See the paired smp_store_release() and smp_rmb() uses.
> This may need a data_race annotation if some tooling decides to protest.
>
> kernel/seccomp.c | 3 +++
> 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c
> index 7bbb408431eb..c839674966e2 100644
> --- a/kernel/seccomp.c
> +++ b/kernel/seccomp.c
> @@ -576,6 +576,9 @@ void seccomp_filter_release(struct task_struct *tsk)
> if (WARN_ON((tsk->flags & PF_EXITING) == 0))
> return;
>
> + if (tsk->seccomp.filter == NULL)
> + return;
> +
> spin_lock_irq(&tsk->sighand->siglock);
> orig = tsk->seccomp.filter;
> /* Detach task from its filter tree. */
If this can be made provably race-safe, I'd be fine with the idea, but
at present, all seccomp.filter manipulation happens under
sighand->siglock...
-Kees
--
Kees Cook
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-02-10 22:57 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-02-10 21:05 Mateusz Guzik
2025-02-10 22:57 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2025-02-10 23:08 ` Mateusz Guzik
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