From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
To: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>,
Paul Durrant <paul@xen.org>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Joao Martins <joao.m.martins@oracle.com>,
David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Subject: [PATCH v2 5/5] KVM: x86/xen: Move kvm_xen_hvm_config field into kvm_xen
Date: Fri, 14 Feb 2025 17:14:37 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250215011437.1203084-6-seanjc@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250215011437.1203084-1-seanjc@google.com>
Now that all KVM usage of the Xen HVM config information is buried behind
CONFIG_KVM_XEN=y, move the per-VM kvm_xen_hvm_config field out of kvm_arch
and into kvm_xen.
No functional change intended.
Reviewed-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Reviewed-by: Paul Durrant <paul@xen.org>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 3 ++-
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 2 +-
arch/x86/kvm/xen.c | 20 ++++++++++----------
arch/x86/kvm/xen.h | 6 +++---
4 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
index f31fca4c4968..9df725e528b1 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
@@ -1188,6 +1188,8 @@ struct kvm_xen {
struct gfn_to_pfn_cache shinfo_cache;
struct idr evtchn_ports;
unsigned long poll_mask[BITS_TO_LONGS(KVM_MAX_VCPUS)];
+
+ struct kvm_xen_hvm_config hvm_config;
};
#endif
@@ -1419,7 +1421,6 @@ struct kvm_arch {
#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_XEN
struct kvm_xen xen;
- struct kvm_xen_hvm_config xen_hvm_config;
#endif
bool backwards_tsc_observed;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index 12c60adb7349..f97d4d435e7f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -3188,7 +3188,7 @@ static int kvm_guest_time_update(struct kvm_vcpu *v)
* problems if they observe PVCLOCK_TSC_STABLE_BIT in the pvclock flags.
*/
bool xen_pvclock_tsc_unstable =
- ka->xen_hvm_config.flags & KVM_XEN_HVM_CONFIG_PVCLOCK_TSC_UNSTABLE;
+ ka->xen.hvm_config.flags & KVM_XEN_HVM_CONFIG_PVCLOCK_TSC_UNSTABLE;
#endif
kernel_ns = 0;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/xen.c b/arch/x86/kvm/xen.c
index 5b94825001a7..8aef7cd24349 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/xen.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/xen.c
@@ -1280,10 +1280,10 @@ int kvm_xen_write_hypercall_page(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 data)
* Note, truncation is a non-issue as 'lm' is guaranteed to be
* false for a 32-bit kernel, i.e. when hva_t is only 4 bytes.
*/
- hva_t blob_addr = lm ? kvm->arch.xen_hvm_config.blob_addr_64
- : kvm->arch.xen_hvm_config.blob_addr_32;
- u8 blob_size = lm ? kvm->arch.xen_hvm_config.blob_size_64
- : kvm->arch.xen_hvm_config.blob_size_32;
+ hva_t blob_addr = lm ? kvm->arch.xen.hvm_config.blob_addr_64
+ : kvm->arch.xen.hvm_config.blob_addr_32;
+ u8 blob_size = lm ? kvm->arch.xen.hvm_config.blob_size_64
+ : kvm->arch.xen.hvm_config.blob_size_32;
u8 *page;
int ret;
@@ -1335,13 +1335,13 @@ int kvm_xen_hvm_config(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_xen_hvm_config *xhc)
mutex_lock(&kvm->arch.xen.xen_lock);
- if (xhc->msr && !kvm->arch.xen_hvm_config.msr)
+ if (xhc->msr && !kvm->arch.xen.hvm_config.msr)
static_branch_inc(&kvm_xen_enabled.key);
- else if (!xhc->msr && kvm->arch.xen_hvm_config.msr)
+ else if (!xhc->msr && kvm->arch.xen.hvm_config.msr)
static_branch_slow_dec_deferred(&kvm_xen_enabled);
- old_flags = kvm->arch.xen_hvm_config.flags;
- memcpy(&kvm->arch.xen_hvm_config, xhc, sizeof(*xhc));
+ old_flags = kvm->arch.xen.hvm_config.flags;
+ memcpy(&kvm->arch.xen.hvm_config, xhc, sizeof(*xhc));
mutex_unlock(&kvm->arch.xen.xen_lock);
@@ -1422,7 +1422,7 @@ static bool kvm_xen_schedop_poll(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool longmode,
int i;
if (!lapic_in_kernel(vcpu) ||
- !(vcpu->kvm->arch.xen_hvm_config.flags & KVM_XEN_HVM_CONFIG_EVTCHN_SEND))
+ !(vcpu->kvm->arch.xen.hvm_config.flags & KVM_XEN_HVM_CONFIG_EVTCHN_SEND))
return false;
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_64BIT) && !longmode) {
@@ -2300,6 +2300,6 @@ void kvm_xen_destroy_vm(struct kvm *kvm)
}
idr_destroy(&kvm->arch.xen.evtchn_ports);
- if (kvm->arch.xen_hvm_config.msr)
+ if (kvm->arch.xen.hvm_config.msr)
static_branch_slow_dec_deferred(&kvm_xen_enabled);
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/xen.h b/arch/x86/kvm/xen.h
index 1e3a913dfb94..d191103d8163 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/xen.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/xen.h
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ static inline void kvm_xen_sw_enable_lapic(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
static inline bool kvm_xen_msr_enabled(struct kvm *kvm)
{
return static_branch_unlikely(&kvm_xen_enabled.key) &&
- kvm->arch.xen_hvm_config.msr;
+ kvm->arch.xen.hvm_config.msr;
}
static inline bool kvm_xen_is_hypercall_page_msr(struct kvm *kvm, u32 msr)
@@ -61,13 +61,13 @@ static inline bool kvm_xen_is_hypercall_page_msr(struct kvm *kvm, u32 msr)
if (!static_branch_unlikely(&kvm_xen_enabled.key))
return false;
- return msr && msr == kvm->arch.xen_hvm_config.msr;
+ return msr && msr == kvm->arch.xen.hvm_config.msr;
}
static inline bool kvm_xen_hypercall_enabled(struct kvm *kvm)
{
return static_branch_unlikely(&kvm_xen_enabled.key) &&
- (kvm->arch.xen_hvm_config.flags &
+ (kvm->arch.xen.hvm_config.flags &
KVM_XEN_HVM_CONFIG_INTERCEPT_HCALL);
}
--
2.48.1.601.g30ceb7b040-goog
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-02-15 1:14 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-02-15 1:14 [PATCH v2 0/5] KVM: x86/xen: Restrict hypercall MSR index Sean Christopherson
2025-02-15 1:14 ` [PATCH v2 1/5] KVM: x86/xen: Restrict hypercall MSR to unofficial synthetic range Sean Christopherson
2025-02-15 11:00 ` David Woodhouse
2025-02-18 16:33 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-02-18 18:47 ` David Woodhouse
2025-02-20 18:36 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-02-20 19:04 ` David Woodhouse
2025-02-15 1:14 ` [PATCH v2 2/5] KVM: x86/xen: Add an #ifdef'd helper to detect writes to Xen MSR Sean Christopherson
2025-02-15 1:14 ` [PATCH v2 3/5] KVM: x86/xen: Consult kvm_xen_enabled when checking for Xen MSR writes Sean Christopherson
2025-02-15 1:14 ` [PATCH v2 4/5] KVM: x86/xen: Bury xen_hvm_config behind CONFIG_KVM_XEN=y Sean Christopherson
2025-02-15 1:14 ` Sean Christopherson [this message]
2025-02-28 17:06 ` [PATCH v2 0/5] KVM: x86/xen: Restrict hypercall MSR index Sean Christopherson
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