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From: Luis Gerhorst <luis.gerhorst@fau.de>
To: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
	Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>,
	Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>,
	Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@linux.dev>,
	Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>, Song Liu <song@kernel.org>,
	Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>,
	John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>,
	KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org>,
	Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@fomichev.me>, Hao Luo <haoluo@google.com>,
	Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>,
	Puranjay Mohan <puranjay@kernel.org>,
	Xu Kuohai <xukuohai@huaweicloud.com>,
	Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>, Mykola Lysenko <mykolal@fb.com>,
	Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>,
	Luis Gerhorst <luis.gerhorst@fau.de>,
	Henriette Herzog <henriette.herzog@rub.de>,
	Cupertino Miranda <cupertino.miranda@oracle.com>,
	Matan Shachnai <m.shachnai@gmail.com>,
	Dimitar Kanaliev <dimitar.kanaliev@siteground.com>,
	Shung-Hsi Yu <shung-hsi.yu@suse.com>, Daniel Xu <dxu@dxuuu.xyz>,
	bpf@vger.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Maximilian Ott <ott@cs.fau.de>, Milan Stephan <milan.stephan@fau.de>
Subject: [RFC PATCH 6/9] bpf: Allow nospec-protected var-offset stack access
Date: Mon, 24 Feb 2025 21:51:41 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250224205141.606149-1-luis.gerhorst@fau.de> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250224203619.594724-1-luis.gerhorst@fau.de>

Insert a nospec before the access to prevent it from ever using a index
that is subject to speculative scalar-confusion.

Signed-off-by: Luis Gerhorst <luis.gerhorst@fau.de>
Acked-by: Henriette Herzog <henriette.herzog@rub.de>
Cc: Maximilian Ott <ott@cs.fau.de>
Cc: Milan Stephan <milan.stephan@fau.de>
---
 kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 15 ++++++++-------
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index aee49f8da0c1..06c2f929d602 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -7638,6 +7638,8 @@ static int check_atomic(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, struct bpf_i
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static struct bpf_insn_aux_data *cur_aux(struct bpf_verifier_env *env);
+
 /* When register 'regno' is used to read the stack (either directly or through
  * a helper function) make sure that it's within stack boundary and, depending
  * on the access type and privileges, that all elements of the stack are
@@ -7677,18 +7679,17 @@ static int check_stack_range_initialized(
 	if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
 		min_off = max_off = reg->var_off.value + off;
 	} else {
-		/* Variable offset is prohibited for unprivileged mode for
+		/* Variable offset requires a nospec for unprivileged mode for
 		 * simplicity since it requires corresponding support in
 		 * Spectre masking for stack ALU.
 		 * See also retrieve_ptr_limit().
 		 */
 		if (!env->bypass_spec_v1) {
-			char tn_buf[48];
-
-			tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off);
-			verbose(env, "R%d variable offset stack access prohibited for !root, var_off=%s\n",
-				regno, tn_buf);
-			return -EACCES;
+			/* Allow the access, but prevent it from using a
+			 * speculative offset using a nospec before the
+			 * dereference op.
+			 */
+			cur_aux(env)->nospec = true;
 		}
 		/* Only initialized buffer on stack is allowed to be accessed
 		 * with variable offset. With uninitialized buffer it's hard to
-- 
2.48.1


  parent reply	other threads:[~2025-02-24 20:57 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-02-24 20:36 [RFC PATCH 0/9] bpf: Mitigate Spectre v1 using speculation barriers Luis Gerhorst
2025-02-24 20:36 ` [RFC PATCH 1/9] bpf/arm64: Unset bypass_spec_v4() instead of ignoring BPF_NOSPEC Luis Gerhorst
2025-02-24 20:36 ` [RFC PATCH 2/9] bpf: Refactor do_check() if/else into do_check_insn() Luis Gerhorst
2025-02-24 20:36 ` [RFC PATCH 3/9] bpf: Return EFAULT on misconfigurations Luis Gerhorst
2025-02-24 20:36 ` [RFC PATCH 4/9] bpf: Return EFAULT on internal errors Luis Gerhorst
2025-02-24 20:47 ` [RFC PATCH 5/9] bpf: Fall back to nospec if v1 verification fails Luis Gerhorst
2025-02-27 16:07   ` Luis Gerhorst
2025-02-24 20:51 ` Luis Gerhorst [this message]
2025-02-24 20:52 ` [RFC PATCH 7/9] bpf: Refactor push_stack to return error code Luis Gerhorst
2025-02-24 20:55 ` [RFC PATCH 8/9] bpf: Fall back to nospec for sanitization-failures Luis Gerhorst
2025-02-24 20:55 ` [RFC PATCH 9/9] bpf: Cut speculative path verification short Luis Gerhorst

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