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From: Neeraj Upadhyay <Neeraj.Upadhyay@amd.com>
To: <seanjc@google.com>, <pbonzini@redhat.com>, <kvm@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, <bp@alien8.de>,
	<tglx@linutronix.de>, <mingo@redhat.com>,
	<dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>, <Thomas.Lendacky@amd.com>,
	<nikunj@amd.com>, <Santosh.Shukla@amd.com>,
	<Vasant.Hegde@amd.com>, <Suravee.Suthikulpanit@amd.com>,
	<David.Kaplan@amd.com>, <x86@kernel.org>, <hpa@zytor.com>,
	<peterz@infradead.org>, <huibo.wang@amd.com>,
	<naveen.rao@amd.com>, <binbin.wu@linux.intel.com>,
	<isaku.yamahata@intel.com>
Subject: [RFC PATCH 05/19] KVM: SVM: Add support for Secure AVIC capability in KVM
Date: Fri, 28 Feb 2025 14:21:01 +0530	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250228085115.105648-6-Neeraj.Upadhyay@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250228085115.105648-1-Neeraj.Upadhyay@amd.com>

Add support to KVM for determining if a system is capable of
supporting Secure AVIC feature.

Secure AVIC feature support is determined based on:

- secure_avic module parameter is set.
- X86_FEATURE_SECURE_AVIC CPU Feature bit is set.
- SNP feature is supported.

Co-developed-by: Kishon Vijay Abraham I <kvijayab@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Kishon Vijay Abraham I <kvijayab@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Neeraj Upadhyay <Neeraj.Upadhyay@amd.com>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h | 1 +
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c     | 9 +++++++++
 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h
index 9391eca5412e..f81b417fe836 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h
@@ -292,6 +292,7 @@ static_assert((X2AVIC_MAX_PHYSICAL_ID & AVIC_PHYSICAL_MAX_INDEX_MASK) == X2AVIC_
 #define SVM_SEV_FEAT_RESTRICTED_INJECTION		BIT(3)
 #define SVM_SEV_FEAT_ALTERNATE_INJECTION		BIT(4)
 #define SVM_SEV_FEAT_DEBUG_SWAP				BIT(5)
+#define SVM_SEV_FEAT_SECURE_AVIC			BIT(16)
 #define SVM_SEV_FEAT_ALLOWED_SEV_FEATURES		BIT_ULL(63)
 
 #define SVM_SEV_FEAT_INT_INJ_MODES		\
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
index bf4e85e11a7b..82209cd56ec6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
@@ -58,6 +58,10 @@ static bool sev_es_debug_swap_enabled = true;
 module_param_named(debug_swap, sev_es_debug_swap_enabled, bool, 0444);
 static u64 sev_supported_vmsa_features;
 
+/* enable/disable SEV-SNP Secure AVIC support */
+bool sev_snp_savic_enabled = true;
+module_param_named(secure_avic, sev_snp_savic_enabled, bool, 0444);
+
 #define AP_RESET_HOLD_NONE		0
 #define AP_RESET_HOLD_NAE_EVENT		1
 #define AP_RESET_HOLD_MSR_PROTO		2
@@ -2962,6 +2966,8 @@ void __init sev_set_cpu_caps(void)
 		kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP);
 		kvm_caps.supported_vm_types |= BIT(KVM_X86_SNP_VM);
 	}
+	if (sev_snp_savic_enabled)
+		kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_SECURE_AVIC);
 }
 
 void __init sev_hardware_setup(void)
@@ -3082,6 +3088,9 @@ void __init sev_hardware_setup(void)
 	    !cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_NO_NESTED_DATA_BP))
 		sev_es_debug_swap_enabled = false;
 
+	if (!sev_snp_supported || !cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SECURE_AVIC))
+		sev_snp_savic_enabled = false;
+
 	sev_supported_vmsa_features = 0;
 	if (sev_es_debug_swap_enabled)
 		sev_supported_vmsa_features |= SVM_SEV_FEAT_DEBUG_SWAP;
-- 
2.34.1


  parent reply	other threads:[~2025-02-28  9:01 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 20+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-02-28  8:50 [RFC PATCH 00/19] AMD: Add Secure AVIC KVM Support Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-02-28  8:50 ` [RFC PATCH 01/19] KVM: TDX: Add support for find pending IRQ in a protected local APIC Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-02-28  8:50 ` [RFC PATCH 02/19] KVM: x86: Assume timer IRQ was injected if APIC state is protected Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-02-28  8:50 ` [RFC PATCH 03/19] KVM: x86: Convert guest_apic_protected bool to an enum type Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-02-28  8:51 ` [RFC PATCH 04/19] x86/cpufeatures: Add Secure AVIC CPU Feature Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-02-28  8:51 ` Neeraj Upadhyay [this message]
2025-02-28  8:51 ` [RFC PATCH 06/19] KVM: SVM: Initialize apic protected state for SAVIC guests Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-02-28  8:51 ` [RFC PATCH 07/19] KVM: SEV: Do not intercept SECURE_AVIC_CONTROL MSR Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-02-28  8:51 ` [RFC PATCH 08/19] KVM: SVM/SEV/X86: Secure AVIC: Add support to inject interrupts Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-02-28  8:51 ` [RFC PATCH 09/19] KVM: SVM/SEV/X86: Secure AVIC: Add hypervisor side IPI Delivery Support Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-02-28  8:51 ` [RFC PATCH 10/19] KVM: SVM: Secure AVIC: Do not inject "Exceptions" for Secure AVIC Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-02-28  8:51 ` [RFC PATCH 11/19] KVM: SVM/SEV: Do not intercept exceptions for Secure AVIC guest Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-02-28  8:51 ` [RFC PATCH 12/19] KVM: SVM/SEV: Secure AVIC: Set VGIF in VMSA area Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-02-28  8:51 ` [RFC PATCH 13/19] KVM: SVM/SEV: Secure AVIC: Enable NMI support Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-02-28  8:51 ` [RFC PATCH 14/19] KVM: SVM/SEV: Add SVM_VMGEXIT_SECURE_AVIC GHCB protocol event handling Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-02-28  8:51 ` [RFC PATCH 15/19] KVM: x86: Secure AVIC: Indicate APIC is enabled by guest SW _always_ Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-02-28  8:51 ` [RFC PATCH 16/19] KVM: x86: Secure AVIC: Add IOAPIC EOI support for level interrupts Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-02-28  8:51 ` [RFC PATCH 17/19] KVM: x86/ioapic: Disable RTC_GSI EOI tracking for protected APIC Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-02-28  8:51 ` [RFC PATCH 18/19] X86: SVM: Check injected vectors before waiting for timer expiry Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-02-28  8:51 ` [RFC PATCH 19/19] KVM: SVM/SEV: Allow creating VMs with Secure AVIC enabled Neeraj Upadhyay

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