From: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>
To: "Eric Paris" <eparis@redhat.com>,
"Paul Moore" <paul@paul-moore.com>,
"Günther Noack" <gnoack@google.com>,
"Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>,
"Ben Scarlato" <akhna@google.com>,
"Casey Schaufler" <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
"Charles Zaffery" <czaffery@roblox.com>,
"Daniel Burgener" <dburgener@linux.microsoft.com>,
"Francis Laniel" <flaniel@linux.microsoft.com>,
"James Morris" <jmorris@namei.org>,
"Jann Horn" <jannh@google.com>, "Jeff Xu" <jeffxu@google.com>,
"Jorge Lucangeli Obes" <jorgelo@google.com>,
"Kees Cook" <kees@kernel.org>,
"Konstantin Meskhidze" <konstantin.meskhidze@huawei.com>,
"Matt Bobrowski" <mattbobrowski@google.com>,
"Mikhail Ivanov" <ivanov.mikhail1@huawei-partners.com>,
"Phil Sutter" <phil@nwl.cc>,
"Praveen K Paladugu" <prapal@linux.microsoft.com>,
"Robert Salvet" <robert.salvet@roblox.com>,
"Shervin Oloumi" <enlightened@google.com>,
"Song Liu" <song@kernel.org>,
"Tahera Fahimi" <fahimitahera@gmail.com>,
"Tingmao Wang" <m@maowtm.org>, "Tyler Hicks" <code@tyhicks.com>,
audit@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v6 18/26] samples/landlock: Enable users to log sandbox denials
Date: Sat, 8 Mar 2025 19:44:14 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250308184422.2159360-19-mic@digikod.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250308184422.2159360-1-mic@digikod.net>
By default, denials from within the sandbox are not logged. Indeed, the
sandboxer's security policy might not be fitted to the set of sandboxed
processes that could be spawned (e.g. from a shell).
For test purpose, parse the LL_FORCE_LOG environment variable to log
every sandbox denials, including after launching the initial sandboxed
program thanks to LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_NEW_EXEC_ON.
Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250308184422.2159360-19-mic@digikod.net
---
Changes since v5:
- Update with new flag.
Changes since v3:
- Extend error message, suggested by Francis Laniel.
Changes since v2:
- New patch.
---
samples/landlock/sandboxer.c | 37 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
security/landlock/syscalls.c | 8 ++------
2 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/samples/landlock/sandboxer.c b/samples/landlock/sandboxer.c
index 07fab2ef534e..4e2854c6f9a3 100644
--- a/samples/landlock/sandboxer.c
+++ b/samples/landlock/sandboxer.c
@@ -58,6 +58,7 @@ static inline int landlock_restrict_self(const int ruleset_fd,
#define ENV_TCP_BIND_NAME "LL_TCP_BIND"
#define ENV_TCP_CONNECT_NAME "LL_TCP_CONNECT"
#define ENV_SCOPED_NAME "LL_SCOPED"
+#define ENV_FORCE_LOG_NAME "LL_FORCE_LOG"
#define ENV_DELIMITER ":"
static int str2num(const char *numstr, __u64 *num_dst)
@@ -295,7 +296,7 @@ static bool check_ruleset_scope(const char *const env_var,
/* clang-format on */
-#define LANDLOCK_ABI_LAST 6
+#define LANDLOCK_ABI_LAST 7
#define XSTR(s) #s
#define STR(s) XSTR(s)
@@ -322,6 +323,9 @@ static const char help[] =
" - \"a\" to restrict opening abstract unix sockets\n"
" - \"s\" to restrict sending signals\n"
"\n"
+ "A sandboxer should not log denied access requests to avoid spamming logs, "
+ "but to test audit we can set " ENV_FORCE_LOG_NAME "=1\n"
+ "\n"
"Example:\n"
ENV_FS_RO_NAME "=\"${PATH}:/lib:/usr:/proc:/etc:/dev/urandom\" "
ENV_FS_RW_NAME "=\"/dev/null:/dev/full:/dev/zero:/dev/pts:/tmp\" "
@@ -340,7 +344,7 @@ int main(const int argc, char *const argv[], char *const *const envp)
const char *cmd_path;
char *const *cmd_argv;
int ruleset_fd, abi;
- char *env_port_name;
+ char *env_port_name, *env_force_log;
__u64 access_fs_ro = ACCESS_FS_ROUGHLY_READ,
access_fs_rw = ACCESS_FS_ROUGHLY_READ | ACCESS_FS_ROUGHLY_WRITE;
@@ -351,6 +355,8 @@ int main(const int argc, char *const argv[], char *const *const envp)
.scoped = LANDLOCK_SCOPE_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET |
LANDLOCK_SCOPE_SIGNAL,
};
+ int supported_restrict_flags = LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_NEW_EXEC_ON;
+ int set_restrict_flags = 0;
if (argc < 2) {
fprintf(stderr, help, argv[0]);
@@ -422,6 +428,13 @@ int main(const int argc, char *const argv[], char *const *const envp)
/* Removes LANDLOCK_SCOPE_* for ABI < 6 */
ruleset_attr.scoped &= ~(LANDLOCK_SCOPE_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET |
LANDLOCK_SCOPE_SIGNAL);
+ __attribute__((fallthrough));
+ case 6:
+ /* Removes LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_NEW_EXEC_ON for ABI < 7 */
+ supported_restrict_flags &=
+ ~LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_NEW_EXEC_ON;
+
+ /* Must be printed for any ABI < LANDLOCK_ABI_LAST. */
fprintf(stderr,
"Hint: You should update the running kernel "
"to leverage Landlock features "
@@ -456,6 +469,24 @@ int main(const int argc, char *const argv[], char *const *const envp)
if (check_ruleset_scope(ENV_SCOPED_NAME, &ruleset_attr))
return 1;
+ /* Enables optional logs. */
+ env_force_log = getenv(ENV_FORCE_LOG_NAME);
+ if (env_force_log) {
+ if (strcmp(env_force_log, "1") != 0) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Unknown value for " ENV_FORCE_LOG_NAME
+ " (only \"1\" is handled)\n");
+ return 1;
+ }
+ if (!(supported_restrict_flags &
+ LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_NEW_EXEC_ON)) {
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "Audit logs not supported by current kernel\n");
+ return 1;
+ }
+ set_restrict_flags |= LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_NEW_EXEC_ON;
+ unsetenv(ENV_FORCE_LOG_NAME);
+ }
+
ruleset_fd =
landlock_create_ruleset(&ruleset_attr, sizeof(ruleset_attr), 0);
if (ruleset_fd < 0) {
@@ -483,7 +514,7 @@ int main(const int argc, char *const argv[], char *const *const envp)
perror("Failed to restrict privileges");
goto err_close_ruleset;
}
- if (landlock_restrict_self(ruleset_fd, 0)) {
+ if (landlock_restrict_self(ruleset_fd, set_restrict_flags)) {
perror("Failed to enforce ruleset");
goto err_close_ruleset;
}
diff --git a/security/landlock/syscalls.c b/security/landlock/syscalls.c
index e38b22075ca1..cae0a0fd08d8 100644
--- a/security/landlock/syscalls.c
+++ b/security/landlock/syscalls.c
@@ -495,12 +495,8 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(landlock_restrict_self, const int, ruleset_fd, const __u32,
/* Translates "off" flag to boolean. */
log_subdomains = !(flags & LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SUBDOMAINS_OFF);
- /*
- * It is allowed to set %LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SUBDOMAINS_OFF with -1
- * as @ruleset_fd, but no other flag must be set.
- */
- if (!(ruleset_fd == -1 &&
- flags == LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SUBDOMAINS_OFF)) {
+ if (!(flags == LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SUBDOMAINS_OFF &&
+ ruleset_fd == -1)) {
/* Gets and checks the ruleset. */
ruleset = get_ruleset_from_fd(ruleset_fd, FMODE_CAN_READ);
if (IS_ERR(ruleset))
--
2.48.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-03-08 18:45 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 28+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-03-08 18:43 [PATCH v6 00/26] Landlock audit support Mickaël Salaün
2025-03-08 18:43 ` [PATCH v6 01/26] lsm: Add audit_log_lsm_data() helper Mickaël Salaün
2025-03-08 18:43 ` [PATCH v6 02/26] landlock: Add unique ID generator Mickaël Salaün
2025-03-08 18:43 ` [PATCH v6 03/26] landlock: Move domain hierarchy management Mickaël Salaün
2025-03-08 18:44 ` [PATCH v6 04/26] landlock: Prepare to use credential instead of domain for filesystem Mickaël Salaün
2025-03-08 18:44 ` [PATCH v6 05/26] landlock: Prepare to use credential instead of domain for network Mickaël Salaün
2025-03-08 18:44 ` [PATCH v6 06/26] landlock: Prepare to use credential instead of domain for scope Mickaël Salaün
2025-03-08 18:44 ` [PATCH v6 07/26] landlock: Prepare to use credential instead of domain for fowner Mickaël Salaün
2025-03-08 18:44 ` [PATCH v6 08/26] landlock: Identify domain execution crossing Mickaël Salaün
2025-03-08 18:44 ` [PATCH v6 09/26] landlock: Add AUDIT_LANDLOCK_ACCESS and log ptrace denials Mickaël Salaün
2025-03-08 18:44 ` [PATCH v6 10/26] landlock: Add AUDIT_LANDLOCK_DOMAIN and log domain status Mickaël Salaün
2025-03-08 18:44 ` [PATCH v6 11/26] landlock: Log mount-related denials Mickaël Salaün
2025-03-08 18:44 ` [PATCH v6 12/26] landlock: Log file-related denials Mickaël Salaün
2025-03-08 18:44 ` [PATCH v6 13/26] landlock: Log truncate and IOCTL denials Mickaël Salaün
2025-03-08 18:44 ` [PATCH v6 14/26] landlock: Log TCP bind and connect denials Mickaël Salaün
2025-03-08 18:44 ` [PATCH v6 15/26] landlock: Log scoped denials Mickaël Salaün
2025-03-08 18:44 ` [PATCH v6 16/26] landlock: Add LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_*_EXEC_* flags Mickaël Salaün
2025-03-08 18:44 ` [PATCH v6 17/26] landlock: Add LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SUBDOMAINS_OFF Mickaël Salaün
2025-03-08 18:44 ` Mickaël Salaün [this message]
2025-03-08 18:44 ` [PATCH v6 19/26] selftests/landlock: Add test for invalid ruleset file descriptor Mickaël Salaün
2025-03-08 18:44 ` [PATCH v6 20/26] selftests/landlock: Extend tests for landlock_restrict_self(2)'s flags Mickaël Salaün
2025-03-08 18:44 ` [PATCH v6 21/26] selftests/landlock: Add tests for audit flags and domain IDs Mickaël Salaün
2025-03-08 18:44 ` [PATCH v6 22/26] selftests/landlock: Test audit with restrict flags Mickaël Salaün
2025-03-08 18:44 ` [PATCH v6 23/26] selftests/landlock: Add audit tests for ptrace Mickaël Salaün
2025-03-08 18:44 ` [PATCH v6 24/26] selftests/landlock: Add audit tests for abstract unix socket scoping Mickaël Salaün
2025-03-08 18:44 ` [PATCH v6 25/26] selftests/landlock: Add audit tests for filesystem Mickaël Salaün
2025-03-08 18:44 ` [PATCH v6 26/26] landlock: Add audit documentation Mickaël Salaün
2025-03-09 9:41 ` [PATCH v6 00/26] Landlock audit support Mickaël Salaün
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