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From: Neeraj Upadhyay <Neeraj.Upadhyay@amd.com>
To: <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: <bp@alien8.de>, <tglx@linutronix.de>, <mingo@redhat.com>,
	<dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>, <Thomas.Lendacky@amd.com>,
	<nikunj@amd.com>, <Santosh.Shukla@amd.com>,
	<Vasant.Hegde@amd.com>, <Suravee.Suthikulpanit@amd.com>,
	<David.Kaplan@amd.com>, <x86@kernel.org>, <hpa@zytor.com>,
	<peterz@infradead.org>, <seanjc@google.com>,
	<pbonzini@redhat.com>, <kvm@vger.kernel.org>,
	<kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>, <huibo.wang@amd.com>,
	<naveen.rao@amd.com>, <francescolavra.fl@gmail.com>
Subject: [PATCH v3 02/17] x86/apic: Initialize Secure AVIC APIC backing page
Date: Tue, 1 Apr 2025 17:06:01 +0530	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250401113616.204203-3-Neeraj.Upadhyay@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250401113616.204203-1-Neeraj.Upadhyay@amd.com>

With Secure AVIC, the APIC backing page is owned and managed by guest.
Allocate and initialize APIC backing page for all guest CPUs.

The NPT entry for a vCPU's APIC backing page must always be present
when the vCPU is running in order for Secure AVIC to function. A
VMEXIT_BUSY is returned on VMRUN and the vCPU cannot be resumed if
the NPT entry for the APIC backing page is not present. Notify GPA of
the vCPU's APIC backing page to the hypervisor by using the
SVM_VMGEXIT_SECURE_AVIC GHCB protocol event. Before executing VMRUN,
the hypervisor makes use of this information to make sure the APIC backing
page is mapped in NPT.

Co-developed-by: Kishon Vijay Abraham I <kvijayab@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Kishon Vijay Abraham I <kvijayab@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Neeraj Upadhyay <Neeraj.Upadhyay@amd.com>
---
Changes since v2:

 - Fix broken AP bringup due to GFP_KERNEL allocation in setup()
   callback.
 - Define apic_page struct and allocate per CPU API backing pages
   for all CPUs in Secure AVIC driver probe.
 - Change savic_register_gpa() to only allow local CPU GPA
   registration.
 - Misc cleanups.

 arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c            | 27 +++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c            | 27 +++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/include/asm/apic.h         |  1 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h          |  2 ++
 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/svm.h     |  3 +++
 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c         |  2 ++
 arch/x86/kernel/apic/x2apic_savic.c | 42 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 6 files changed, 77 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c b/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c
index b0c1a7a57497..036833ac17e1 100644
--- a/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c
+++ b/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c
@@ -1501,6 +1501,33 @@ static enum es_result vc_handle_msr(struct ghcb *ghcb, struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt)
 	return ret;
 }
 
+enum es_result savic_register_gpa(u64 gpa)
+{
+	struct ghcb_state state;
+	struct es_em_ctxt ctxt;
+	unsigned long flags;
+	enum es_result res;
+	struct ghcb *ghcb;
+
+	local_irq_save(flags);
+
+	ghcb = __sev_get_ghcb(&state);
+
+	vc_ghcb_invalidate(ghcb);
+
+	/* Register GPA for the local CPU */
+	ghcb_set_rax(ghcb, -1ULL);
+	ghcb_set_rbx(ghcb, gpa);
+	res = sev_es_ghcb_hv_call(ghcb, &ctxt, SVM_VMGEXIT_SECURE_AVIC,
+			SVM_VMGEXIT_SECURE_AVIC_REGISTER_GPA, 0);
+
+	__sev_put_ghcb(&state);
+
+	local_irq_restore(flags);
+
+	return res;
+}
+
 static void snp_register_per_cpu_ghcb(void)
 {
 	struct sev_es_runtime_data *data;
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/apic.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/apic.h
index c903d358405d..e17c8cb810a2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/apic.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/apic.h
@@ -305,6 +305,7 @@ struct apic {
 
 	/* Probe, setup and smpboot functions */
 	int	(*probe)(void);
+	void	(*setup)(void);
 	int	(*acpi_madt_oem_check)(char *oem_id, char *oem_table_id);
 
 	void	(*init_apic_ldr)(void);
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
index ba7999f66abe..3448032bae8c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
@@ -483,6 +483,7 @@ int snp_send_guest_request(struct snp_msg_desc *mdesc, struct snp_guest_req *req
 
 void __init snp_secure_tsc_prepare(void);
 void __init snp_secure_tsc_init(void);
+enum es_result savic_register_gpa(u64 gpa);
 
 #else	/* !CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT */
 
@@ -526,6 +527,7 @@ static inline int snp_send_guest_request(struct snp_msg_desc *mdesc, struct snp_
 					 struct snp_guest_request_ioctl *rio) { return -ENODEV; }
 static inline void __init snp_secure_tsc_prepare(void) { }
 static inline void __init snp_secure_tsc_init(void) { }
+static inline enum es_result savic_register_gpa(u64 gpa) { return ES_UNSUPPORTED; }
 
 #endif	/* CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT */
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/svm.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/svm.h
index ec1321248dac..36fc87bdb859 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/svm.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/svm.h
@@ -117,6 +117,9 @@
 #define SVM_VMGEXIT_AP_CREATE			1
 #define SVM_VMGEXIT_AP_DESTROY			2
 #define SVM_VMGEXIT_SNP_RUN_VMPL		0x80000018
+#define SVM_VMGEXIT_SECURE_AVIC			0x8000001a
+#define SVM_VMGEXIT_SECURE_AVIC_REGISTER_GPA	0
+#define SVM_VMGEXIT_SECURE_AVIC_UNREGISTER_GPA	1
 #define SVM_VMGEXIT_HV_FEATURES			0x8000fffd
 #define SVM_VMGEXIT_TERM_REQUEST		0x8000fffe
 #define SVM_VMGEXIT_TERM_REASON(reason_set, reason_code)	\
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c b/arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c
index 62584a347931..f59ed284ec5b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c
@@ -1502,6 +1502,8 @@ static void setup_local_APIC(void)
 		return;
 	}
 
+	if (apic->setup)
+		apic->setup();
 	/*
 	 * If this comes from kexec/kcrash the APIC might be enabled in
 	 * SPIV. Soft disable it before doing further initialization.
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/apic/x2apic_savic.c b/arch/x86/kernel/apic/x2apic_savic.c
index 28cb32e3d803..44a44fe242bf 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/apic/x2apic_savic.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/apic/x2apic_savic.c
@@ -9,12 +9,25 @@
 
 #include <linux/cpumask.h>
 #include <linux/cc_platform.h>
+#include <linux/percpu-defs.h>
 
 #include <asm/apic.h>
 #include <asm/sev.h>
 
 #include "local.h"
 
+/* APIC_EILVTn(3) is the last defined APIC register. */
+#define NR_APIC_REGS	(APIC_EILVTn(4) >> 2)
+
+struct apic_page {
+	union {
+		u32	regs[NR_APIC_REGS];
+		u8	bytes[PAGE_SIZE];
+	};
+} __aligned(PAGE_SIZE);
+
+static struct apic_page __percpu *apic_page __ro_after_init;
+
 static int x2apic_savic_acpi_madt_oem_check(char *oem_id, char *oem_table_id)
 {
 	return x2apic_enabled() && cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_SNP_SECURE_AVIC);
@@ -60,6 +73,30 @@ static void x2apic_savic_send_ipi_mask_allbutself(const struct cpumask *mask, in
 	__send_ipi_mask(mask, vector, true);
 }
 
+static void x2apic_savic_setup(void)
+{
+	void *backing_page;
+	enum es_result ret;
+	unsigned long gpa;
+
+	backing_page = this_cpu_ptr(apic_page);
+	gpa = __pa(backing_page);
+
+	/*
+	 * The NPT entry for a vCPU's APIC backing page must always be
+	 * present when the vCPU is running in order for Secure AVIC to
+	 * function. A VMEXIT_BUSY is returned on VMRUN and the vCPU cannot
+	 * be resumed if the NPT entry for the APIC backing page is not
+	 * present. Notify GPA of the vCPU's APIC backing page to the
+	 * hypervisor by calling savic_register_gpa(). Before executing
+	 * VMRUN, the hypervisor makes use of this information to make sure
+	 * the APIC backing page is mapped in NPT.
+	 */
+	ret = savic_register_gpa(gpa);
+	if (ret != ES_OK)
+		snp_abort();
+}
+
 static int x2apic_savic_probe(void)
 {
 	if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_SNP_SECURE_AVIC))
@@ -70,6 +107,10 @@ static int x2apic_savic_probe(void)
 		snp_abort();
 	}
 
+	apic_page = alloc_percpu(struct apic_page);
+	if (!apic_page)
+		snp_abort();
+
 	return 1;
 }
 
@@ -78,6 +119,7 @@ static struct apic apic_x2apic_savic __ro_after_init = {
 	.name				= "secure avic x2apic",
 	.probe				= x2apic_savic_probe,
 	.acpi_madt_oem_check		= x2apic_savic_acpi_madt_oem_check,
+	.setup				= x2apic_savic_setup,
 
 	.dest_mode_logical		= false,
 
-- 
2.34.1


  parent reply	other threads:[~2025-04-01 11:37 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 30+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-04-01 11:35 [PATCH v3 00/17] AMD: Add Secure AVIC Guest Support Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-04-01 11:36 ` [PATCH v3 01/17] x86/apic: Add new driver for Secure AVIC Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-04-03 11:34   ` Thomas Gleixner
2025-04-03 11:42     ` Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-04-01 11:36 ` Neeraj Upadhyay [this message]
2025-04-03 11:37   ` [PATCH v3 02/17] x86/apic: Initialize Secure AVIC APIC backing page Thomas Gleixner
2025-04-03 11:44     ` Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-04-01 11:36 ` [PATCH v3 03/17] x86/apic: Populate .read()/.write() callbacks of Secure AVIC driver Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-04-01 11:36 ` [PATCH v3 04/17] x86/apic: Initialize APIC ID for Secure AVIC Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-04-01 11:36 ` [PATCH v3 05/17] x86/apic: Add update_vector callback " Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-04-01 11:36 ` [PATCH v3 06/17] x86/apic: Add support to send IPI " Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-04-03 11:45   ` Thomas Gleixner
2025-04-03 11:58     ` Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-04-01 11:36 ` [PATCH v3 07/17] x86/apic: Support LAPIC timer " Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-04-03 12:13   ` Thomas Gleixner
2025-04-03 12:36     ` Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-04-01 11:36 ` [PATCH v3 08/17] x86/sev: Initialize VGIF for secondary VCPUs " Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-04-01 11:36 ` [PATCH v3 09/17] x86/apic: Add support to send NMI IPI " Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-04-01 11:36 ` [PATCH v3 10/17] x86/apic: Allow NMI to be injected from hypervisor " Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-04-01 11:36 ` [PATCH v3 11/17] x86/sev: Enable NMI support " Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-04-01 11:36 ` [PATCH v3 12/17] x86/apic: Read and write LVT* APIC registers from HV for SAVIC guests Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-04-14 23:57   ` Liz Jordan
2025-04-01 11:36 ` [PATCH v3 13/17] x86/apic: Handle EOI writes " Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-04-07 15:45   ` Sean Christopherson
2025-04-07 16:19     ` Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-04-01 11:36 ` [PATCH v3 14/17] x86/apic: Add kexec support for Secure AVIC Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-04-11 17:01   ` Francesco Lavra
2025-04-01 11:36 ` [PATCH v3 15/17] x86/apic: Enable Secure AVIC in Control MSR Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-04-01 11:36 ` [PATCH v3 16/17] x86/sev: Prevent SECURE_AVIC_CONTROL MSR interception for Secure AVIC guests Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-04-01 11:36 ` [PATCH v3 17/17] x86/sev: Indicate SEV-SNP guest supports Secure AVIC Neeraj Upadhyay

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