From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
To: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH] KVM: x86: Acquire SRCU in KVM_GET_MP_STATE to protect guest memory accesses
Date: Tue, 1 Apr 2025 08:05:04 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250401150504.829812-1-seanjc@google.com> (raw)
Acquire a lock on kvm->srcu when userspace is getting MP state to handle a
rather extreme edge case where "accepting" APIC events, i.e. processing
pending INIT or SIPI, can trigger accesses to guest memory. If the vCPU
is in L2 with INIT *and* a TRIPLE_FAULT request pending, then getting MP
state will trigger a nested VM-Exit by way of ->check_nested_events(), and
emuating the nested VM-Exit can access guest memory.
The splat was originally hit by syzkaller on a Google-internal kernel, and
reproduced on an upstream kernel by hacking the triple_fault_event_test
selftest to stuff a pending INIT, store an MSR on VM-Exit (to generate a
memory access on VMX), and do vcpu_mp_state_get() to trigger the scenario.
=============================
WARNING: suspicious RCU usage
6.14.0-rc3-b112d356288b-vmx/pi_lockdep_false_pos-lock #3 Not tainted
-----------------------------
include/linux/kvm_host.h:1058 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage!
other info that might help us debug this:
rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1
1 lock held by triple_fault_ev/1256:
#0: ffff88810df5a330 (&vcpu->mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x8b/0x9a0 [kvm]
stack backtrace:
CPU: 11 UID: 1000 PID: 1256 Comm: triple_fault_ev Not tainted 6.14.0-rc3-b112d356288b-vmx #3
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x7f/0x90
lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x144/0x190
kvm_vcpu_gfn_to_memslot+0x156/0x180 [kvm]
kvm_vcpu_read_guest+0x3e/0x90 [kvm]
read_and_check_msr_entry+0x2e/0x180 [kvm_intel]
__nested_vmx_vmexit+0x550/0xde0 [kvm_intel]
kvm_check_nested_events+0x1b/0x30 [kvm]
kvm_apic_accept_events+0x33/0x100 [kvm]
kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_get_mpstate+0x30/0x1d0 [kvm]
kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x33e/0x9a0 [kvm]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x8b/0xb0
do_syscall_64+0x6c/0x170
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
</TASK>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
---
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 4 ++++
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index c841817a914a..3712dde0bf9d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -11786,6 +11786,8 @@ int kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_get_mpstate(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
if (kvm_mpx_supported())
kvm_load_guest_fpu(vcpu);
+ kvm_vcpu_srcu_read_lock(vcpu);
+
r = kvm_apic_accept_events(vcpu);
if (r < 0)
goto out;
@@ -11799,6 +11801,8 @@ int kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_get_mpstate(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
mp_state->mp_state = vcpu->arch.mp_state;
out:
+ kvm_vcpu_srcu_read_unlock(vcpu);
+
if (kvm_mpx_supported())
kvm_put_guest_fpu(vcpu);
vcpu_put(vcpu);
base-commit: 782f9feaa9517caf33186dcdd6b50a8f770ed29b
--
2.49.0.472.ge94155a9ec-goog
next reply other threads:[~2025-04-01 15:05 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-04-01 15:05 Sean Christopherson [this message]
2025-04-04 10:35 ` Paolo Bonzini
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