From: Joel Savitz <jsavitz@redhat.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Joel Savitz <jsavitz@redhat.com>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v2] docs: namespace: Tweak and reword resource control doc
Date: Sat, 19 Apr 2025 11:04:28 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250419150428.1129352-1-jsavitz@redhat.com> (raw)
Fix the document title and reword the phrasing to active voice.
Signed-off-by: Joel Savitz <jsavitz@redhat.com>
---
Changes since v1:
- Fix spelling of resource
.../namespaces/resource-control.rst | 24 +++++++++----------
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/namespaces/resource-control.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/namespaces/resource-control.rst
index 369556e00f0c..350134c26a98 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/namespaces/resource-control.rst
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/namespaces/resource-control.rst
@@ -1,17 +1,17 @@
-===========================
-Namespaces research control
-===========================
+====================================
+User namespaces and resource control
+====================================
-There are a lot of kinds of objects in the kernel that don't have
-individual limits or that have limits that are ineffective when a set
-of processes is allowed to switch user ids. With user namespaces
-enabled in a kernel for people who don't trust their users or their
-users programs to play nice this problems becomes more acute.
+The kernel contains many kinds of objects that either don't have
+individual limits or that have limits which are ineffective when
+a set of processes is allowed to switch their UID. On a system
+where there admins don't trust their users or their users' programs,
+user namespaces expose the system to potential misuse of resources.
-Therefore it is recommended that memory control groups be enabled in
-kernels that enable user namespaces, and it is further recommended
-that userspace configure memory control groups to limit how much
-memory user's they don't trust to play nice can use.
+In order to mitigate this, we recommend that admins enable memory
+control groups on any system that enables user namespaces.
+Furthermore, we recommend that admins configure the memory control
+groups to limit the maximum memory usable by any untrusted user.
Memory control groups can be configured by installing the libcgroup
package present on most distros editing /etc/cgrules.conf,
--
2.45.2
next reply other threads:[~2025-04-19 15:04 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-04-19 15:04 Joel Savitz [this message]
2025-04-20 2:34 ` Bagas Sanjaya
2025-04-21 16:14 ` Joel Savitz
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