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From: Joel Savitz <jsavitz@redhat.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Joel Savitz <jsavitz@redhat.com>,
	Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
	linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v3] docs: namespace: Tweak and reword resource control doc
Date: Mon, 21 Apr 2025 12:17:23 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250421161723.1138903-1-jsavitz@redhat.com> (raw)

Fix the document title and reword the phrasing to active voice.

Signed-off-by: Joel Savitz <jsavitz@redhat.com>
---
Changes since v2:
- Fix another typo
Changes since v1:
- Fix spelling of resource

 .../namespaces/resource-control.rst           | 24 +++++++++----------
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/namespaces/resource-control.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/namespaces/resource-control.rst
index 369556e00f0c..553a44803231 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/namespaces/resource-control.rst
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/namespaces/resource-control.rst
@@ -1,17 +1,17 @@
-===========================
-Namespaces research control
-===========================
+====================================
+User namespaces and resource control
+====================================
 
-There are a lot of kinds of objects in the kernel that don't have
-individual limits or that have limits that are ineffective when a set
-of processes is allowed to switch user ids.  With user namespaces
-enabled in a kernel for people who don't trust their users or their
-users programs to play nice this problems becomes more acute.
+The kernel contains many kinds of objects that either don't have
+individual limits or that have limits which are ineffective when
+a set of processes is allowed to switch their UID. On a system
+where the admins don't trust their users or their users' programs,
+user namespaces expose the system to potential misuse of resources.
 
-Therefore it is recommended that memory control groups be enabled in
-kernels that enable user namespaces, and it is further recommended
-that userspace configure memory control groups to limit how much
-memory user's they don't trust to play nice can use.
+In order to mitigate this, we recommend that admins enable memory
+control groups on any system that enables user namespaces.
+Furthermore, we recommend that admins configure the memory control
+groups to limit the maximum memory usable by any untrusted user.
 
 Memory control groups can be configured by installing the libcgroup
 package present on most distros editing /etc/cgrules.conf,
-- 
2.45.2


             reply	other threads:[~2025-04-21 16:17 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-04-21 16:17 Joel Savitz [this message]
2025-04-28 12:54 ` Joel Savitz
2025-04-28 14:28 ` Bagas Sanjaya
2025-04-29  0:01 ` Jonathan Corbet

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