From: Xu Yilun <yilun.xu@linux.intel.com>
To: kvm@vger.kernel.org, sumit.semwal@linaro.org,
christian.koenig@amd.com, pbonzini@redhat.com, seanjc@google.com,
alex.williamson@redhat.com, jgg@nvidia.com,
dan.j.williams@intel.com, aik@amd.com,
linux-coco@lists.linux.dev
Cc: dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org, linux-media@vger.kernel.org,
linaro-mm-sig@lists.linaro.org, vivek.kasireddy@intel.com,
yilun.xu@intel.com, yilun.xu@linux.intel.com,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, lukas@wunner.de,
yan.y.zhao@intel.com, daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch, leon@kernel.org,
baolu.lu@linux.intel.com, zhenzhong.duan@intel.com,
tao1.su@intel.com, linux-pci@vger.kernel.org, zhiw@nvidia.com,
simona.vetter@ffwll.ch, shameerali.kolothum.thodi@huawei.com,
aneesh.kumar@kernel.org, iommu@lists.linux.dev,
kevin.tian@intel.com
Subject: [RFC PATCH 17/30] iommufd/device: Add TSM Bind/Unbind for TIO support
Date: Thu, 29 May 2025 13:35:00 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250529053513.1592088-18-yilun.xu@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250529053513.1592088-1-yilun.xu@linux.intel.com>
Add new kAPIs against iommufd_device to support TSM Bind/Unbind
commands issued by CoCo-VM. The TSM bind means VMM does all
preparations for private device assignement, lock down the device by
transiting it to TDISP CONFIG_LOCKED or RUN state (when in RUN state,
TSM could still block any accessing to/from device), so that the device
is ready for attestation by CoCo-VM.
The interfaces are added against IOMMUFD because IOMMUFD builds several
abstract objects applicable for private device assignment, e.g. viommu
for secure iommu & kvm, vdevice for vBDF. IOMMUFD links them up to
finish all configurations required by secure firmware. That also means
TSM Bind interface should be called after viommu & vdevice allocation.
Suggested-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com>
Originally-by: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Xu Yilun <yilun.xu@linux.intel.com>
---
drivers/iommu/iommufd/device.c | 84 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
drivers/iommu/iommufd/iommufd_private.h | 6 ++
drivers/iommu/iommufd/viommu.c | 44 +++++++++++++
include/linux/iommufd.h | 3 +
4 files changed, 137 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/iommu/iommufd/device.c b/drivers/iommu/iommufd/device.c
index 37ef6bec2009..984780c66ab2 100644
--- a/drivers/iommu/iommufd/device.c
+++ b/drivers/iommu/iommufd/device.c
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
*/
#include <linux/iommu.h>
#include <linux/iommufd.h>
+#include <linux/pci.h>
#include <linux/pci-ats.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <uapi/linux/iommufd.h>
@@ -1561,3 +1562,86 @@ int iommufd_get_hw_info(struct iommufd_ucmd *ucmd)
iommufd_put_object(ucmd->ictx, &idev->obj);
return rc;
}
+
+/**
+ * iommufd_device_tsm_bind - Move a device to TSM Bind state
+ * @idev: device to attach
+ * @vdev_id: Input a IOMMUFD_OBJ_VDEVICE
+ *
+ * This configures for device Confidential Computing(CC), and moves the device
+ * to the TSM Bind state. Once this completes the device is locked down (TDISP
+ * CONFIG_LOCKED or RUN), waiting for guest's attestation.
+ *
+ * This function is undone by calling iommufd_device_tsm_unbind().
+ */
+int iommufd_device_tsm_bind(struct iommufd_device *idev, u32 vdevice_id)
+{
+ struct iommufd_vdevice *vdev;
+ int rc;
+
+ if (!dev_is_pci(idev->dev))
+ return -ENODEV;
+
+ vdev = container_of(iommufd_get_object(idev->ictx, vdevice_id, IOMMUFD_OBJ_VDEVICE),
+ struct iommufd_vdevice, obj);
+ if (IS_ERR(vdev))
+ return PTR_ERR(vdev);
+
+ if (vdev->dev != idev->dev) {
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out_put_vdev;
+ }
+
+ mutex_lock(&idev->igroup->lock);
+ if (idev->vdev) {
+ rc = -EEXIST;
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
+
+ rc = iommufd_vdevice_tsm_bind(vdev);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out_unlock;
+
+ idev->vdev = vdev;
+ refcount_inc(&vdev->obj.users);
+ mutex_unlock(&idev->igroup->lock);
+
+ /*
+ * Pairs with iommufd_device_tsm_unbind() - catches caller bugs attempting
+ * to destroy a bound device.
+ */
+ refcount_inc(&idev->obj.users);
+ goto out_put_vdev;
+
+out_unlock:
+ mutex_unlock(&idev->igroup->lock);
+out_put_vdev:
+ iommufd_put_object(idev->ictx, &vdev->obj);
+ return rc;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_NS_GPL(iommufd_device_tsm_bind, "IOMMUFD");
+
+/**
+ * iommufd_device_tsm_unbind - Move a device out of TSM bind state
+ * @idev: device to detach
+ *
+ * Undo iommufd_device_tsm_bind(). This removes all Confidential Computing
+ * configurations, Once this completes the device is unlocked (TDISP
+ * CONFIG_UNLOCKED).
+ */
+void iommufd_device_tsm_unbind(struct iommufd_device *idev)
+{
+ mutex_lock(&idev->igroup->lock);
+ if (!idev->vdev) {
+ mutex_unlock(&idev->igroup->lock);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ iommufd_vdevice_tsm_unbind(idev->vdev);
+ refcount_dec(&idev->vdev->obj.users);
+ idev->vdev = NULL;
+ mutex_unlock(&idev->igroup->lock);
+
+ refcount_dec(&idev->obj.users);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_NS_GPL(iommufd_device_tsm_unbind, "IOMMUFD");
diff --git a/drivers/iommu/iommufd/iommufd_private.h b/drivers/iommu/iommufd/iommufd_private.h
index 297e4e2a12d1..29af8616e4aa 100644
--- a/drivers/iommu/iommufd/iommufd_private.h
+++ b/drivers/iommu/iommufd/iommufd_private.h
@@ -430,6 +430,7 @@ struct iommufd_device {
/* protect iopf_enabled counter */
struct mutex iopf_lock;
unsigned int iopf_enabled;
+ struct iommufd_vdevice *vdev;
};
static inline struct iommufd_device *
@@ -615,8 +616,13 @@ struct iommufd_vdevice {
struct iommufd_viommu *viommu;
struct device *dev;
u64 id; /* per-vIOMMU virtual ID */
+ struct mutex tsm_lock;
+ bool tsm_bound;
};
+int iommufd_vdevice_tsm_bind(struct iommufd_vdevice *vdev);
+void iommufd_vdevice_tsm_unbind(struct iommufd_vdevice *vdev);
+
#ifdef CONFIG_IOMMUFD_TEST
int iommufd_test(struct iommufd_ucmd *ucmd);
void iommufd_selftest_destroy(struct iommufd_object *obj);
diff --git a/drivers/iommu/iommufd/viommu.c b/drivers/iommu/iommufd/viommu.c
index 2fcef3f8d1a5..296143e21368 100644
--- a/drivers/iommu/iommufd/viommu.c
+++ b/drivers/iommu/iommufd/viommu.c
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM)
#include <linux/kvm_host.h>
#endif
+#include <linux/pci-tsm.h>
#include "iommufd_private.h"
@@ -193,11 +194,13 @@ int iommufd_vdevice_alloc_ioctl(struct iommufd_ucmd *ucmd)
goto out_put_idev;
}
+ vdev->ictx = ucmd->ictx; //This is a unrelated fix for vdevice alloc
vdev->id = virt_id;
vdev->dev = idev->dev;
get_device(idev->dev);
vdev->viommu = viommu;
refcount_inc(&viommu->obj.users);
+ mutex_init(&vdev->tsm_lock);
curr = xa_cmpxchg(&viommu->vdevs, virt_id, NULL, vdev, GFP_KERNEL);
if (curr) {
@@ -220,3 +223,44 @@ int iommufd_vdevice_alloc_ioctl(struct iommufd_ucmd *ucmd)
iommufd_put_object(ucmd->ictx, &viommu->obj);
return rc;
}
+
+int iommufd_vdevice_tsm_bind(struct iommufd_vdevice *vdev)
+{
+ struct kvm *kvm;
+ int rc;
+
+ mutex_lock(&vdev->tsm_lock);
+ if (vdev->tsm_bound) {
+ rc = -EEXIST;
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
+
+ kvm = vdev->viommu->kvm;
+ if (!kvm) {
+ rc = -ENOENT;
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
+
+ rc = pci_tsm_bind(to_pci_dev(vdev->dev), kvm, vdev->id);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out_unlock;
+
+ vdev->tsm_bound = true;
+
+out_unlock:
+ mutex_unlock(&vdev->tsm_lock);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+void iommufd_vdevice_tsm_unbind(struct iommufd_vdevice *vdev)
+{
+ mutex_lock(&vdev->tsm_lock);
+ if (!vdev->tsm_bound)
+ goto out_unlock;
+
+ pci_tsm_unbind(to_pci_dev(vdev->dev));
+ vdev->tsm_bound = false;
+
+out_unlock:
+ mutex_unlock(&vdev->tsm_lock);
+}
diff --git a/include/linux/iommufd.h b/include/linux/iommufd.h
index 2712421802b9..5f9a286232ac 100644
--- a/include/linux/iommufd.h
+++ b/include/linux/iommufd.h
@@ -63,6 +63,9 @@ int iommufd_device_replace(struct iommufd_device *idev, ioasid_t pasid,
u32 *pt_id);
void iommufd_device_detach(struct iommufd_device *idev, ioasid_t pasid);
+int iommufd_device_tsm_bind(struct iommufd_device *idev, u32 vdevice_id);
+void iommufd_device_tsm_unbind(struct iommufd_device *idev);
+
struct iommufd_ctx *iommufd_device_to_ictx(struct iommufd_device *idev);
u32 iommufd_device_to_id(struct iommufd_device *idev);
--
2.25.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-05-29 5:43 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 75+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-05-29 5:34 [RFC PATCH 00/30] Host side (KVM/VFIO/IOMMUFD) support for TDISP using TSM Xu Yilun
2025-05-29 5:34 ` [RFC PATCH 01/30] HACK: dma-buf: Introduce dma_buf_get_pfn_unlocked() kAPI Xu Yilun
2025-05-29 5:34 ` [RFC PATCH 02/30] vfio: Export vfio device get and put registration helpers Xu Yilun
2025-05-29 5:34 ` [RFC PATCH 03/30] vfio/pci: Share the core device pointer while invoking feature functions Xu Yilun
2025-05-29 5:34 ` [RFC PATCH 04/30] vfio/pci: Allow MMIO regions to be exported through dma-buf Xu Yilun
2025-05-29 5:34 ` [RFC PATCH 05/30] fixup! vfio/pci: fix dma-buf revoke typo on reset Xu Yilun
2025-05-29 5:34 ` [RFC PATCH 06/30] HACK: vfio/pci: Support get_pfn() callback for dma-buf Xu Yilun
2025-05-29 5:34 ` [RFC PATCH 07/30] KVM: Support vfio_dmabuf backed MMIO region Xu Yilun
2025-05-29 5:34 ` [RFC PATCH 08/30] KVM: x86/mmu: Handle page fault for vfio_dmabuf backed MMIO Xu Yilun
2025-05-29 5:34 ` [RFC PATCH 09/30] KVM: x86/mmu: Handle page fault for private MMIO Xu Yilun
2025-05-29 5:34 ` [RFC PATCH 10/30] vfio/pci: Export vfio dma-buf specific info for importers Xu Yilun
2025-06-02 13:30 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2025-06-03 5:01 ` Xu Yilun
2026-07-12 1:01 ` Ackerley Tng
2026-07-12 22:19 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-07-13 23:16 ` Ackerley Tng
2026-07-13 19:08 ` Fuad Tabba
2026-07-13 19:17 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-07-13 22:40 ` Ackerley Tng
2026-07-14 6:38 ` Fuad Tabba
2025-05-29 5:34 ` [RFC PATCH 11/30] KVM: vfio_dmabuf: Fetch VFIO specific dma-buf data for sanity check Xu Yilun
2025-05-29 5:34 ` [RFC PATCH 12/30] iommufd/device: Associate a kvm pointer to iommufd_device Xu Yilun
2025-05-29 5:34 ` [RFC PATCH 13/30] fixup! iommufd/selftest: Sync iommufd_device_bind() change to selftest Xu Yilun
2025-05-29 5:34 ` [RFC PATCH 14/30] iommu/arm-smmu-v3-iommufd: Pass in kvm pointer to viommu_alloc Xu Yilun
2025-05-29 5:34 ` [RFC PATCH 15/30] fixup: iommu/selftest: Sync .viommu_alloc() change to selftest Xu Yilun
2025-05-29 5:34 ` [RFC PATCH 16/30] iommufd/viommu: track the kvm pointer & its refcount in viommu core Xu Yilun
2025-05-29 5:35 ` Xu Yilun [this message]
2025-06-02 12:43 ` [RFC PATCH 17/30] iommufd/device: Add TSM Bind/Unbind for TIO support Aneesh Kumar K.V
2025-06-03 6:20 ` Xu Yilun
2025-06-03 12:21 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2025-06-04 8:40 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2025-06-04 13:24 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2025-06-06 7:59 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2025-05-29 5:35 ` [RFC PATCH 18/30] iommufd/viommu: Add trusted IOMMU configuration handlers for vdev Xu Yilun
2025-05-29 5:35 ` [RFC PATCH 19/30] vfio/pci: Add TSM TDI bind/unbind IOCTLs for TEE-IO support Xu Yilun
2025-06-01 10:45 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2025-06-02 14:43 ` Xu Yilun
2025-06-04 13:37 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2025-06-05 9:41 ` Xu Yilun
2025-06-05 15:09 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2025-06-06 3:25 ` Xu Yilun
2025-06-05 16:09 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2025-06-16 8:16 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2025-06-18 4:54 ` Xu Yilun
2025-06-05 12:03 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2025-06-05 15:10 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2025-06-05 16:17 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2025-06-05 16:33 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2025-06-06 4:26 ` Xu Yilun
2025-06-06 9:32 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2025-06-06 12:09 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2025-05-29 5:35 ` [RFC PATCH 20/30] vfio/pci: Do TSM Unbind before zapping bars Xu Yilun
2025-06-02 5:20 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2025-06-02 13:56 ` Xu Yilun
2025-06-02 14:00 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2025-06-03 4:50 ` Xu Yilun
2025-05-29 5:35 ` [RFC PATCH 21/30] iommufd/vdevice: Add TSM Guest request uAPI Xu Yilun
2025-05-29 5:35 ` [RFC PATCH 22/30] fixup! PCI/TSM: Change the guest request type definition Xu Yilun
2025-05-29 5:35 ` [RFC PATCH 23/30] coco/tdx_tsm: Introduce a "tdx" subsystem and "tsm" device Xu Yilun
2025-05-29 5:35 ` [RFC PATCH 24/30] coco/tdx_tsm: TEE Security Manager driver for TDX Xu Yilun
2025-05-29 5:35 ` [RFC PATCH 25/30] coco/tdx_tsm: Add connect()/disconnect() handlers prototype Xu Yilun
2025-05-29 5:35 ` [RFC PATCH 26/30] coco/tdx_tsm: Add bind()/unbind()/guest_req() " Xu Yilun
2025-05-29 5:35 ` [RFC PATCH 27/30] PCI/TSM: Add PCI driver callbacks to handle TSM requirements Xu Yilun
2025-06-02 13:06 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2025-06-03 5:52 ` Xu Yilun
2025-05-29 5:35 ` [RFC PATCH 28/30] vfio/pci: Implement TSM handlers for MMIO Xu Yilun
2025-05-29 5:35 ` [RFC PATCH 29/30] iommufd/vdevice: Implement TSM handlers for trusted DMA Xu Yilun
2025-05-29 5:35 ` [RFC PATCH 30/30] coco/tdx_tsm: Manage TDX Module enforced operation sequences for Unbind Xu Yilun
2025-06-02 13:37 ` [RFC PATCH 00/30] Host side (KVM/VFIO/IOMMUFD) support for TDISP using TSM Jason Gunthorpe
2025-06-20 4:21 ` Xu Yilun
2025-06-11 1:55 ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2025-06-21 1:07 ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2025-06-25 10:45 ` Xu Yilun
2025-07-11 23:08 ` dan.j.williams
2025-07-15 11:09 ` Jonathan Cameron
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