From: Roman Kisel <romank@linux.microsoft.com>
To: alok.a.tiwari@oracle.com, arnd@arndb.de, bp@alien8.de,
corbet@lwn.net, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, decui@microsoft.com,
haiyangz@microsoft.com, hpa@zytor.com, kys@microsoft.com,
mingo@redhat.com, mhklinux@outlook.com, tglx@linutronix.de,
wei.liu@kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-hyperv@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org
Cc: apais@microsoft.com, benhill@microsoft.com,
bperkins@microsoft.com, sunilmut@microsoft.com
Subject: [PATCH hyperv-next v3 06/15] Drivers: hv: Allocate the paravisor SynIC pages when required
Date: Tue, 3 Jun 2025 17:43:32 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250604004341.7194-7-romank@linux.microsoft.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250604004341.7194-1-romank@linux.microsoft.com>
The paravisor needs the SynIC pages to communicate with the guest
via the confidential VMBus.
Refactor and extaned the exisitng code to account for that.
Signed-off-by: Roman Kisel <romank@linux.microsoft.com>
---
drivers/hv/hv.c | 184 +++++++++++++++++++-------------------
drivers/hv/hyperv_vmbus.h | 17 ++++
2 files changed, 111 insertions(+), 90 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/hv/hv.c b/drivers/hv/hv.c
index 964b9102477d..e25c91eb6af5 100644
--- a/drivers/hv/hv.c
+++ b/drivers/hv/hv.c
@@ -94,10 +94,70 @@ int hv_post_message(union hv_connection_id connection_id,
return hv_result(status);
}
+static int hv_alloc_page(unsigned int cpu, void **page, bool decrypt,
+ const char *note)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * After the page changes its encryption status, its contents might
+ * appear scrambled on some hardware. Thus `get_zeroed_page` would
+ * zero the page out in vain, we do that ourselves exactly once.
+ *
+ * By default, the page is allocated encrypted provided the system
+ * supports that.
+ */
+ *page = (void *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!*page)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ if (decrypt)
+ ret = set_memory_decrypted((unsigned long)*page, 1);
+ if (ret)
+ goto failed;
+
+ memset(*page, 0, PAGE_SIZE);
+ return 0;
+
+failed:
+
+ pr_err("allocation failed for %s page, error %d when allocating the page, decrypted %d\n",
+ note, ret, decrypt);
+ free_page((unsigned long)*page);
+ *page = NULL;
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int hv_free_page(void **page, bool encrypt, const char *note)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ if (!*page)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (encrypt)
+ ret = set_memory_encrypted((unsigned long)*page, 1);
+
+ /*
+ * In the case of the action failure, the page is leaked.
+ * Something is wrong, prefer to lose the page and stay afloat.
+ */
+ if (ret) {
+ pr_err("deallocation failed for %s page, error %d, encrypt %d\n",
+ note, ret, encrypt);
+ } else
+ free_page((unsigned long)*page);
+
+ *page = NULL;
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
int hv_synic_alloc(void)
{
int cpu, ret = -ENOMEM;
struct hv_per_cpu_context *hv_cpu;
+ const bool decrypt = !vmbus_is_confidential();
/*
* First, zero all per-cpu memory areas so hv_synic_free() can
@@ -123,73 +183,37 @@ int hv_synic_alloc(void)
vmbus_on_msg_dpc, (unsigned long)hv_cpu);
if (ms_hyperv.paravisor_present && hv_isolation_type_tdx()) {
- hv_cpu->post_msg_page = (void *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_ATOMIC);
- if (!hv_cpu->post_msg_page) {
- pr_err("Unable to allocate post msg page\n");
- goto err;
- }
-
- ret = set_memory_decrypted((unsigned long)hv_cpu->post_msg_page, 1);
- if (ret) {
- pr_err("Failed to decrypt post msg page: %d\n", ret);
- /* Just leak the page, as it's unsafe to free the page. */
- hv_cpu->post_msg_page = NULL;
+ ret = hv_alloc_page(cpu, &hv_cpu->post_msg_page,
+ decrypt, "post msg");
+ if (ret)
goto err;
- }
-
- memset(hv_cpu->post_msg_page, 0, PAGE_SIZE);
}
/*
- * Synic message and event pages are allocated by paravisor.
- * Skip these pages allocation here.
+ * If these SynIC pages are not allocated, SIEF and SIM pages
+ * are configured using what the root partition or the paravisor
+ * provides upon reading the SIEFP and SIMP registers.
*/
if (!ms_hyperv.paravisor_present && !hv_root_partition()) {
- hv_cpu->hyp_synic_message_page =
- (void *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_ATOMIC);
- if (!hv_cpu->hyp_synic_message_page) {
- pr_err("Unable to allocate SYNIC message page\n");
+ ret = hv_alloc_page(cpu, &hv_cpu->hyp_synic_message_page,
+ decrypt, "hypervisor SynIC msg");
+ if (ret)
goto err;
- }
-
- hv_cpu->hyp_synic_event_page =
- (void *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_ATOMIC);
- if (!hv_cpu->hyp_synic_event_page) {
- pr_err("Unable to allocate SYNIC event page\n");
-
- free_page((unsigned long)hv_cpu->hyp_synic_message_page);
- hv_cpu->hyp_synic_message_page = NULL;
+ ret = hv_alloc_page(cpu, &hv_cpu->hyp_synic_event_page,
+ decrypt, "hypervisor SynIC event");
+ if (ret)
goto err;
}
- }
- if (!ms_hyperv.paravisor_present &&
- (hv_isolation_type_snp() || hv_isolation_type_tdx())) {
- ret = set_memory_decrypted((unsigned long)
- hv_cpu->hyp_synic_message_page, 1);
- if (ret) {
- pr_err("Failed to decrypt SYNIC msg page: %d\n", ret);
- hv_cpu->hyp_synic_message_page = NULL;
-
- /*
- * Free the event page here so that hv_synic_free()
- * won't later try to re-encrypt it.
- */
- free_page((unsigned long)hv_cpu->hyp_synic_event_page);
- hv_cpu->hyp_synic_event_page = NULL;
+ if (vmbus_is_confidential()) {
+ ret = hv_alloc_page(cpu, &hv_cpu->para_synic_message_page,
+ decrypt, "paravisor SynIC msg");
+ if (ret)
goto err;
- }
-
- ret = set_memory_decrypted((unsigned long)
- hv_cpu->hyp_synic_event_page, 1);
- if (ret) {
- pr_err("Failed to decrypt SYNIC event page: %d\n", ret);
- hv_cpu->hyp_synic_event_page = NULL;
+ ret = hv_alloc_page(cpu, &hv_cpu->para_synic_event_page,
+ decrypt, "paravisor SynIC event");
+ if (ret)
goto err;
- }
-
- memset(hv_cpu->hyp_synic_message_page, 0, PAGE_SIZE);
- memset(hv_cpu->hyp_synic_event_page, 0, PAGE_SIZE);
}
}
@@ -205,48 +229,28 @@ int hv_synic_alloc(void)
void hv_synic_free(void)
{
- int cpu, ret;
+ int cpu;
+ const bool encrypt = !vmbus_is_confidential();
for_each_present_cpu(cpu) {
struct hv_per_cpu_context *hv_cpu =
per_cpu_ptr(hv_context.cpu_context, cpu);
- /* It's better to leak the page if the encryption fails. */
- if (ms_hyperv.paravisor_present && hv_isolation_type_tdx()) {
- if (hv_cpu->post_msg_page) {
- ret = set_memory_encrypted((unsigned long)
- hv_cpu->post_msg_page, 1);
- if (ret) {
- pr_err("Failed to encrypt post msg page: %d\n", ret);
- hv_cpu->post_msg_page = NULL;
- }
- }
+ if (ms_hyperv.paravisor_present && hv_isolation_type_tdx())
+ hv_free_page(&hv_cpu->post_msg_page,
+ encrypt, "post msg");
+ if (!ms_hyperv.paravisor_present && !hv_root_partition()) {
+ hv_free_page(&hv_cpu->hyp_synic_event_page,
+ encrypt, "hypervisor SynIC event");
+ hv_free_page(&hv_cpu->hyp_synic_message_page,
+ encrypt, "hypervisor SynIC msg");
}
-
- if (!ms_hyperv.paravisor_present &&
- (hv_isolation_type_snp() || hv_isolation_type_tdx())) {
- if (hv_cpu->hyp_synic_message_page) {
- ret = set_memory_encrypted((unsigned long)
- hv_cpu->hyp_synic_message_page, 1);
- if (ret) {
- pr_err("Failed to encrypt SYNIC msg page: %d\n", ret);
- hv_cpu->hyp_synic_message_page = NULL;
- }
- }
-
- if (hv_cpu->hyp_synic_event_page) {
- ret = set_memory_encrypted((unsigned long)
- hv_cpu->hyp_synic_event_page, 1);
- if (ret) {
- pr_err("Failed to encrypt SYNIC event page: %d\n", ret);
- hv_cpu->hyp_synic_event_page = NULL;
- }
- }
+ if (vmbus_is_confidential()) {
+ hv_free_page(&hv_cpu->para_synic_event_page,
+ encrypt, "paravisor SynIC event");
+ hv_free_page(&hv_cpu->para_synic_message_page,
+ encrypt, "paravisor SynIC msg");
}
-
- free_page((unsigned long)hv_cpu->post_msg_page);
- free_page((unsigned long)hv_cpu->hyp_synic_event_page);
- free_page((unsigned long)hv_cpu->hyp_synic_message_page);
}
kfree(hv_context.hv_numa_map);
diff --git a/drivers/hv/hyperv_vmbus.h b/drivers/hv/hyperv_vmbus.h
index fc3cdb26ff1a..9619edcf9f88 100644
--- a/drivers/hv/hyperv_vmbus.h
+++ b/drivers/hv/hyperv_vmbus.h
@@ -120,8 +120,25 @@ enum {
* Per cpu state for channel handling
*/
struct hv_per_cpu_context {
+ /*
+ * SynIC pages for communicating with the host.
+ *
+ * These pages are accessible to the host partition and the hypervisor,
+ * so they can only be used for exchanging data when the host partition
+ * and the hypervisor are trusted.
+ */
void *hyp_synic_message_page;
void *hyp_synic_event_page;
+ /*
+ * SynIC pages for communicating with the paravisor.
+ *
+ * These pages can be accessed only from within the guest partition.
+ * Neither the host partition nor the hypervisor can access these pages,
+ * so they can be used for exchanging data when the host partition and
+ * the hypervisor are not trusted, such as in a confidential VM.
+ */
+ void *para_synic_message_page;
+ void *para_synic_event_page;
/*
* The page is only used in hv_post_message() for a TDX VM (with the
--
2.43.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-06-04 0:43 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 36+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-06-04 0:43 [PATCH hyperv-next v3 00/15] Confidential VMBus Roman Kisel
2025-06-04 0:43 ` [PATCH hyperv-next v3 01/15] Documentation: hyperv: " Roman Kisel
2025-06-04 2:56 ` Randy Dunlap
2025-06-04 12:53 ` Jonathan Corbet
2025-06-04 13:20 ` ALOK TIWARI
2025-06-18 16:17 ` Michael Kelley
2025-06-04 0:43 ` [PATCH hyperv-next v3 02/15] drivers: hv: VMBus protocol version 6.0 Roman Kisel
2025-06-04 0:43 ` [PATCH hyperv-next v3 03/15] arch: hyperv: Get/set SynIC synth.registers via paravisor Roman Kisel
2025-06-04 13:27 ` ALOK TIWARI
2025-06-18 16:17 ` Michael Kelley
2025-06-04 0:43 ` [PATCH hyperv-next v3 04/15] arch/x86: mshyperv: Trap on access for some synthetic MSRs Roman Kisel
2025-06-04 13:38 ` ALOK TIWARI
2025-06-18 16:18 ` Michael Kelley
2025-06-04 0:43 ` [PATCH hyperv-next v3 05/15] Drivers: hv: Rename fields for SynIC message and event pages Roman Kisel
2025-06-18 16:18 ` Michael Kelley
2025-06-04 0:43 ` Roman Kisel [this message]
2025-06-18 16:18 ` [PATCH hyperv-next v3 06/15] Drivers: hv: Allocate the paravisor SynIC pages when required Michael Kelley
2025-06-04 0:43 ` [PATCH hyperv-next v3 07/15] Drivers: hv: Post messages via the confidential VMBus if available Roman Kisel
2025-06-04 13:48 ` ALOK TIWARI
2025-06-18 16:18 ` Michael Kelley
2025-06-04 0:43 ` [PATCH hyperv-next v3 08/15] Drivers: hv: remove stale comment Roman Kisel
2025-06-04 0:43 ` [PATCH hyperv-next v3 09/15] Drivers: hv: Use memunmap() to check if the address is in IO map Roman Kisel
2025-06-18 16:18 ` Michael Kelley
2025-06-04 0:43 ` [PATCH hyperv-next v3 10/15] Drivers: hv: Rename the SynIC enable and disable routines Roman Kisel
2025-06-18 16:19 ` Michael Kelley
2025-06-04 0:43 ` [PATCH hyperv-next v3 11/15] Drivers: hv: Functions for setting up and tearing down the paravisor SynIC Roman Kisel
2025-06-18 16:19 ` Michael Kelley
2025-06-04 0:43 ` [PATCH hyperv-next v3 12/15] Drivers: hv: Allocate encrypted buffers when requested Roman Kisel
2025-06-18 16:19 ` Michael Kelley
2025-06-04 0:43 ` [PATCH hyperv-next v3 13/15] Drivers: hv: Support confidential VMBus channels Roman Kisel
2025-06-04 14:15 ` ALOK TIWARI
2025-06-18 16:19 ` Michael Kelley
2025-06-04 0:43 ` [PATCH hyperv-next v3 14/15] Drivers: hv: Support establishing the confidential VMBus connection Roman Kisel
2025-06-18 16:19 ` Michael Kelley
2025-06-04 0:43 ` [PATCH hyperv-next v3 15/15] Drivers: hv: Set the default VMBus version to 6.0 Roman Kisel
2025-06-18 16:13 ` [PATCH hyperv-next v3 00/15] Confidential VMBus Michael Kelley
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