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From: Roman Kisel <romank@linux.microsoft.com>
To: alok.a.tiwari@oracle.com, arnd@arndb.de, bp@alien8.de,
	corbet@lwn.net, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, decui@microsoft.com,
	haiyangz@microsoft.com, hpa@zytor.com, kys@microsoft.com,
	mingo@redhat.com, mhklinux@outlook.com, tglx@linutronix.de,
	wei.liu@kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-hyperv@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org
Cc: apais@microsoft.com, benhill@microsoft.com,
	bperkins@microsoft.com, sunilmut@microsoft.com
Subject: [PATCH hyperv-next v3 06/15] Drivers: hv: Allocate the paravisor SynIC pages when required
Date: Tue,  3 Jun 2025 17:43:32 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250604004341.7194-7-romank@linux.microsoft.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250604004341.7194-1-romank@linux.microsoft.com>

The paravisor needs the SynIC pages to communicate with the guest
via the confidential VMBus.

Refactor and extaned the exisitng code to account for that.

Signed-off-by: Roman Kisel <romank@linux.microsoft.com>
---
 drivers/hv/hv.c           | 184 +++++++++++++++++++-------------------
 drivers/hv/hyperv_vmbus.h |  17 ++++
 2 files changed, 111 insertions(+), 90 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/hv/hv.c b/drivers/hv/hv.c
index 964b9102477d..e25c91eb6af5 100644
--- a/drivers/hv/hv.c
+++ b/drivers/hv/hv.c
@@ -94,10 +94,70 @@ int hv_post_message(union hv_connection_id connection_id,
 	return hv_result(status);
 }
 
+static int hv_alloc_page(unsigned int cpu, void **page, bool decrypt,
+	const char *note)
+{
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * After the page changes its encryption status, its contents might
+	 * appear scrambled on some hardware. Thus `get_zeroed_page` would
+	 * zero the page out in vain, we do that ourselves exactly once.
+	 *
+	 * By default, the page is allocated encrypted provided the system
+	 * supports that.
+	 */
+	*page = (void *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!*page)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	if (decrypt)
+		ret = set_memory_decrypted((unsigned long)*page, 1);
+	if (ret)
+		goto failed;
+
+	memset(*page, 0, PAGE_SIZE);
+	return 0;
+
+failed:
+
+	pr_err("allocation failed for %s page, error %d when allocating the page, decrypted %d\n",
+		note, ret, decrypt);
+	free_page((unsigned long)*page);
+	*page = NULL;
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int hv_free_page(void **page, bool encrypt, const char *note)
+{
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	if (!*page)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (encrypt)
+		ret = set_memory_encrypted((unsigned long)*page, 1);
+
+	/*
+	 * In the case of the action failure, the page is leaked.
+	 * Something is wrong, prefer to lose the page and stay afloat.
+	 */
+	if (ret) {
+		pr_err("deallocation failed for %s page, error %d, encrypt %d\n",
+			note, ret, encrypt);
+	} else
+		free_page((unsigned long)*page);
+
+	*page = NULL;
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
 int hv_synic_alloc(void)
 {
 	int cpu, ret = -ENOMEM;
 	struct hv_per_cpu_context *hv_cpu;
+	const bool decrypt = !vmbus_is_confidential();
 
 	/*
 	 * First, zero all per-cpu memory areas so hv_synic_free() can
@@ -123,73 +183,37 @@ int hv_synic_alloc(void)
 			     vmbus_on_msg_dpc, (unsigned long)hv_cpu);
 
 		if (ms_hyperv.paravisor_present && hv_isolation_type_tdx()) {
-			hv_cpu->post_msg_page = (void *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_ATOMIC);
-			if (!hv_cpu->post_msg_page) {
-				pr_err("Unable to allocate post msg page\n");
-				goto err;
-			}
-
-			ret = set_memory_decrypted((unsigned long)hv_cpu->post_msg_page, 1);
-			if (ret) {
-				pr_err("Failed to decrypt post msg page: %d\n", ret);
-				/* Just leak the page, as it's unsafe to free the page. */
-				hv_cpu->post_msg_page = NULL;
+			ret = hv_alloc_page(cpu, &hv_cpu->post_msg_page,
+				decrypt, "post msg");
+			if (ret)
 				goto err;
-			}
-
-			memset(hv_cpu->post_msg_page, 0, PAGE_SIZE);
 		}
 
 		/*
-		 * Synic message and event pages are allocated by paravisor.
-		 * Skip these pages allocation here.
+		 * If these SynIC pages are not allocated, SIEF and SIM pages
+		 * are configured using what the root partition or the paravisor
+		 * provides upon reading the SIEFP and SIMP registers.
 		 */
 		if (!ms_hyperv.paravisor_present && !hv_root_partition()) {
-			hv_cpu->hyp_synic_message_page =
-				(void *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_ATOMIC);
-			if (!hv_cpu->hyp_synic_message_page) {
-				pr_err("Unable to allocate SYNIC message page\n");
+			ret = hv_alloc_page(cpu, &hv_cpu->hyp_synic_message_page,
+				decrypt, "hypervisor SynIC msg");
+			if (ret)
 				goto err;
-			}
-
-			hv_cpu->hyp_synic_event_page =
-				(void *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_ATOMIC);
-			if (!hv_cpu->hyp_synic_event_page) {
-				pr_err("Unable to allocate SYNIC event page\n");
-
-				free_page((unsigned long)hv_cpu->hyp_synic_message_page);
-				hv_cpu->hyp_synic_message_page = NULL;
+			ret = hv_alloc_page(cpu, &hv_cpu->hyp_synic_event_page,
+				decrypt, "hypervisor SynIC event");
+			if (ret)
 				goto err;
 			}
-		}
 
-		if (!ms_hyperv.paravisor_present &&
-		    (hv_isolation_type_snp() || hv_isolation_type_tdx())) {
-			ret = set_memory_decrypted((unsigned long)
-				hv_cpu->hyp_synic_message_page, 1);
-			if (ret) {
-				pr_err("Failed to decrypt SYNIC msg page: %d\n", ret);
-				hv_cpu->hyp_synic_message_page = NULL;
-
-				/*
-				 * Free the event page here so that hv_synic_free()
-				 * won't later try to re-encrypt it.
-				 */
-				free_page((unsigned long)hv_cpu->hyp_synic_event_page);
-				hv_cpu->hyp_synic_event_page = NULL;
+		if (vmbus_is_confidential()) {
+			ret = hv_alloc_page(cpu, &hv_cpu->para_synic_message_page,
+				decrypt, "paravisor SynIC msg");
+			if (ret)
 				goto err;
-			}
-
-			ret = set_memory_decrypted((unsigned long)
-				hv_cpu->hyp_synic_event_page, 1);
-			if (ret) {
-				pr_err("Failed to decrypt SYNIC event page: %d\n", ret);
-				hv_cpu->hyp_synic_event_page = NULL;
+			ret = hv_alloc_page(cpu, &hv_cpu->para_synic_event_page,
+				decrypt, "paravisor SynIC event");
+			if (ret)
 				goto err;
-			}
-
-			memset(hv_cpu->hyp_synic_message_page, 0, PAGE_SIZE);
-			memset(hv_cpu->hyp_synic_event_page, 0, PAGE_SIZE);
 		}
 	}
 
@@ -205,48 +229,28 @@ int hv_synic_alloc(void)
 
 void hv_synic_free(void)
 {
-	int cpu, ret;
+	int cpu;
+	const bool encrypt = !vmbus_is_confidential();
 
 	for_each_present_cpu(cpu) {
 		struct hv_per_cpu_context *hv_cpu =
 			per_cpu_ptr(hv_context.cpu_context, cpu);
 
-		/* It's better to leak the page if the encryption fails. */
-		if (ms_hyperv.paravisor_present && hv_isolation_type_tdx()) {
-			if (hv_cpu->post_msg_page) {
-				ret = set_memory_encrypted((unsigned long)
-					hv_cpu->post_msg_page, 1);
-				if (ret) {
-					pr_err("Failed to encrypt post msg page: %d\n", ret);
-					hv_cpu->post_msg_page = NULL;
-				}
-			}
+		if (ms_hyperv.paravisor_present && hv_isolation_type_tdx())
+			hv_free_page(&hv_cpu->post_msg_page,
+				encrypt, "post msg");
+		if (!ms_hyperv.paravisor_present && !hv_root_partition()) {
+			hv_free_page(&hv_cpu->hyp_synic_event_page,
+				encrypt, "hypervisor SynIC event");
+			hv_free_page(&hv_cpu->hyp_synic_message_page,
+				encrypt, "hypervisor SynIC msg");
 		}
-
-		if (!ms_hyperv.paravisor_present &&
-		    (hv_isolation_type_snp() || hv_isolation_type_tdx())) {
-			if (hv_cpu->hyp_synic_message_page) {
-				ret = set_memory_encrypted((unsigned long)
-					hv_cpu->hyp_synic_message_page, 1);
-				if (ret) {
-					pr_err("Failed to encrypt SYNIC msg page: %d\n", ret);
-					hv_cpu->hyp_synic_message_page = NULL;
-				}
-			}
-
-			if (hv_cpu->hyp_synic_event_page) {
-				ret = set_memory_encrypted((unsigned long)
-					hv_cpu->hyp_synic_event_page, 1);
-				if (ret) {
-					pr_err("Failed to encrypt SYNIC event page: %d\n", ret);
-					hv_cpu->hyp_synic_event_page = NULL;
-				}
-			}
+		if (vmbus_is_confidential()) {
+			hv_free_page(&hv_cpu->para_synic_event_page,
+				encrypt, "paravisor SynIC event");
+			hv_free_page(&hv_cpu->para_synic_message_page,
+				encrypt, "paravisor SynIC msg");
 		}
-
-		free_page((unsigned long)hv_cpu->post_msg_page);
-		free_page((unsigned long)hv_cpu->hyp_synic_event_page);
-		free_page((unsigned long)hv_cpu->hyp_synic_message_page);
 	}
 
 	kfree(hv_context.hv_numa_map);
diff --git a/drivers/hv/hyperv_vmbus.h b/drivers/hv/hyperv_vmbus.h
index fc3cdb26ff1a..9619edcf9f88 100644
--- a/drivers/hv/hyperv_vmbus.h
+++ b/drivers/hv/hyperv_vmbus.h
@@ -120,8 +120,25 @@ enum {
  * Per cpu state for channel handling
  */
 struct hv_per_cpu_context {
+	/*
+	 * SynIC pages for communicating with the host.
+	 *
+	 * These pages are accessible to the host partition and the hypervisor,
+	 * so they can only be used for exchanging data when the host partition
+	 * and the hypervisor are trusted.
+	 */
 	void *hyp_synic_message_page;
 	void *hyp_synic_event_page;
+	/*
+	 * SynIC pages for communicating with the paravisor.
+	 *
+	 * These pages can be accessed only from within the guest partition.
+	 * Neither the host partition nor the hypervisor can access these pages,
+	 * so they can be used for exchanging data when the host partition and
+	 * the hypervisor are not trusted, such as in a confidential VM.
+	 */
+	void *para_synic_message_page;
+	void *para_synic_event_page;
 
 	/*
 	 * The page is only used in hv_post_message() for a TDX VM (with the
-- 
2.43.0


  parent reply	other threads:[~2025-06-04  0:43 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 36+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-06-04  0:43 [PATCH hyperv-next v3 00/15] Confidential VMBus Roman Kisel
2025-06-04  0:43 ` [PATCH hyperv-next v3 01/15] Documentation: hyperv: " Roman Kisel
2025-06-04  2:56   ` Randy Dunlap
2025-06-04 12:53   ` Jonathan Corbet
2025-06-04 13:20   ` ALOK TIWARI
2025-06-18 16:17   ` Michael Kelley
2025-06-04  0:43 ` [PATCH hyperv-next v3 02/15] drivers: hv: VMBus protocol version 6.0 Roman Kisel
2025-06-04  0:43 ` [PATCH hyperv-next v3 03/15] arch: hyperv: Get/set SynIC synth.registers via paravisor Roman Kisel
2025-06-04 13:27   ` ALOK TIWARI
2025-06-18 16:17   ` Michael Kelley
2025-06-04  0:43 ` [PATCH hyperv-next v3 04/15] arch/x86: mshyperv: Trap on access for some synthetic MSRs Roman Kisel
2025-06-04 13:38   ` ALOK TIWARI
2025-06-18 16:18   ` Michael Kelley
2025-06-04  0:43 ` [PATCH hyperv-next v3 05/15] Drivers: hv: Rename fields for SynIC message and event pages Roman Kisel
2025-06-18 16:18   ` Michael Kelley
2025-06-04  0:43 ` Roman Kisel [this message]
2025-06-18 16:18   ` [PATCH hyperv-next v3 06/15] Drivers: hv: Allocate the paravisor SynIC pages when required Michael Kelley
2025-06-04  0:43 ` [PATCH hyperv-next v3 07/15] Drivers: hv: Post messages via the confidential VMBus if available Roman Kisel
2025-06-04 13:48   ` ALOK TIWARI
2025-06-18 16:18   ` Michael Kelley
2025-06-04  0:43 ` [PATCH hyperv-next v3 08/15] Drivers: hv: remove stale comment Roman Kisel
2025-06-04  0:43 ` [PATCH hyperv-next v3 09/15] Drivers: hv: Use memunmap() to check if the address is in IO map Roman Kisel
2025-06-18 16:18   ` Michael Kelley
2025-06-04  0:43 ` [PATCH hyperv-next v3 10/15] Drivers: hv: Rename the SynIC enable and disable routines Roman Kisel
2025-06-18 16:19   ` Michael Kelley
2025-06-04  0:43 ` [PATCH hyperv-next v3 11/15] Drivers: hv: Functions for setting up and tearing down the paravisor SynIC Roman Kisel
2025-06-18 16:19   ` Michael Kelley
2025-06-04  0:43 ` [PATCH hyperv-next v3 12/15] Drivers: hv: Allocate encrypted buffers when requested Roman Kisel
2025-06-18 16:19   ` Michael Kelley
2025-06-04  0:43 ` [PATCH hyperv-next v3 13/15] Drivers: hv: Support confidential VMBus channels Roman Kisel
2025-06-04 14:15   ` ALOK TIWARI
2025-06-18 16:19   ` Michael Kelley
2025-06-04  0:43 ` [PATCH hyperv-next v3 14/15] Drivers: hv: Support establishing the confidential VMBus connection Roman Kisel
2025-06-18 16:19   ` Michael Kelley
2025-06-04  0:43 ` [PATCH hyperv-next v3 15/15] Drivers: hv: Set the default VMBus version to 6.0 Roman Kisel
2025-06-18 16:13 ` [PATCH hyperv-next v3 00/15] Confidential VMBus Michael Kelley

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