From: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
To: Jamie Bainbridge <jamie.bainbridge@gmail.com>
Cc: Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com>,
Przemek Kitszel <przemyslaw.kitszel@intel.com>,
Andrew Lunn <andrew+netdev@lunn.ch>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>,
Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>, Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>,
Michal Schmidt <mschmidt@redhat.com>,
Brett Creeley <brett.creeley@amd.com>,
Ivan Vecera <ivecera@redhat.com>,
intel-wired-lan@lists.osuosl.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 net] i40e: When removing VF MAC filters, only check PF-set MAC
Date: Wed, 25 Jun 2025 10:07:34 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250625090734.GJ1562@horms.kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <c856f16e6ab37286733174c0fcf12bc72b677096.1750807588.git.jamie.bainbridge@gmail.com>
On Wed, Jun 25, 2025 at 09:29:18AM +1000, Jamie Bainbridge wrote:
> When the PF is processing an Admin Queue message to delete a VF's MACs
> from the MAC filter, we currently check if the PF set the MAC and if
> the VF is trusted.
>
> This results in undesirable behaviour, where if a trusted VF with a
> PF-set MAC sets itself down (which sends an AQ message to delete the
> VF's MAC filters) then the VF MAC is erased from the interface.
>
> This results in the VF losing its PF-set MAC which should not happen.
>
> There is no need to check for trust at all, because an untrusted VF
> cannot change its own MAC. The only check needed is whether the PF set
> the MAC. If the PF set the MAC, then don't erase the MAC on link-down.
>
> Resolve this by changing the deletion check only for PF-set MAC.
>
> (the out-of-tree driver has also intentionally removed the check for VF
> trust here with OOT driver version 2.26.8, this changes the Linux kernel
> driver behaviour and comment to match the OOT driver behaviour)
>
> Fixes: ea2a1cfc3b201 ("i40e: Fix VF MAC filter removal")
> Signed-off-by: Jamie Bainbridge <jamie.bainbridge@gmail.com>
> ---
> v2: Reword commit message as suggested by Simon Horman.
Thanks for the update.
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-06-25 9:07 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-06-24 23:29 Jamie Bainbridge
2025-06-25 9:07 ` Simon Horman [this message]
2025-07-21 9:42 ` [Intel-wired-lan] " Romanowski, Rafal
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20250625090734.GJ1562@horms.kernel.org \
--to=horms@kernel.org \
--cc=andrew+netdev@lunn.ch \
--cc=anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com \
--cc=brett.creeley@amd.com \
--cc=davem@davemloft.net \
--cc=edumazet@google.com \
--cc=intel-wired-lan@lists.osuosl.org \
--cc=ivecera@redhat.com \
--cc=jamie.bainbridge@gmail.com \
--cc=kuba@kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=mschmidt@redhat.com \
--cc=netdev@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=pabeni@redhat.com \
--cc=przemyslaw.kitszel@intel.com \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox
all inboxes | Powered by JetHome®