From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
To: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>,
"Jason A . Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, x86@kernel.org,
Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>,
stable@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 4/5] lib/crypto: x86/poly1305: Fix register corruption in no-SIMD contexts
Date: Sun, 6 Jul 2025 16:10:59 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250706231100.176113-5-ebiggers@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250706231100.176113-1-ebiggers@kernel.org>
Restore the SIMD usability check and base conversion that were removed
by commit 318c53ae02f2 ("crypto: x86/poly1305 - Add block-only
interface").
This safety check is cheap and is well worth eliminating a footgun.
While the Poly1305 functions *should* be called only where SIMD
registers are usable, if they are anyway, they should just do the right
thing instead of corrupting random tasks' registers and/or computing
incorrect MACs. Fixing this is also needed for poly1305_kunit to pass.
Just use irq_fpu_usable() instead of the original crypto_simd_usable(),
since poly1305_kunit won't rely on crypto_simd_disabled_for_test.
Fixes: 318c53ae02f2 ("crypto: x86/poly1305 - Add block-only interface")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
---
lib/crypto/x86/poly1305_glue.c | 40 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
1 file changed, 39 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/lib/crypto/x86/poly1305_glue.c b/lib/crypto/x86/poly1305_glue.c
index b7e78a583e07..968d84677631 100644
--- a/lib/crypto/x86/poly1305_glue.c
+++ b/lib/crypto/x86/poly1305_glue.c
@@ -23,10 +23,46 @@ struct poly1305_arch_internal {
u64 r[2];
u64 pad;
struct { u32 r2, r1, r4, r3; } rn[9];
};
+/*
+ * The AVX code uses base 2^26, while the scalar code uses base 2^64. If we hit
+ * the unfortunate situation of using AVX and then having to go back to scalar
+ * -- because the user is silly and has called the update function from two
+ * separate contexts -- then we need to convert back to the original base before
+ * proceeding. It is possible to reason that the initial reduction below is
+ * sufficient given the implementation invariants. However, for an avoidance of
+ * doubt and because this is not performance critical, we do the full reduction
+ * anyway. Z3 proof of below function: https://xn--4db.cc/ltPtHCKN/py
+ */
+static void convert_to_base2_64(void *ctx)
+{
+ struct poly1305_arch_internal *state = ctx;
+ u32 cy;
+
+ if (!state->is_base2_26)
+ return;
+
+ cy = state->h[0] >> 26; state->h[0] &= 0x3ffffff; state->h[1] += cy;
+ cy = state->h[1] >> 26; state->h[1] &= 0x3ffffff; state->h[2] += cy;
+ cy = state->h[2] >> 26; state->h[2] &= 0x3ffffff; state->h[3] += cy;
+ cy = state->h[3] >> 26; state->h[3] &= 0x3ffffff; state->h[4] += cy;
+ state->hs[0] = ((u64)state->h[2] << 52) | ((u64)state->h[1] << 26) | state->h[0];
+ state->hs[1] = ((u64)state->h[4] << 40) | ((u64)state->h[3] << 14) | (state->h[2] >> 12);
+ state->hs[2] = state->h[4] >> 24;
+ /* Unsigned Less Than: branchlessly produces 1 if a < b, else 0. */
+#define ULT(a, b) ((a ^ ((a ^ b) | ((a - b) ^ b))) >> (sizeof(a) * 8 - 1))
+ cy = (state->hs[2] >> 2) + (state->hs[2] & ~3ULL);
+ state->hs[2] &= 3;
+ state->hs[0] += cy;
+ state->hs[1] += (cy = ULT(state->hs[0], cy));
+ state->hs[2] += ULT(state->hs[1], cy);
+#undef ULT
+ state->is_base2_26 = 0;
+}
+
asmlinkage void poly1305_block_init_arch(
struct poly1305_block_state *state,
const u8 raw_key[POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE]);
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(poly1305_block_init_arch);
asmlinkage void poly1305_blocks_x86_64(struct poly1305_arch_internal *ctx,
@@ -60,11 +96,13 @@ void poly1305_blocks_arch(struct poly1305_block_state *state, const u8 *inp,
/* SIMD disables preemption, so relax after processing each page. */
BUILD_BUG_ON(SZ_4K < POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE ||
SZ_4K % POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE);
- if (!static_branch_likely(&poly1305_use_avx)) {
+ if (!static_branch_likely(&poly1305_use_avx) ||
+ unlikely(!irq_fpu_usable())) {
+ convert_to_base2_64(ctx);
poly1305_blocks_x86_64(ctx, inp, len, padbit);
return;
}
do {
--
2.50.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-07-06 23:11 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-07-06 23:10 [PATCH 0/5] lib/crypto: Poly1305 fixes Eric Biggers
2025-07-06 23:10 ` [PATCH 1/5] lib/crypto: arm/poly1305: Remove unneeded empty weak function Eric Biggers
2025-07-06 23:10 ` [PATCH 2/5] lib/crypto: arm/poly1305: Fix register corruption in no-SIMD contexts Eric Biggers
2025-07-06 23:10 ` [PATCH 3/5] lib/crypto: arm64/poly1305: " Eric Biggers
2025-07-06 23:10 ` Eric Biggers [this message]
2025-07-06 23:11 ` [PATCH 5/5] lib/crypto: x86/poly1305: Fix performance regression on short messages Eric Biggers
2025-07-08 3:22 ` [PATCH 0/5] lib/crypto: Poly1305 fixes Ard Biesheuvel
2025-07-09 19:16 ` Eric Biggers
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