From: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>
To: kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: acme@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com,
hpa@zytor.com, john.allen@amd.com, mingo@kernel.org,
mingo@redhat.com, minipli@grsecurity.net, mlevitsk@redhat.com,
namhyung@kernel.org, pbonzini@redhat.com, prsampat@amd.com,
rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com, seanjc@google.com, shuah@kernel.org,
tglx@linutronix.de, weijiang.yang@intel.com, x86@kernel.org,
xin@zytor.com, xiaoyao.li@intel.com
Subject: [PATCH v14 15/22] KVM: x86: Don't emulate instructions guarded by CET
Date: Tue, 9 Sep 2025 02:39:46 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250909093953.202028-16-chao.gao@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250909093953.202028-1-chao.gao@intel.com>
From: Yang Weijiang <weijiang.yang@intel.com>
Don't emulate the branch instructions, e.g., CALL/RET/JMP etc., when CET
is active in guest, return KVM_INTERNAL_ERROR_EMULATION to userspace to
handle it.
KVM doesn't emulate CPU behaviors to check CET protected stuffs while
emulating guest instructions, instead it stops emulation on detecting
the instructions in process are CET protected. By doing so, it can avoid
generating bogus #CP in guest and preventing CET protected execution flow
subversion from guest side.
Suggested-by: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Weijiang <weijiang.yang@intel.com>
Tested-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@grsecurity.net>
Tested-by: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>
Tested-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>
---
arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c | 46 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
1 file changed, 35 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c b/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c
index 542d3664afa3..97a4d1e69583 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c
@@ -178,6 +178,8 @@
#define IncSP ((u64)1 << 54) /* SP is incremented before ModRM calc */
#define TwoMemOp ((u64)1 << 55) /* Instruction has two memory operand */
#define IsBranch ((u64)1 << 56) /* Instruction is considered a branch. */
+#define ShadowStack ((u64)1 << 57) /* Instruction protected by Shadow Stack. */
+#define IndirBrnTrk ((u64)1 << 58) /* Instruction protected by IBT. */
#define DstXacc (DstAccLo | SrcAccHi | SrcWrite)
@@ -4068,9 +4070,11 @@ static const struct opcode group4[] = {
static const struct opcode group5[] = {
F(DstMem | SrcNone | Lock, em_inc),
F(DstMem | SrcNone | Lock, em_dec),
- I(SrcMem | NearBranch | IsBranch, em_call_near_abs),
- I(SrcMemFAddr | ImplicitOps | IsBranch, em_call_far),
- I(SrcMem | NearBranch | IsBranch, em_jmp_abs),
+ I(SrcMem | NearBranch | IsBranch | ShadowStack | IndirBrnTrk,
+ em_call_near_abs),
+ I(SrcMemFAddr | ImplicitOps | IsBranch | ShadowStack | IndirBrnTrk,
+ em_call_far),
+ I(SrcMem | NearBranch | IsBranch | IndirBrnTrk, em_jmp_abs),
I(SrcMemFAddr | ImplicitOps | IsBranch, em_jmp_far),
I(SrcMem | Stack | TwoMemOp, em_push), D(Undefined),
};
@@ -4332,11 +4336,11 @@ static const struct opcode opcode_table[256] = {
/* 0xC8 - 0xCF */
I(Stack | SrcImmU16 | Src2ImmByte | IsBranch, em_enter),
I(Stack | IsBranch, em_leave),
- I(ImplicitOps | SrcImmU16 | IsBranch, em_ret_far_imm),
- I(ImplicitOps | IsBranch, em_ret_far),
- D(ImplicitOps | IsBranch), DI(SrcImmByte | IsBranch, intn),
+ I(ImplicitOps | SrcImmU16 | IsBranch | ShadowStack, em_ret_far_imm),
+ I(ImplicitOps | IsBranch | ShadowStack, em_ret_far),
+ D(ImplicitOps | IsBranch), DI(SrcImmByte | IsBranch | ShadowStack, intn),
D(ImplicitOps | No64 | IsBranch),
- II(ImplicitOps | IsBranch, em_iret, iret),
+ II(ImplicitOps | IsBranch | ShadowStack, em_iret, iret),
/* 0xD0 - 0xD7 */
G(Src2One | ByteOp, group2), G(Src2One, group2),
G(Src2CL | ByteOp, group2), G(Src2CL, group2),
@@ -4352,7 +4356,7 @@ static const struct opcode opcode_table[256] = {
I2bvIP(SrcImmUByte | DstAcc, em_in, in, check_perm_in),
I2bvIP(SrcAcc | DstImmUByte, em_out, out, check_perm_out),
/* 0xE8 - 0xEF */
- I(SrcImm | NearBranch | IsBranch, em_call),
+ I(SrcImm | NearBranch | IsBranch | ShadowStack, em_call),
D(SrcImm | ImplicitOps | NearBranch | IsBranch),
I(SrcImmFAddr | No64 | IsBranch, em_jmp_far),
D(SrcImmByte | ImplicitOps | NearBranch | IsBranch),
@@ -4371,7 +4375,8 @@ static const struct opcode opcode_table[256] = {
static const struct opcode twobyte_table[256] = {
/* 0x00 - 0x0F */
G(0, group6), GD(0, &group7), N, N,
- N, I(ImplicitOps | EmulateOnUD | IsBranch, em_syscall),
+ N, I(ImplicitOps | EmulateOnUD | IsBranch | ShadowStack | IndirBrnTrk,
+ em_syscall),
II(ImplicitOps | Priv, em_clts, clts), N,
DI(ImplicitOps | Priv, invd), DI(ImplicitOps | Priv, wbinvd), N, N,
N, D(ImplicitOps | ModRM | SrcMem | NoAccess), N, N,
@@ -4402,8 +4407,9 @@ static const struct opcode twobyte_table[256] = {
IIP(ImplicitOps, em_rdtsc, rdtsc, check_rdtsc),
II(ImplicitOps | Priv, em_rdmsr, rdmsr),
IIP(ImplicitOps, em_rdpmc, rdpmc, check_rdpmc),
- I(ImplicitOps | EmulateOnUD | IsBranch, em_sysenter),
- I(ImplicitOps | Priv | EmulateOnUD | IsBranch, em_sysexit),
+ I(ImplicitOps | EmulateOnUD | IsBranch | ShadowStack | IndirBrnTrk,
+ em_sysenter),
+ I(ImplicitOps | Priv | EmulateOnUD | IsBranch | ShadowStack, em_sysexit),
N, N,
N, N, N, N, N, N, N, N,
/* 0x40 - 0x4F */
@@ -4941,6 +4947,24 @@ int x86_decode_insn(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, void *insn, int insn_len, int
if (ctxt->d == 0)
return EMULATION_FAILED;
+ if (ctxt->ops->get_cr(ctxt, 4) & X86_CR4_CET) {
+ u64 u_cet, s_cet;
+ bool stop_em;
+
+ if (ctxt->ops->get_msr(ctxt, MSR_IA32_U_CET, &u_cet) ||
+ ctxt->ops->get_msr(ctxt, MSR_IA32_S_CET, &s_cet))
+ return EMULATION_FAILED;
+
+ stop_em = ((u_cet & CET_SHSTK_EN) || (s_cet & CET_SHSTK_EN)) &&
+ (opcode.flags & ShadowStack);
+
+ stop_em |= ((u_cet & CET_ENDBR_EN) || (s_cet & CET_ENDBR_EN)) &&
+ (opcode.flags & IndirBrnTrk);
+
+ if (stop_em)
+ return EMULATION_FAILED;
+ }
+
ctxt->execute = opcode.u.execute;
if (unlikely(emulation_type & EMULTYPE_TRAP_UD) &&
--
2.47.3
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-09-09 9:40 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 53+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-09-09 9:39 [PATCH v14 00/22] Enable CET Virtualization Chao Gao
2025-09-09 9:39 ` [PATCH v14 01/22] KVM: x86: Introduce KVM_{G,S}ET_ONE_REG uAPIs support Chao Gao
2025-09-10 9:03 ` Xiaoyao Li
2025-09-10 17:17 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-09-10 17:35 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-09-09 9:39 ` [PATCH v14 02/22] KVM: x86: Report XSS as to-be-saved if there are supported features Chao Gao
2025-09-11 6:52 ` Binbin Wu
2025-09-09 9:39 ` [PATCH v14 03/22] KVM: x86: Check XSS validity against guest CPUIDs Chao Gao
2025-09-10 9:22 ` Xiaoyao Li
2025-09-10 11:33 ` Chao Gao
2025-09-10 18:47 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-09-09 9:39 ` [PATCH v14 04/22] KVM: x86: Refresh CPUID on write to guest MSR_IA32_XSS Chao Gao
2025-09-10 9:23 ` Xiaoyao Li
2025-09-11 7:02 ` Binbin Wu
2025-09-09 9:39 ` [PATCH v14 05/22] KVM: x86: Initialize kvm_caps.supported_xss Chao Gao
2025-09-10 9:36 ` Xiaoyao Li
2025-09-09 9:39 ` [PATCH v14 06/22] KVM: x86: Load guest FPU state when access XSAVE-managed MSRs Chao Gao
2025-09-10 9:37 ` Xiaoyao Li
2025-09-10 11:18 ` Chao Gao
2025-09-10 13:46 ` Xiaoyao Li
2025-09-10 15:24 ` Chao Gao
2025-09-10 17:50 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-09-09 9:39 ` [PATCH v14 07/22] KVM: x86: Add fault checks for guest CR4.CET setting Chao Gao
2025-09-10 9:38 ` Xiaoyao Li
2025-09-09 9:39 ` [PATCH v14 08/22] KVM: x86: Report KVM supported CET MSRs as to-be-saved Chao Gao
2025-09-09 9:39 ` [PATCH v14 09/22] KVM: VMX: Introduce CET VMCS fields and control bits Chao Gao
2025-09-09 9:39 ` [PATCH v14 10/22] KVM: x86: Enable guest SSP read/write interface with new uAPIs Chao Gao
2025-09-09 9:39 ` [PATCH v14 11/22] KVM: VMX: Emulate read and write to CET MSRs Chao Gao
2025-09-11 8:05 ` Xiaoyao Li
2025-09-11 9:02 ` Chao Gao
2025-09-11 20:24 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-09-09 9:39 ` [PATCH v14 12/22] KVM: x86: Save and reload SSP to/from SMRAM Chao Gao
2025-09-09 9:39 ` [PATCH v14 13/22] KVM: VMX: Set up interception for CET MSRs Chao Gao
2025-09-09 9:39 ` [PATCH v14 14/22] KVM: VMX: Set host constant supervisor states to VMCS fields Chao Gao
2025-09-12 22:04 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-09-09 9:39 ` Chao Gao [this message]
2025-09-11 9:18 ` [PATCH v14 15/22] KVM: x86: Don't emulate instructions guarded by CET Xiaoyao Li
2025-09-11 10:42 ` Chao Gao
2025-09-12 6:23 ` Xiaoyao Li
2025-09-12 14:37 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-09-12 15:11 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-09-16 14:42 ` Chao Gao
2025-09-12 14:42 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-09-09 9:39 ` [PATCH v14 16/22] KVM: x86: Enable CET virtualization for VMX and advertise to userspace Chao Gao
2025-09-09 9:39 ` [PATCH v14 17/22] KVM: nVMX: Virtualize NO_HW_ERROR_CODE_CC for L1 event injection to L2 Chao Gao
2025-09-09 9:39 ` [PATCH v14 18/22] KVM: nVMX: Prepare for enabling CET support for nested guest Chao Gao
2025-09-09 9:39 ` [PATCH v14 19/22] KVM: nVMX: Add consistency checks for CR0.WP and CR4.CET Chao Gao
2025-09-09 9:39 ` [PATCH v14 20/22] KVM: nVMX: Add consistency checks for CET states Chao Gao
2025-09-09 9:39 ` [PATCH v14 21/22] KVM: nVMX: Advertise new VM-Entry/Exit control bits for CET state Chao Gao
2025-09-09 9:39 ` [PATCH v14 22/22] KVM: selftest: Add tests for KVM_{GET,SET}_ONE_REG Chao Gao
2025-09-10 18:06 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-09-09 9:52 ` [PATCH v14 00/22] Enable CET Virtualization Chao Gao
2025-09-10 18:29 ` Sean Christopherson
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