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From: Neeraj Upadhyay <Neeraj.Upadhyay@amd.com>
To: <kvm@vger.kernel.org>, <seanjc@google.com>, <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, <Thomas.Lendacky@amd.com>,
	<nikunj@amd.com>, <Santosh.Shukla@amd.com>,
	<Vasant.Hegde@amd.com>, <Suravee.Suthikulpanit@amd.com>,
	<bp@alien8.de>, <David.Kaplan@amd.com>, <huibo.wang@amd.com>,
	<naveen.rao@amd.com>, <tiala@microsoft.com>
Subject: [RFC PATCH v2 16/17] KVM: x86/cpuid: Disable paravirt APIC features for protected APIC
Date: Tue, 23 Sep 2025 10:33:16 +0530	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250923050317.205482-17-Neeraj.Upadhyay@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250923050317.205482-1-Neeraj.Upadhyay@amd.com>

The paravirtualized APIC features, PV_EOI and PV_SEND_IPI, are
predicated on KVM having full visibility and control over the guest's
vAPIC state. This assumption is invalid for guests with a protected APIC
(e.g., AMD SEV-SNP with Secure AVIC, Intel TDX), where the APIC state is
opaque to the hypervisor and managed by the hardware.

- PV_EOI: KVM cannot service a PV_EOI MSR write because it has no
  access to the guest's true In-Service Register (ISR). For these
  guests, EOIs are either accelerated by hardware or virtualized via
  a different, technology-specific VM-Exit, not the PV MSR.

- PV_SEND_IPI: Protected guest models have their own specific IPI
  virtualization flows (e.g., VMGEXIT on ICR write for Secure AVIC).
  Exposing the generic PV_SEND_IPI hypercall would provide a
  conflicting, incorrect path that bypasses the required secure flow.

To prevent the guest from using these incompatible interfaces, clear
the KVM_FEATURE_PV_EOI and KVM_FEATURE_PV_SEND_IPI PV feature CPUID
bits when for guests with protected APIC.

Signed-off-by: Neeraj Upadhyay <Neeraj.Upadhyay@amd.com>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
index e2836a255b16..01b3c4e88282 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
@@ -245,6 +245,10 @@ static u32 kvm_apply_cpuid_pv_features_quirk(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	if (kvm_hlt_in_guest(vcpu->kvm))
 		best->eax &= ~(1 << KVM_FEATURE_PV_UNHALT);
 
+	if (vcpu->arch.apic->guest_apic_protected)
+		best->eax &= ~((1 << KVM_FEATURE_PV_EOI) |
+			       (1 << KVM_FEATURE_PV_SEND_IPI));
+
 	return best->eax;
 }
 
-- 
2.34.1


  parent reply	other threads:[~2025-09-23  5:08 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 32+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-09-23  5:03 [RFC PATCH v2 00/17] AMD: Add Secure AVIC KVM Support Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-09-23  5:03 ` [RFC PATCH v2 01/17] KVM: x86/lapic: Differentiate protected APIC interrupt mechanisms Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-09-23  5:03 ` [RFC PATCH v2 02/17] x86/cpufeatures: Add Secure AVIC CPU feature Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-09-23  5:03 ` [RFC PATCH v2 03/17] KVM: SVM: Add support for Secure AVIC capability in KVM Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-09-23  5:03 ` [RFC PATCH v2 04/17] KVM: SVM: Set guest APIC protection flags for Secure AVIC Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-09-23  5:03 ` [RFC PATCH v2 05/17] KVM: SVM: Do not intercept SECURE_AVIC_CONTROL MSR for SAVIC guests Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-09-23 13:55   ` Tom Lendacky
2025-09-25  5:16     ` Upadhyay, Neeraj
2025-09-25 13:54       ` Tom Lendacky
2025-09-23  5:03 ` [RFC PATCH v2 06/17] KVM: SVM: Implement interrupt injection for Secure AVIC Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-09-23 14:47   ` Tom Lendacky
2025-09-23  5:03 ` [RFC PATCH v2 07/17] KVM: SVM: Add IPI Delivery Support " Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-09-23  5:03 ` [RFC PATCH v2 08/17] KVM: SVM: Do not inject exception " Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-09-23 15:00   ` Tom Lendacky
2025-09-23  5:03 ` [RFC PATCH v2 09/17] KVM: SVM: Do not intercept exceptions for Secure AVIC guests Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-09-23 15:15   ` Tom Lendacky
2025-09-23  5:03 ` [RFC PATCH v2 10/17] KVM: SVM: Set VGIF in VMSA area " Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-09-23 15:16   ` Tom Lendacky
2025-09-23  5:03 ` [RFC PATCH v2 11/17] KVM: SVM: Enable NMI support " Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-09-23 15:25   ` Tom Lendacky
2025-09-23  5:03 ` [RFC PATCH v2 12/17] KVM: SVM: Add VMGEXIT handler for Secure AVIC backing page Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-09-23 16:02   ` Tom Lendacky
2025-09-23  5:03 ` [RFC PATCH v2 13/17] KVM: SVM: Add IOAPIC EOI support for Secure AVIC guests Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-09-23 16:15   ` Tom Lendacky
2025-09-23  5:03 ` [RFC PATCH v2 14/17] KVM: x86/ioapic: Disable RTC EOI tracking for protected APIC guests Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-09-23 16:23   ` Tom Lendacky
2025-09-23  5:03 ` [RFC PATCH v2 15/17] KVM: SVM: Check injected timers for Secure AVIC guests Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-09-23 16:32   ` Tom Lendacky
2025-09-23  5:03 ` Neeraj Upadhyay [this message]
2025-09-23  5:03 ` [RFC PATCH v2 17/17] KVM: SVM: Advertise Secure AVIC support for SNP guests Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-09-23 10:02 ` [syzbot ci] Re: AMD: Add Secure AVIC KVM Support syzbot ci
2025-09-23 10:17   ` Upadhyay, Neeraj

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