From: Yuhao Jiang <danisjiang@gmail.com>
To: James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com, martin.petersen@oracle.com
Cc: linux-scsi@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Yuhao Jiang <danisjiang@gmail.com>,
stable@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH] scsi: wd33c93: fix buffer overflow in SCSI message-in handling
Date: Mon, 20 Oct 2025 21:08:04 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20251021020804.3248930-1-danisjiang@gmail.com> (raw)
A buffer overflow vulnerability exists in the wd33c93 SCSI driver's
message handling where missing bounds checking allows a malicious
SCSI device to overflow the incoming_msg[] buffer and corrupt kernel
memory.
The issue occurs because:
- incoming_msg[] is a fixed 8-byte buffer (line 235 in wd33c93.h)
- wd33c93_intr() writes to incoming_msg[incoming_ptr] without
validating incoming_ptr is within bounds (line 935)
- For EXTENDED_MESSAGE, incoming_ptr increments based on the device-
supplied length field (line 1085) with no maximum check
- The validation at line 1001 only checks if the message is complete,
not if it exceeds buffer size
This allows an attacker controlling a SCSI device to craft an extended
message with length field 0xFF, causing the driver to write 256 bytes
into an 8-byte buffer. This can corrupt adjacent fields in the
WD33C93_hostdata structure including function pointers, potentially
leading to arbitrary code execution.
Add bounds checking in the MESSAGE_IN handler to ensure incoming_ptr
does not exceed buffer capacity before writing. Reject oversized
messages per SCSI protocol by sending MESSAGE_REJECT.
Reported-by: Yuhao Jiang <danisjiang@gmail.com>
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Yuhao Jiang <danisjiang@gmail.com>
---
drivers/scsi/wd33c93.c | 13 +++++++++++++
1 file changed, 13 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/scsi/wd33c93.c b/drivers/scsi/wd33c93.c
index dd1fef9226f2..2d50a0a01726 100644
--- a/drivers/scsi/wd33c93.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/wd33c93.c
@@ -932,6 +932,19 @@ wd33c93_intr(struct Scsi_Host *instance)
sr = read_wd33c93(regs, WD_SCSI_STATUS); /* clear interrupt */
udelay(7);
+ /* Prevent buffer overflow from malicious extended messages */
+ if (hostdata->incoming_ptr >= sizeof(hostdata->incoming_msg)) {
+ printk("wd33c93: Incoming message too long, rejecting\n");
+ hostdata->incoming_ptr = 0;
+ write_wd33c93_cmd(regs, WD_CMD_ASSERT_ATN);
+ hostdata->outgoing_msg[0] = MESSAGE_REJECT;
+ hostdata->outgoing_len = 1;
+ write_wd33c93_cmd(regs, WD_CMD_NEGATE_ACK);
+ hostdata->state = S_CONNECTED;
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&hostdata->lock, flags);
+ break;
+ }
+
hostdata->incoming_msg[hostdata->incoming_ptr] = msg;
if (hostdata->incoming_msg[0] == EXTENDED_MESSAGE)
msg = EXTENDED_MESSAGE;
--
2.34.1
next reply other threads:[~2025-10-21 2:08 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-10-21 2:08 Yuhao Jiang [this message]
2025-10-21 5:36 ` Christoph Hellwig
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