From: Ahmet Eray Karadag <eraykrdg1@gmail.com>
To: mark@fasheh.com, jlbec@evilplan.org, joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com
Cc: ocfs2-devel@lists.linux.dev, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
david.hunter.linux@gmail.com, skhan@linuxfoundation.org,
Ahmet Eray Karadag <eraykrdg1@gmail.com>,
syzbot+55c40ae8a0e5f3659f2b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com,
Albin Babu Varghese <albinbabuvarghese20@gmail.com>
Subject: [PATCH v2] ocfs2: Invalidate inode if i_mode is zero after block read
Date: Fri, 24 Oct 2025 05:30:57 +0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20251024023056.29275-2-eraykrdg1@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20251022222752.46758-2-eraykrdg1@gmail.com>
A panic occurs in ocfs2_unlink due to WARN_ON(inode->i_nlink == 0) when
handling a corrupted inode with i_mode=0 and i_nlink=0 in memory.
This "zombie" inode is created because ocfs2_read_locked_inode proceeds
even after ocfs2_validate_inode_block successfully validates a block
that structurally looks okay (passes checksum, signature etc.) but
contains semantically invalid data (specifically i_mode=0). The current
validation function doesn't check for i_mode being zero.
This results in an in-memory inode with i_mode=0 being added to the VFS
cache, which later triggers the panic during unlink.
Prevent this by adding an explicit check for i_mode == 0 within
ocfs2_validate_inode_block. If i_mode is zero, return -EFSCORRUPTED to signal
corruption. This causes the caller (ocfs2_read_locked_inode) to invoke
make_bad_inode(), correctly preventing the zombie inode from entering
the cache.
---
[RFC]:
The current fix handles i_mode=0 corruption detected during inode read
by returning -EFSCORRUPTED from ocfs2_validate_inode_block, which leads to
make_bad_inode() being called, preventing the corrupted inode from
entering the cache. This approach avoids immediately forcing the entire
filesystem read-only, assuming the corruption might be localized to
this inode.
Is this less aggressive error handling strategy appropriate for i_mode=0
corruption? Or is this condition considered severe enough that we *should*
explicitly call ocfs2_error() within the validation function to guarantee
the filesystem is marked read-only immediately upon detection?
Feedback and testing on the correct severity assessment and error
handling for this type of corruption would be appreciated.
---
v2:
- Reviewed how ext4 handling same situation and we come up with this
solution
---
Reported-by: syzbot+55c40ae8a0e5f3659f2b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=55c40ae8a0e5f3659f2b
Co-developed-by: Albin Babu Varghese <albinbabuvarghese20@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Albin Babu Varghese <albinbabuvarghese20@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ahmet Eray Karadag <eraykrdg1@gmail.com>
---
fs/ocfs2/inode.c | 10 +++++++++-
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/inode.c b/fs/ocfs2/inode.c
index 14bf440ea4df..6c936f62b169 100644
--- a/fs/ocfs2/inode.c
+++ b/fs/ocfs2/inode.c
@@ -1455,7 +1455,15 @@ int ocfs2_validate_inode_block(struct super_block *sb,
(unsigned long long)bh->b_blocknr);
goto bail;
}
-
+ if (di->i_links_count == 0) {
+ if (le16_to_cpu(di->i_mode) == 0 ||
+ !(le32_to_cpu(di->i_flags) & OCFS2_ORPHANED_FL)) {
+ mlog(ML_ERROR, "Invalid dinode #%llu: i_mode is zero!\n",
+ (unsigned long long)bh->b_blocknr);
+ rc = -EFSCORRUPTED;
+ goto bail;
+ }
+ }
/*
* Errors after here are fatal.
*/
--
2.43.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-10-24 2:31 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 9+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-10-22 22:27 [RFC RFT PATCH] " Ahmet Eray Karadag
2025-10-23 0:34 ` Joseph Qi
2025-10-24 2:30 ` Ahmet Eray Karadag [this message]
2025-10-24 9:05 ` [PATCH v2] " Joseph Qi
2025-10-25 11:13 ` [PATCH v3] " Ahmet Eray Karadag
2025-10-25 12:24 ` Joseph Qi
2025-10-25 14:39 ` [PATCH v4] " Ahmet Eray Karadag
2025-11-08 12:01 [RFT PATCH] " Ahmet Eray Karadag
2025-11-17 22:35 ` [PATCH v2] " Ahmet Eray Karadag
2025-11-19 14:27 ` Heming Zhao
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