From: Qianchang Zhao <pioooooooooip@gmail.com>
To: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>, Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, linux-cifs@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, security@kernel.org,
Zhitong Liu <liuzhitong1993@gmail.com>,
Qianchang Zhao <pioooooooooip@gmail.com>,
stable@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH] ksmbd: vfs_cache: avoid integer overflow in inode_hash()
Date: Thu, 13 Nov 2025 12:04:53 +0900 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20251113030453.526393-1-pioooooooooip@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <2025111234-synthesis-wimp-7485@gregkh>
inode_hash() currently mixes a name-derived hash with the super_block
pointer using an unbounded multiplication:
tmp = (hashval * (unsigned long)sb) ^
(GOLDEN_RATIO_PRIME + hashval) / L1_CACHE_BYTES;
On 64-bit kernels this multiplication can overflow for many inputs.
With attacker-chosen filenames (authenticated client), overflowed
products collapse into a small set of buckets, saturating a few chains
and degrading lookups from O(1) to O(n). This produces second-scale
latency spikes and high CPU usage in ksmbd workers (algorithmic DoS).
Replace the pointer*hash multiply with hash_long() over a mixed value
(hashval ^ (unsigned long)sb) and keep the existing shift/mask. This
removes the overflow source and improves bucket distribution under
adversarial inputs without changing external behavior.
This is an algorithmic-complexity issue (CWE-190/CWE-407), not a
memory-safety bug.
Reported-by: Qianchang Zhao <pioooooooooip@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Zhitong Liu <liuzhitong1993@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Qianchang Zhao <pioooooooooip@gmail.com>
---
fs/smb/server/vfs_cache.c | 9 +++------
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/smb/server/vfs_cache.c b/fs/smb/server/vfs_cache.c
index dfed6fce8..ac18edf56 100644
--- a/fs/smb/server/vfs_cache.c
+++ b/fs/smb/server/vfs_cache.c
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
#include <linux/kthread.h>
#include <linux/freezer.h>
+#include <linux/hash.h>
#include "glob.h"
#include "vfs_cache.h"
@@ -65,12 +66,8 @@ static void fd_limit_close(void)
static unsigned long inode_hash(struct super_block *sb, unsigned long hashval)
{
- unsigned long tmp;
-
- tmp = (hashval * (unsigned long)sb) ^ (GOLDEN_RATIO_PRIME + hashval) /
- L1_CACHE_BYTES;
- tmp = tmp ^ ((tmp ^ GOLDEN_RATIO_PRIME) >> inode_hash_shift);
- return tmp & inode_hash_mask;
+ return hash_long(hashval ^ (unsigned long)sb, inode_hash_shift) &
+ inode_hash_mask;
}
static struct ksmbd_inode *__ksmbd_inode_lookup(struct dentry *de)
--
2.34.1
parent reply other threads:[~2025-11-13 3:05 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed
[parent not found: <2025111234-synthesis-wimp-7485@gregkh>]
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