From: Ethan Graham <ethan.w.s.graham@gmail.com>
To: ethan.w.s.graham@gmail.com, glider@google.com
Cc: andreyknvl@gmail.com, andy@kernel.org, andy.shevchenko@gmail.com,
brauner@kernel.org, brendan.higgins@linux.dev,
davem@davemloft.net, davidgow@google.com, dhowells@redhat.com,
dvyukov@google.com, elver@google.com,
herbert@gondor.apana.org.au, ignat@cloudflare.com, jack@suse.cz,
jannh@google.com, johannes@sipsolutions.net,
kasan-dev@googlegroups.com, kees@kernel.org,
kunit-dev@googlegroups.com, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
lukas@wunner.de, rmoar@google.com, shuah@kernel.org,
sj@kernel.org, tarasmadan@google.com,
Ethan Graham <ethangraham@google.com>
Subject: [PATCH 01/10] mm/kasan: implement kasan_poison_range
Date: Thu, 4 Dec 2025 15:12:40 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20251204141250.21114-2-ethan.w.s.graham@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20251204141250.21114-1-ethan.w.s.graham@gmail.com>
From: Ethan Graham <ethangraham@google.com>
Introduce a new helper function, kasan_poison_range(), to encapsulate
the logic for poisoning an arbitrary memory range of a given size, and
expose it publically in <include/linux/kasan.h>.
This is a preparatory change for the upcoming KFuzzTest patches, which
requires the ability to poison the inter-region padding in its input
buffers.
No functional change to any other subsystem is intended by this commit.
Signed-off-by: Ethan Graham <ethangraham@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Ethan Graham <ethan.w.s.graham@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
---
PR v3:
- Move kasan_poison_range into mm/kasan/common.c so that it is built
with HW_TAGS mode enabled.
- Add a runtime check for kasan_enabled() in kasan_poison_range.
- Add two WARN_ON()s in kasan_poison_range when the input is invalid.
PR v1:
- Enforce KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE alignment for the end of the range in
kasan_poison_range(), and return -EINVAL when this isn't respected.
---
---
include/linux/kasan.h | 11 +++++++++++
mm/kasan/common.c | 37 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 48 insertions(+)
diff --git a/include/linux/kasan.h b/include/linux/kasan.h
index 890011071f2b..cd6cdf732378 100644
--- a/include/linux/kasan.h
+++ b/include/linux/kasan.h
@@ -102,6 +102,16 @@ static inline bool kasan_has_integrated_init(void)
}
#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN
+
+/**
+ * kasan_poison_range - poison the memory range [@addr, @addr + @size)
+ *
+ * The exact behavior is subject to alignment with KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE, defined
+ * in <mm/kasan/kasan.h>: if @start is unaligned, the initial partial granule
+ * at the beginning of the range is only poisoned if CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC=y.
+ */
+int kasan_poison_range(const void *addr, size_t size);
+
void __kasan_unpoison_range(const void *addr, size_t size);
static __always_inline void kasan_unpoison_range(const void *addr, size_t size)
{
@@ -402,6 +412,7 @@ static __always_inline bool kasan_check_byte(const void *addr)
#else /* CONFIG_KASAN */
+static inline int kasan_poison_range(const void *start, size_t size) { return 0; }
static inline void kasan_unpoison_range(const void *address, size_t size) {}
static inline void kasan_poison_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order,
bool init) {}
diff --git a/mm/kasan/common.c b/mm/kasan/common.c
index 9142964ab9c9..c83579ef37c6 100644
--- a/mm/kasan/common.c
+++ b/mm/kasan/common.c
@@ -570,3 +570,40 @@ bool __kasan_check_byte(const void *address, unsigned long ip)
}
return true;
}
+
+int kasan_poison_range(const void *addr, size_t size)
+{
+ uintptr_t start_addr = (uintptr_t)addr;
+ uintptr_t head_granule_start;
+ uintptr_t poison_body_start;
+ uintptr_t poison_body_end;
+ size_t head_prefix_size;
+ uintptr_t end_addr;
+
+ if (!kasan_enabled())
+ return 0;
+
+ end_addr = start_addr + size;
+ if (WARN_ON(end_addr % KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (WARN_ON(start_addr >= end_addr))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ head_granule_start = ALIGN_DOWN(start_addr, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE);
+ head_prefix_size = start_addr - head_granule_start;
+
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) && head_prefix_size > 0)
+ kasan_poison_last_granule((void *)head_granule_start,
+ head_prefix_size);
+
+ poison_body_start = ALIGN(start_addr, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE);
+ poison_body_end = end_addr;
+
+ if (poison_body_start < poison_body_end)
+ kasan_poison((void *)poison_body_start,
+ poison_body_end - poison_body_start,
+ KASAN_SLAB_REDZONE, false);
+ return 0;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(kasan_poison_range);
--
2.51.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-12-04 14:13 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 31+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-12-04 14:12 [PATCH v3 00/10] KFuzzTest: a new kernel fuzzing framework Ethan Graham
2025-12-04 14:12 ` Ethan Graham [this message]
2025-12-04 15:17 ` [PATCH 01/10] mm/kasan: implement kasan_poison_range Andrey Konovalov
2025-12-04 15:31 ` Andy Shevchenko
2025-12-04 14:12 ` [PATCH 02/10] kfuzztest: add user-facing API and data structures Ethan Graham
2025-12-04 14:12 ` [PATCH 03/10] kfuzztest: introduce the FUZZ_TEST_SIMPLE macro Ethan Graham
2025-12-04 14:12 ` [PATCH 04/10] kfuzztest: implement core module and input processing Ethan Graham
2025-12-04 14:12 ` [PATCH 05/10] tools: add kfuzztest-bridge utility Ethan Graham
2025-12-07 6:38 ` kernel test robot
2025-12-04 14:12 ` [PATCH 06/10] kfuzztest: add ReST documentation Ethan Graham
2025-12-04 14:12 ` [PATCH 07/10] kfuzztest: add KFuzzTest sample fuzz targets Ethan Graham
2025-12-04 14:12 ` [PATCH 08/10] crypto: implement KFuzzTest targets for PKCS7 and RSA parsing Ethan Graham
2025-12-04 14:12 ` [PATCH 09/10] drivers/auxdisplay: add a KFuzzTest for parse_xy() Ethan Graham
2025-12-04 15:26 ` Andy Shevchenko
2025-12-04 15:28 ` Andy Shevchenko
2025-12-04 15:32 ` Marco Elver
2025-12-04 15:34 ` Andy Shevchenko
2025-12-04 15:35 ` Marco Elver
2025-12-04 15:42 ` Marco Elver
2025-12-04 15:56 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2025-12-04 17:10 ` Andy Shevchenko
2025-12-04 21:38 ` Ethan Graham
2025-12-08 0:58 ` kernel test robot
2025-12-04 14:12 ` [PATCH 10/10] MAINTAINERS: add maintainer information for KFuzzTest Ethan Graham
2025-12-12 8:01 ` [PATCH v3 00/10] KFuzzTest: a new kernel fuzzing framework Luis Chamberlain
2025-12-12 15:09 ` Andy Shevchenko
2025-12-13 0:06 ` Shuah Khan
2025-12-17 9:53 ` David Gow
2025-12-17 10:19 ` Alexander Potapenko
2025-12-17 10:31 ` Johannes Berg
2025-12-17 1:08 ` Wentao Zhang
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