From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 4E26861FFE; Sat, 17 Jan 2026 15:21:19 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1768663279; cv=none; b=VXGIjuiAo2VNPVOFsIlXXKcRZZ0v8aRetZnXCyBk8fC0KTAMhGmBpVMj69C/7Sw2dJhvPPQiFoIDlit+1KSCrfCDk5KoZ7YVb/OfFCM7VJWUm37xaM7E79IlHBzc9MIQn75zKsJYuoZNHdjOZMxWqKwX98MiSwGovYmtYiz2prw= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1768663279; c=relaxed/simple; bh=gFkoz1r3hG+2o0L/C3beJWRpCPLd6P4OG0NGZ1Rf4Ik=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:Message-ID:References:MIME-Version: Content-Type:Content-Disposition:In-Reply-To; b=n72iXd0YmGaX6jRv4sXaDLZF2mLDidPnI2oyHLjxrgHzNV8R0wokWP/IdTToERbtQhvPgsEGvGCy1xMO/QfiRXom3TiDoMKlFjbDM56mqxZwZk+SKojaanDK1n8UpUy+cdxFG3pyy7z3Li2fa7qZ2R46gyL6y+hHEopC1Y4yXFU= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b=NCSYA+7x; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="NCSYA+7x" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 90690C4CEF7; Sat, 17 Jan 2026 15:21:18 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1768663278; bh=gFkoz1r3hG+2o0L/C3beJWRpCPLd6P4OG0NGZ1Rf4Ik=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:References:In-Reply-To:From; b=NCSYA+7xGnwleCyGOjSHK9c5OgFXJEfL7AGfh+A+WSjBLW5ymY+cMqTKsanEmu0QJ 5IWSbV6QkU0fZxgw0MHiVGiAk2qtQjEIu74HvdfdOIOULntnjWMyIJj9sgaSudzI9m L33eJ52arvEt2diaoHy251ucKaPV1cwXVZ63JqWDWJ+o6Y+Gnl14hEr5vWVJ/7KqJK lVx+y64mAg1OnlilgZw6ROOfUdlclGhFTHinR0i+iC0LaTw6MumHQ8IFL4n7lEirsl lzWisqvT3kAH4rzPuUigkO/tTz2WG0U1oKG2jQKn3YqGCTpLDitdg3AaJOmwH1aksr xim1zQ7+wJ40A== Date: Sat, 17 Jan 2026 16:21:13 +0100 From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: Harshit Mogalapalli Cc: cve@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-cve-announce@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: CVE-2025-68212: fs: Fix uninitialized 'offp' in statmount_string() Message-ID: <2026011757-shrivel-take-208f@gregkh> References: <2025121630-CVE-2025-68212-eab7@gregkh> <234e1969-d574-469e-a571-e1165d274cef@oracle.com> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <234e1969-d574-469e-a571-e1165d274cef@oracle.com> On Sat, Jan 17, 2026 at 08:13:21PM +0530, Harshit Mogalapalli wrote: > Hi Greg, > > > On 16/12/25 19:27, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote: > > From: Greg Kroah-Hartman > > > > Description > > =========== > > > > In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: > > > > fs: Fix uninitialized 'offp' in statmount_string() > > > > In statmount_string(), most flags assign an output offset pointer (offp) > > which is later updated with the string offset. However, the > > STATMOUNT_MNT_UIDMAP and STATMOUNT_MNT_GIDMAP cases directly set the > > struct fields instead of using offp. This leaves offp uninitialized, > > leading to a possible uninitialized dereference when *offp is updated. > > > > Fix it by assigning offp for UIDMAP and GIDMAP as well, keeping the code > > path consistent. > > > > The Linux kernel CVE team has assigned CVE-2025-68212 to this issue. > > > > > > Affected and fixed versions > > =========================== > > > > Issue introduced in 6.14 with commit e52e97f09fb66fd868260d05bd6b74a9a3db39ee and fixed in 6.17.10 with commit acfde9400e611c8d2668f1c70053c4a1d6ecfc36 > > Issue introduced in 6.14 with commit e52e97f09fb66fd868260d05bd6b74a9a3db39ee and fixed in 6.18 with commit 0778ac7df5137d5041783fadfc201f8fd55a1d9b > > Issue introduced in 6.12.14 with commit d49c64c1d723c167f521833f429ab28d3ca7e0d9 > > Issue introduced in 6.13.3 with commit c3787a4fae66e710543137b4b1b073cb2bff3bca > > > > I have reviewed the broken commit/vulnerable commit for this: > > Probably the logic in scripts is to find the oldest Fixes tag if there are > more than one Fixes' tags in the commit message: Yes, that is true. > > commit 0778ac7df5137d5041783fadfc201f8fd55a1d9b > Author: Zhen Ni > Date: Mon Oct 13 19:41:51 2025 +0800 > > fs: Fix uninitialized 'offp' in statmount_string() > > In statmount_string(), most flags assign an output offset pointer (offp) > which is later updated with the string offset. However, the > STATMOUNT_MNT_UIDMAP and STATMOUNT_MNT_GIDMAP cases directly set the > struct fields instead of using offp. This leaves offp uninitialized, > leading to a possible uninitialized dereference when *offp is updated. > > Fix it by assigning offp for UIDMAP and GIDMAP as well, keeping the code > path consistent. > > Fixes: 37c4a9590e1e ("statmount: allow to retrieve idmappings") > Fixes: e52e97f09fb6 ("statmount: let unset strings be empty") > > > For the CVE fix, the actual broken commit which is more appropriate is > 37c4a9590e1e introduces the STATMOUNT_MNT_{U,G}IDMAP cases but only > writes sm->mnt_* = start while leaving offp unset, so the shared tail of > statmount_string() later dereferences an uninitialised pointer. > > Hence 37c4a9590e1e is probably the more appropriate vulnerable commit for > this CVE. > > Should I send a patch to add CVE-2025-68212.vulnerable for getting it > updated correctly ? Please do! thanks greg k-h