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From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
To: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
	Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	 Mathias Krause <minipli@grsecurity.net>,
	John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>,
	 Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
	Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>,
	 Binbin Wu <binbin.wu@linux.intel.com>,
	Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>,
	 Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Subject: [PATCH v2 1/3] KVM: x86: Explicitly configure supported XSS from {svm,vmx}_set_cpu_caps()
Date: Tue, 27 Jan 2026 17:43:08 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260128014310.3255561-2-seanjc@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260128014310.3255561-1-seanjc@google.com>

Explicitly configure KVM's supported XSS as part of each vendor's setup
flow to fix a bug where clearing SHSTK and IBT in kvm_cpu_caps, e.g. due
to lack of CET XFEATURE support, makes kvm-intel.ko unloadable when nested
VMX is enabled, i.e. when nested=1.  The late clearing results in
nested_vmx_setup_{entry,exit}_ctls() clearing VM_{ENTRY,EXIT}_LOAD_CET_STATE
when nested_vmx_setup_ctls_msrs() runs during the CPU compatibility checks,
ultimately leading to a mismatched VMCS config due to the reference config
having the CET bits set, but every CPU's "local" config having the bits
cleared.

Note, kvm_caps.supported_{xcr0,xss} are unconditionally initialized by
kvm_x86_vendor_init(), before calling into vendor code, and not referenced
between ops->hardware_setup() and their current/old location.

Fixes: 69cc3e886582 ("KVM: x86: Add XSS support for CET_KERNEL and CET_USER")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Mathias Krause <minipli@grsecurity.net>
Cc: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>
Cc: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Cc: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>
Cc: Binbin Wu <binbin.wu@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c |  2 ++
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c |  2 ++
 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c     | 30 +++++++++++++++++-------------
 arch/x86/kvm/x86.h     |  2 ++
 4 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
index 7803d2781144..c00a696dacfc 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
@@ -5387,6 +5387,8 @@ static __init void svm_set_cpu_caps(void)
 	 */
 	kvm_cpu_cap_clear(X86_FEATURE_BUS_LOCK_DETECT);
 	kvm_cpu_cap_clear(X86_FEATURE_MSR_IMM);
+
+	kvm_setup_xss_caps();
 }
 
 static __init int svm_hardware_setup(void)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
index 27acafd03381..9f85c3829890 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -8230,6 +8230,8 @@ static __init void vmx_set_cpu_caps(void)
 		kvm_cpu_cap_clear(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK);
 		kvm_cpu_cap_clear(X86_FEATURE_IBT);
 	}
+
+	kvm_setup_xss_caps();
 }
 
 static bool vmx_is_io_intercepted(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index 8acfdfc583a1..cac1d6a67b49 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -9965,6 +9965,23 @@ static struct notifier_block pvclock_gtod_notifier = {
 };
 #endif
 
+void kvm_setup_xss_caps(void)
+{
+	if (!kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_XSAVES))
+		kvm_caps.supported_xss = 0;
+
+	if (!kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) &&
+	    !kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_IBT))
+		kvm_caps.supported_xss &= ~XFEATURE_MASK_CET_ALL;
+
+	if ((kvm_caps.supported_xss & XFEATURE_MASK_CET_ALL) != XFEATURE_MASK_CET_ALL) {
+		kvm_cpu_cap_clear(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK);
+		kvm_cpu_cap_clear(X86_FEATURE_IBT);
+		kvm_caps.supported_xss &= ~XFEATURE_MASK_CET_ALL;
+	}
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM_INTERNAL(kvm_setup_xss_caps);
+
 static inline void kvm_ops_update(struct kvm_x86_init_ops *ops)
 {
 	memcpy(&kvm_x86_ops, ops->runtime_ops, sizeof(kvm_x86_ops));
@@ -10138,19 +10155,6 @@ int kvm_x86_vendor_init(struct kvm_x86_init_ops *ops)
 	if (!tdp_enabled)
 		kvm_caps.supported_quirks &= ~KVM_X86_QUIRK_IGNORE_GUEST_PAT;
 
-	if (!kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_XSAVES))
-		kvm_caps.supported_xss = 0;
-
-	if (!kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) &&
-	    !kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_IBT))
-		kvm_caps.supported_xss &= ~XFEATURE_MASK_CET_ALL;
-
-	if ((kvm_caps.supported_xss & XFEATURE_MASK_CET_ALL) != XFEATURE_MASK_CET_ALL) {
-		kvm_cpu_cap_clear(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK);
-		kvm_cpu_cap_clear(X86_FEATURE_IBT);
-		kvm_caps.supported_xss &= ~XFEATURE_MASK_CET_ALL;
-	}
-
 	if (kvm_caps.has_tsc_control) {
 		/*
 		 * Make sure the user can only configure tsc_khz values that
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
index 70e81f008030..94d4f07aaaa0 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
@@ -483,6 +483,8 @@ extern struct kvm_host_values kvm_host;
 extern bool enable_pmu;
 extern bool enable_mediated_pmu;
 
+void kvm_setup_xss_caps(void);
+
 /*
  * Get a filtered version of KVM's supported XCR0 that strips out dynamic
  * features for which the current process doesn't (yet) have permission to use.
-- 
2.52.0.457.g6b5491de43-goog


  reply	other threads:[~2026-01-28  1:43 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 17+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-01-28  1:43 [PATCH v2 0/3] KVM: x86: CET vs. nVMX fix and hardening Sean Christopherson
2026-01-28  1:43 ` Sean Christopherson [this message]
2026-01-29  2:55   ` [PATCH v2 1/3] KVM: x86: Explicitly configure supported XSS from {svm,vmx}_set_cpu_caps() Xiaoyao Li
2026-01-29 15:03     ` Sean Christopherson
2026-01-29  7:34   ` Binbin Wu
2026-01-30  3:23     ` Xiaoyao Li
2026-01-30  5:06       ` Binbin Wu
2026-01-30  8:56   ` Binbin Wu
2026-01-28  1:43 ` [PATCH v2 2/3] KVM: x86: Harden against unexpected adjustments to kvm_cpu_caps Sean Christopherson
2026-01-29  3:09   ` Xiaoyao Li
2026-01-29 15:12     ` Sean Christopherson
2026-01-30  3:01       ` Xiaoyao Li
2026-01-30  8:59   ` Binbin Wu
2026-01-28  1:43 ` [PATCH v2 3/3] KVM: VMX: Print out "bad" offsets+value on VMCS config mismatch Sean Christopherson
2026-01-29  3:16   ` Xiaoyao Li
2026-01-30  9:17   ` Binbin Wu
2026-02-04  0:10 ` [PATCH v2 0/3] KVM: x86: CET vs. nVMX fix and hardening Sean Christopherson

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