From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
To: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Mathias Krause <minipli@grsecurity.net>,
John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>,
Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>,
Binbin Wu <binbin.wu@linux.intel.com>,
Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>,
Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Subject: [PATCH v2 1/3] KVM: x86: Explicitly configure supported XSS from {svm,vmx}_set_cpu_caps()
Date: Tue, 27 Jan 2026 17:43:08 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260128014310.3255561-2-seanjc@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260128014310.3255561-1-seanjc@google.com>
Explicitly configure KVM's supported XSS as part of each vendor's setup
flow to fix a bug where clearing SHSTK and IBT in kvm_cpu_caps, e.g. due
to lack of CET XFEATURE support, makes kvm-intel.ko unloadable when nested
VMX is enabled, i.e. when nested=1. The late clearing results in
nested_vmx_setup_{entry,exit}_ctls() clearing VM_{ENTRY,EXIT}_LOAD_CET_STATE
when nested_vmx_setup_ctls_msrs() runs during the CPU compatibility checks,
ultimately leading to a mismatched VMCS config due to the reference config
having the CET bits set, but every CPU's "local" config having the bits
cleared.
Note, kvm_caps.supported_{xcr0,xss} are unconditionally initialized by
kvm_x86_vendor_init(), before calling into vendor code, and not referenced
between ops->hardware_setup() and their current/old location.
Fixes: 69cc3e886582 ("KVM: x86: Add XSS support for CET_KERNEL and CET_USER")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Mathias Krause <minipli@grsecurity.net>
Cc: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>
Cc: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Cc: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>
Cc: Binbin Wu <binbin.wu@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
---
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 2 ++
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 2 ++
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 30 +++++++++++++++++-------------
arch/x86/kvm/x86.h | 2 ++
4 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
index 7803d2781144..c00a696dacfc 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
@@ -5387,6 +5387,8 @@ static __init void svm_set_cpu_caps(void)
*/
kvm_cpu_cap_clear(X86_FEATURE_BUS_LOCK_DETECT);
kvm_cpu_cap_clear(X86_FEATURE_MSR_IMM);
+
+ kvm_setup_xss_caps();
}
static __init int svm_hardware_setup(void)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
index 27acafd03381..9f85c3829890 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -8230,6 +8230,8 @@ static __init void vmx_set_cpu_caps(void)
kvm_cpu_cap_clear(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK);
kvm_cpu_cap_clear(X86_FEATURE_IBT);
}
+
+ kvm_setup_xss_caps();
}
static bool vmx_is_io_intercepted(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index 8acfdfc583a1..cac1d6a67b49 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -9965,6 +9965,23 @@ static struct notifier_block pvclock_gtod_notifier = {
};
#endif
+void kvm_setup_xss_caps(void)
+{
+ if (!kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_XSAVES))
+ kvm_caps.supported_xss = 0;
+
+ if (!kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) &&
+ !kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_IBT))
+ kvm_caps.supported_xss &= ~XFEATURE_MASK_CET_ALL;
+
+ if ((kvm_caps.supported_xss & XFEATURE_MASK_CET_ALL) != XFEATURE_MASK_CET_ALL) {
+ kvm_cpu_cap_clear(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK);
+ kvm_cpu_cap_clear(X86_FEATURE_IBT);
+ kvm_caps.supported_xss &= ~XFEATURE_MASK_CET_ALL;
+ }
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM_INTERNAL(kvm_setup_xss_caps);
+
static inline void kvm_ops_update(struct kvm_x86_init_ops *ops)
{
memcpy(&kvm_x86_ops, ops->runtime_ops, sizeof(kvm_x86_ops));
@@ -10138,19 +10155,6 @@ int kvm_x86_vendor_init(struct kvm_x86_init_ops *ops)
if (!tdp_enabled)
kvm_caps.supported_quirks &= ~KVM_X86_QUIRK_IGNORE_GUEST_PAT;
- if (!kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_XSAVES))
- kvm_caps.supported_xss = 0;
-
- if (!kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) &&
- !kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_IBT))
- kvm_caps.supported_xss &= ~XFEATURE_MASK_CET_ALL;
-
- if ((kvm_caps.supported_xss & XFEATURE_MASK_CET_ALL) != XFEATURE_MASK_CET_ALL) {
- kvm_cpu_cap_clear(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK);
- kvm_cpu_cap_clear(X86_FEATURE_IBT);
- kvm_caps.supported_xss &= ~XFEATURE_MASK_CET_ALL;
- }
-
if (kvm_caps.has_tsc_control) {
/*
* Make sure the user can only configure tsc_khz values that
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
index 70e81f008030..94d4f07aaaa0 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
@@ -483,6 +483,8 @@ extern struct kvm_host_values kvm_host;
extern bool enable_pmu;
extern bool enable_mediated_pmu;
+void kvm_setup_xss_caps(void);
+
/*
* Get a filtered version of KVM's supported XCR0 that strips out dynamic
* features for which the current process doesn't (yet) have permission to use.
--
2.52.0.457.g6b5491de43-goog
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-01-28 1:43 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 17+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-01-28 1:43 [PATCH v2 0/3] KVM: x86: CET vs. nVMX fix and hardening Sean Christopherson
2026-01-28 1:43 ` Sean Christopherson [this message]
2026-01-29 2:55 ` [PATCH v2 1/3] KVM: x86: Explicitly configure supported XSS from {svm,vmx}_set_cpu_caps() Xiaoyao Li
2026-01-29 15:03 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-01-29 7:34 ` Binbin Wu
2026-01-30 3:23 ` Xiaoyao Li
2026-01-30 5:06 ` Binbin Wu
2026-01-30 8:56 ` Binbin Wu
2026-01-28 1:43 ` [PATCH v2 2/3] KVM: x86: Harden against unexpected adjustments to kvm_cpu_caps Sean Christopherson
2026-01-29 3:09 ` Xiaoyao Li
2026-01-29 15:12 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-01-30 3:01 ` Xiaoyao Li
2026-01-30 8:59 ` Binbin Wu
2026-01-28 1:43 ` [PATCH v2 3/3] KVM: VMX: Print out "bad" offsets+value on VMCS config mismatch Sean Christopherson
2026-01-29 3:16 ` Xiaoyao Li
2026-01-30 9:17 ` Binbin Wu
2026-02-04 0:10 ` [PATCH v2 0/3] KVM: x86: CET vs. nVMX fix and hardening Sean Christopherson
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20260128014310.3255561-2-seanjc@google.com \
--to=seanjc@google.com \
--cc=binbin.wu@linux.intel.com \
--cc=chao.gao@intel.com \
--cc=jmattson@google.com \
--cc=john.allen@amd.com \
--cc=kvm@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=minipli@grsecurity.net \
--cc=pbonzini@redhat.com \
--cc=rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com \
--cc=xiaoyao.li@intel.com \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox
all inboxes | Powered by JetHome®