From: Hao-Yu Yang <naup96721@gmail.com>
To: security@kernel.org
Cc: tglx@kernel.org, mingo@redhat.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Hao-Yu Yang <naup96721@gmail.com>
Subject: [PATCH v1] futex: Use-after-free between futex_key_to_node_opt and vma_replace_policy
Date: Fri, 13 Mar 2026 20:05:29 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260313120529.46754-1-naup96721@gmail.com> (raw)
During futex_key_to_node_opt() execution, vma->vm_policy is read under
speculative mmap lock and RCU. Concurrently, mbind() may call
vma_replace_policy() which frees the old mempolicy immediately via
kmem_cache_free().
This creates a race where __futex_key_to_node() dereferences a freed
mempolicy pointer, causing a use-after-free read of mpol->mode.
[ 151.412631] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __futex_key_to_node (kernel/futex/core.c:349)
[ 151.414046] Read of size 2 at addr ffff888001c49634 by task e/87
[ 151.414476]
[ 151.415431] CPU: 1 UID: 1000 PID: 87 Comm: e Not tainted 7.0.0-rc3-g0257f64bdac7 #1 PREEMPT(lazy)
[ 151.415758] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014
[ 151.415969] Call Trace:
[ 151.416059] <TASK>
[ 151.416161] dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:123)
[ 151.416299] print_report (mm/kasan/report.c:379 mm/kasan/report.c:482)
[ 151.416359] ? __virt_addr_valid (./include/linux/mmzone.h:2046 ./include/linux/mmzone.h:2198 arch/x86/mm/physaddr.c:54)
[ 151.416412] ? __futex_key_to_node (kernel/futex/core.c:349)
[ 151.416517] ? kasan_complete_mode_report_info (mm/kasan/report_generic.c:182)
[ 151.416583] ? __futex_key_to_node (kernel/futex/core.c:349)
[ 151.416631] kasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:597)
[ 151.416677] ? __futex_key_to_node (kernel/futex/core.c:349)
[ 151.416732] __asan_load2 (mm/kasan/generic.c:271)
[ 151.416777] __futex_key_to_node (kernel/futex/core.c:349)
[ 151.416822] get_futex_key (kernel/futex/core.c:374 kernel/futex/core.c:386 kernel/futex/core.c:593)
[ 151.416871] ? __pfx_get_futex_key (kernel/futex/core.c:550)
[ 151.416927] futex_wake (kernel/futex/waitwake.c:165)
[ 151.416976] ? __pfx_futex_wake (kernel/futex/waitwake.c:156)
[ 151.417022] ? __pfx___x64_sys_futex_wait (kernel/futex/syscalls.c:398)
[ 151.417081] __x64_sys_futex_wake (kernel/futex/syscalls.c:382 kernel/futex/syscalls.c:366 kernel/futex/syscalls.c:366)
[ 151.417129] x64_sys_call (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:41)
[ 151.417236] do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94)
[ 151.417342] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:130)
[ 151.418312] </TASK>
I don't really know how to fix this vulnerability. So this
patch just initial attempt to patch and need more discussion.
I think we need to remove this path or add some lock.
Fixes: c042c505210d ("futex: Implement FUTEX2_MPOL")
Reported-by: Hao-Yu Yang <naup96721@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hao-Yu Yang <naup96721@gmail.com>
---
kernel/futex/core.c | 23 -----------------------
1 file changed, 23 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/futex/core.c b/kernel/futex/core.c
index cf7e610eac42..0b44fcb30268 100644
--- a/kernel/futex/core.c
+++ b/kernel/futex/core.c
@@ -362,31 +362,8 @@ static int __futex_key_to_node(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr)
return node;
}
-static int futex_key_to_node_opt(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr)
-{
- int seq, node;
-
- guard(rcu)();
-
- if (!mmap_lock_speculate_try_begin(mm, &seq))
- return -EBUSY;
-
- node = __futex_key_to_node(mm, addr);
-
- if (mmap_lock_speculate_retry(mm, seq))
- return -EAGAIN;
-
- return node;
-}
-
static int futex_mpol(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr)
{
- int node;
-
- node = futex_key_to_node_opt(mm, addr);
- if (node >= FUTEX_NO_NODE)
- return node;
-
guard(mmap_read_lock)(mm);
return __futex_key_to_node(mm, addr);
}
--
2.34.1
next reply other threads:[~2026-03-13 12:07 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-03-13 12:05 Hao-Yu Yang [this message]
2026-03-13 12:26 ` Eric Dumazet
2026-03-13 12:42 ` Hao-Yu Yang
2026-03-13 12:47 ` Eric Dumazet
2026-03-13 12:50 ` Hao-Yu Yang
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20260313120529.46754-1-naup96721@gmail.com \
--to=naup96721@gmail.com \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=mingo@redhat.com \
--cc=security@kernel.org \
--cc=tglx@kernel.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox
all inboxes | Powered by JetHome®