From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from casper.infradead.org (casper.infradead.org [90.155.50.34]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id C32F336CE02 for ; Thu, 19 Mar 2026 09:08:21 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=90.155.50.34 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1773911304; cv=none; b=JFGimr+vOKmWdzl/8qrabmC4ptZrtlBfCi4Kp2K2saDqOfq8F40yeoX9rvK9ahC+hO7buxCWUG49kRyQhnGPI7fPT2wkdiiQDpkjkBE9fKiZ94e4lniR64jrreZSrBCITzYQmVGJxabCUBR8TIM0Yc5hESgEedu4ReLM5TGkVxE= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1773911304; c=relaxed/simple; bh=K+svYj/QG5NAvdIF6+M+pBoGlz/uLbc/JJqE55EZdbc=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:Message-ID:References:MIME-Version: Content-Type:Content-Disposition:In-Reply-To; b=WOa2mt2I9Pnmu/kALKvOYpJ774huiGTiXSnihtdCHVwnGkHwO2gFm2QDZ8Rz8FMYre0oYRtLXHARl0hlLyi6y4339F9LdcENSyxzgOdY7C33r8JRy02qWyLdE221ICmxXOHs2DAbDEPX50nnh743X0+wVFM4WeuslDLQObkcW94= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=none dis=none) header.from=infradead.org; spf=none smtp.mailfrom=infradead.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=infradead.org header.i=@infradead.org header.b=v3wnpJaC; arc=none smtp.client-ip=90.155.50.34 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=none dis=none) header.from=infradead.org Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; spf=none smtp.mailfrom=infradead.org Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=infradead.org header.i=@infradead.org header.b="v3wnpJaC" DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; q=dns/txt; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=infradead.org; s=casper.20170209; h=In-Reply-To:Content-Type:MIME-Version: References:Message-ID:Subject:Cc:To:From:Date:Sender:Reply-To: Content-Transfer-Encoding:Content-ID:Content-Description; bh=wEYAgeGaiD429DE2xYuN0vUh9XMTjU5f1CohOIk0I/k=; b=v3wnpJaCro1XKAq2kpfzx3hpnS L13S//3WDPdQdDcL6KJaHSC0t2EKCgg0FkgdCyxVFszXaBf9u8BKCVuPS3sAu3D2Q6WLTAFfO+mgm ysyPDP7gc4F3stcyT0VVbN7IX0xD+0hCzWGR/Qt+eiIG2RriA8BC5fyX5OBrWnhMCqDNxZFEtHkZs 9MWU1K6oLDyIHn6qTz82JMjtSzReu6/GKndgoo/PAv0PxQ8pAILIDGVV0GlQwMEHQZB7kBZziUMYz OmeyzlFxJTL/UOXI7y4DMGNBanUYMuYhzQAlfkgoTHbLFMoGt4avQi7PaM8kIy3uMPOLplBwWydkK T3d7z+9w==; Received: from 77-249-17-252.cable.dynamic.v4.ziggo.nl ([77.249.17.252] helo=noisy.programming.kicks-ass.net) by casper.infradead.org with esmtpsa (Exim 4.98.2 #2 (Red Hat Linux)) id 1w39MM-00000005qgV-2Z9R; Thu, 19 Mar 2026 09:08:07 +0000 Received: by noisy.programming.kicks-ass.net (Postfix, from userid 1000) id 4FB0C301185; Thu, 19 Mar 2026 10:08:05 +0100 (CET) Date: Thu, 19 Mar 2026 10:08:05 +0100 From: Peter Zijlstra To: Florian Weimer Cc: Thomas =?iso-8859-1?Q?Wei=DFschuh?= , Thomas Gleixner , LKML , Mathieu Desnoyers , =?iso-8859-1?Q?Andr=E9?= Almeida , Sebastian Andrzej Siewior , Carlos O'Donell , Rich Felker , Torvald Riegel , Darren Hart , Ingo Molnar , Davidlohr Bueso , Arnd Bergmann , "Liam R . Howlett" Subject: Re: [patch 8/8] x86/vdso: Implement __vdso_futex_robust_try_unlock() Message-ID: <20260319090805.GT3738010@noisy.programming.kicks-ass.net> References: <20260316162316.356674433@kernel.org> <20260316164951.484640267@kernel.org> <20260317081606-6b19f6a3-34e5-4056-9b8b-e9b90028b960@linutronix.de> <87bjgmokb0.ffs@tglx> <20260317120032-5d3d8bb8-27af-4380-9f82-5a132d84a0af@linutronix.de> <87ikatm7rx.ffs@tglx> <20260319081750-6676c5a6-80c4-4904-a53d-e272a5cfaeb1@linutronix.de> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: On Thu, Mar 19, 2026 at 09:53:53AM +0100, Florian Weimer wrote: > If the the /lib/modules/$(uname -r)/vdso/vdsoNN.so path is standard, we > can use it in the link map, at the expense of an additional system call > during process startup. It isn't just a performance cost. We've seen > seccomp filters that kill the process on uname calls. I've always though it would be a good idea to expose vdsoNN.so somewhere in our virtual filesystem, either /proc or /sys or whatever.