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From: Feng Yang <yangfeng59949@163.com>
To: casey@schaufler-ca.com
Cc: jmorris@namei.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, paul@paul-moore.com,
	serge@hallyn.com, yangfeng59949@163.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH] lsm: Fix the crash issue in xfrm_decode_session
Date: Fri, 20 Mar 2026 11:03:30 +0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260320030330.82615-1-yangfeng59949@163.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <80ff003b-51fd-4ec8-9505-dfc1c5890ced@schaufler-ca.com>

On Thu, 19 Mar 2026 10:51:24 -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> On 3/18/2026 7:22 PM, Feng Yang wrote:
> > On Wed, 18 Mar 2026 10:09:47 -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> >> On 3/17/2026 11:19 PM, Feng Yang wrote:
> >>> From: Feng Yang <yangfeng@kylinos.cn>
> >>>
> >>> After hooking the following BPF program:
> >>> SEC("lsm/xfrm_decode_session")
> >>> int BPF_PROG(lsm_hook_xfrm_decode_session, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid, int ckall)
> >>> {
> >>>     return 1; // Any non-zero value
> >>> }
> >>> Subsequent packet transmission triggers will cause a kernel panic:
> >> LSM hooks that use or provide secids cannot be stacked. That is,
> >> you can't provide a BPF LSM hook and an SELinux LSM hook and expect
> >> correct behavior. Your proposed "fix" removes a legitimate check.
> > I'm very sorry, I didn't quite understand what you meant.
> >
> > Maybe my commit message wasn't clear. I only used a BPF LSM hook without SELinux stacking enabled.
> 
> Do i understand correctly that you do not have SELinux enabled?

Yes.

> 
> > Therefore, is it the expected behavior that simply using
> > SEC("lsm/xfrm_decode_session")
> > int BPF_PROG(lsm_hook_xfrm_decode_session, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid, int ckall) {
> >     return -1;
> > }
> > would cause a kernel panic?
> 
> Yes. As the infrastructure is written, any return other than 0 is erroneous.
> You will need to query the SELinux developers about why they decided to
> implement the xfrm handling in this way.
> 
> >  If not, and if the BUG_ON check is still necessary,
> > then does it mean we need to modify the return value validation logic in the BPF
> > verifier to ensure that only BPF programs returning 0 are accepted for this hook?
> >
> > Thanks.
> >
> >


  parent reply	other threads:[~2026-03-20  3:04 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 10+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-03-18  6:19 Feng Yang
2026-03-18  8:37 ` Feng Yang
2026-03-18 17:09 ` Casey Schaufler
2026-03-19  2:22   ` Feng Yang
2026-03-19 17:51     ` Casey Schaufler
2026-03-19 18:22       ` Stephen Smalley
2026-03-20  3:24         ` [PATCH RESEND] " Feng Yang
2026-03-20  3:03       ` Feng Yang [this message]
2026-04-13 17:39 ` [PATCH] " Stephen Smalley
2026-04-22  6:39   ` Feng Yang

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