From: Ruidong Tian <tianruidong@linux.alibaba.com>
To: mingo@redhat.com, peterz@infradead.org, juri.lelli@redhat.com,
vincent.guittot@linaro.org, dietmar.eggemann@arm.com,
rostedt@goodmis.org, bsegall@google.com, mgorman@suse.de,
vschneid@redhat.com, kprateek.nayak@amd.com
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, oliver.yang@linux.alibaba.com,
Ruidong Tian <tianruidong@linux.alibaba.com>
Subject: [PATCH] sched: move stack_canary to the start of the randomizable region
Date: Fri, 8 May 2026 14:15:58 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260508061558.2976364-1-tianruidong@linux.alibaba.com> (raw)
task_struct keeps growing over time. On architectures that compute the
per-task stack canary offset from asm-offsets.h and pass it to the
compiler via -mstack-protector-guard-offset=, this growth eventually
pushes stack_canary beyond what the target ISA can encode.
On RISC-V, canary loads are emitted as
ld t0, TSK_STACK_CANARY(tp)
where TSK_STACK_CANARY must fit into a 12-bit signed immediate, i.e.
[-2048, 2047]. Once stack_canary sits past byte 2047 of task_struct,
the build fails with
cc1: error: '<N>' is not a valid offset in
'-mstack-protector-guard-offset='
Move stack_canary to the very first slot of the randomizable region of
task_struct, right after __state / saved_state:
* On RISC-V, CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR_PER_TASK depends on !RANDSTRUCT,
so randomized_struct_fields_start/end always expand to nothing and
stack_canary lands at a small, stable offset well within the
12-bit signed immediate range. The build error goes away.
* On architectures that enable RANDSTRUCT for hardening, stack_canary
stays inside the randomized region and is still shuffled together
with the other fields by the layout randomization, so its hardening
coverage is preserved. asm-offsets-based architectures read the
shuffled offset at build time, so the generated canary accesses
remain correct.
This is a refinement of Christophe Leroy's 2018 proposal [1], which
placed stack_canary before randomized_struct_fields_start and thereby
pulled it out of the randomized region entirely. Michael Ellerman
flagged that at the time as a regression of the hardening coverage.
Keeping the field inside the region preserves the "scheduling-critical
items only" invariant documented above the start marker and retains
RANDSTRUCT protection on architectures that enable it.
[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/d60ce7dd74704b0ca0a857186f30de4006b63534.1537355312.git.christophe.leroy@c-s.fr/
Signed-off-by: Ruidong Tian <tianruidong@linux.alibaba.com>
---
include/linux/sched.h | 9 +++++----
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/sched.h b/include/linux/sched.h
index 368c7b4d7cb5..d9ee2381c3a3 100644
--- a/include/linux/sched.h
+++ b/include/linux/sched.h
@@ -836,6 +836,11 @@ struct task_struct {
*/
randomized_struct_fields_start
+#ifdef CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR
+ /* Canary value for the -fstack-protector GCC feature: */
+ unsigned long stack_canary;
+#endif
+
void *stack;
refcount_t usage;
/* Per task flags (PF_*), defined further below: */
@@ -1060,10 +1065,6 @@ struct task_struct {
pid_t pid;
pid_t tgid;
-#ifdef CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR
- /* Canary value for the -fstack-protector GCC feature: */
- unsigned long stack_canary;
-#endif
/*
* Pointers to the (original) parent process, youngest child, younger sibling,
* older sibling, respectively. (p->father can be replaced with
--
2.51.2.612.gdc70283dfc
next reply other threads:[~2026-05-08 6:16 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-05-08 6:15 Ruidong Tian [this message]
2026-05-08 16:38 ` K Prateek Nayak
2026-05-09 3:49 ` Ruidong Tian
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