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Mon, 18 May 2026 09:35:26 -0700 (PDT) From: Jann Horn Date: Mon, 18 May 2026 18:35:16 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 2/2] proc: protect ptrace_may_access() with exec_update_lock (FD links) Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Message-Id: <20260518-procfs-lockfix-part1-v1-2-5c3d20e0ac33@google.com> References: <20260518-procfs-lockfix-part1-v1-0-5c3d20e0ac33@google.com> In-Reply-To: <20260518-procfs-lockfix-part1-v1-0-5c3d20e0ac33@google.com> To: Alexander Viro , Christian Brauner Cc: Jan Kara , Arjan van de Ven , "Eric W. Biederman" , Jake Edge , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, Jann Horn , stable@vger.kernel.org X-Mailer: b4 0.15-dev X-Developer-Signature: v=1; a=ed25519-sha256; t=1779122120; l=7748; i=jannh@google.com; s=20240730; h=from:subject:message-id; bh=J6vYP+pwxqJtl3IXGpjK6NcN9iylazyz59URcLbnfuQ=; b=VGuWqwO60b4SF4T9W/cDNEZOqXEC7aVVevIZX9SsSb7uy7X+b/lA73E07zjsjHEDTj1bkJKC4 Sr5mX0rxXNWBNf5FqcB4mV1qb5KBWiQZz4gXJvCc1GPzB4bRclzXhJN X-Developer-Key: i=jannh@google.com; a=ed25519; pk=AljNtGOzXeF6khBXDJVVvwSEkVDGnnZZYqfWhP1V+C8= proc_pid_get_link() and proc_pid_readlink() currently look up the task from the pid once, then do the ptrace access check on that task, then look up the task from the pid a second time to do the actual access. That's racy in several ways. To fix it, pass the task to the ->proc_get_link() handler, and instead of proc_fd_access_allowed(), introduce a new helper call_proc_get_link() that looks up and locks the task, does the access check, and calls ->proc_get_link(). Fixes: 778c1144771f ("[PATCH] proc: Use sane permission checks on the /proc//fd/ symlinks") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jann Horn --- fs/proc/base.c | 119 +++++++++++++++++++++-------------------------------- fs/proc/fd.c | 27 +++++------- fs/proc/internal.h | 2 +- 3 files changed, 59 insertions(+), 89 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c index 09b02d1621e5..ef2f59461374 100644 --- a/fs/proc/base.c +++ b/fs/proc/base.c @@ -218,33 +218,24 @@ static int get_task_root(struct task_struct *task, struct path *root) return result; } -static int proc_cwd_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct path *path) +static int proc_cwd_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct path *path, + struct task_struct *task) { - struct task_struct *task = get_proc_task(d_inode(dentry)); int result = -ENOENT; - if (task) { - task_lock(task); - if (task->fs) { - get_fs_pwd(task->fs, path); - result = 0; - } - task_unlock(task); - put_task_struct(task); + task_lock(task); + if (task->fs) { + get_fs_pwd(task->fs, path); + result = 0; } + task_unlock(task); return result; } -static int proc_root_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct path *path) +static int proc_root_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct path *path, + struct task_struct *task) { - struct task_struct *task = get_proc_task(d_inode(dentry)); - int result = -ENOENT; - - if (task) { - result = get_task_root(task, path); - put_task_struct(task); - } - return result; + return get_task_root(task, path); } /* @@ -710,23 +701,6 @@ static int proc_pid_syscall(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns, /* Here the fs part begins */ /************************************************************************/ -/* permission checks */ -static bool proc_fd_access_allowed(struct inode *inode) -{ - struct task_struct *task; - bool allowed = false; - /* Allow access to a task's file descriptors if it is us or we - * may use ptrace attach to the process and find out that - * information. - */ - task = get_proc_task(inode); - if (task) { - allowed = ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS); - put_task_struct(task); - } - return allowed; -} - int proc_nochmod_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr) { @@ -1783,16 +1757,12 @@ static const struct file_operations proc_pid_set_comm_operations = { .release = single_release, }; -static int proc_exe_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct path *exe_path) +static int proc_exe_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct path *exe_path, + struct task_struct *task) { - struct task_struct *task; struct file *exe_file; - task = get_proc_task(d_inode(dentry)); - if (!task) - return -ENOENT; exe_file = get_task_exe_file(task); - put_task_struct(task); if (exe_file) { *exe_path = exe_file->f_path; path_get(&exe_file->f_path); @@ -1802,26 +1772,42 @@ static int proc_exe_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct path *exe_path) return -ENOENT; } +static int call_proc_get_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, struct path *path_out) +{ + struct task_struct *task; + int ret; + + task = get_proc_task(inode); + if (!task) + return -ENOENT; + ret = down_read_killable(&task->signal->exec_update_lock); + if (ret) + goto out_put_task; + if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS)) { + ret = -EACCES; + goto out; + } + ret = PROC_I(inode)->op.proc_get_link(dentry, path_out, task); + +out: + up_read(&task->signal->exec_update_lock); +out_put_task: + put_task_struct(task); + return ret; +} + static const char *proc_pid_get_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, struct delayed_call *done) { struct path path; - int error = -EACCES; + int error; if (!dentry) return ERR_PTR(-ECHILD); - - /* Are we allowed to snoop on the tasks file descriptors? */ - if (!proc_fd_access_allowed(inode)) - goto out; - - error = PROC_I(inode)->op.proc_get_link(dentry, &path); - if (error) - goto out; - - error = nd_jump_link(&path); -out: + error = call_proc_get_link(dentry, inode, &path); + if (!error) + error = nd_jump_link(&path); return ERR_PTR(error); } @@ -1855,17 +1841,11 @@ static int proc_pid_readlink(struct dentry * dentry, char __user * buffer, int b struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry); struct path path; - /* Are we allowed to snoop on the tasks file descriptors? */ - if (!proc_fd_access_allowed(inode)) - goto out; - - error = PROC_I(inode)->op.proc_get_link(dentry, &path); - if (error) - goto out; - - error = do_proc_readlink(&path, buffer, buflen); - path_put(&path); -out: + error = call_proc_get_link(dentry, inode, &path); + if (!error) { + error = do_proc_readlink(&path, buffer, buflen); + path_put(&path); + } return error; } @@ -2256,21 +2236,16 @@ static const struct dentry_operations tid_map_files_dentry_operations = { .d_delete = pid_delete_dentry, }; -static int map_files_get_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct path *path) +static int map_files_get_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct path *path, + struct task_struct *task) { unsigned long vm_start, vm_end; struct vm_area_struct *vma; - struct task_struct *task; struct mm_struct *mm; int rc; rc = -ENOENT; - task = get_proc_task(d_inode(dentry)); - if (!task) - goto out; - mm = get_task_mm(task); - put_task_struct(task); if (!mm) goto out; diff --git a/fs/proc/fd.c b/fs/proc/fd.c index 05c7513e77c7..0f9a1556f2a3 100644 --- a/fs/proc/fd.c +++ b/fs/proc/fd.c @@ -171,24 +171,19 @@ static const struct dentry_operations tid_fd_dentry_operations = { .d_delete = pid_delete_dentry, }; -static int proc_fd_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct path *path) +static int proc_fd_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct path *path, + struct task_struct *task) { - struct task_struct *task; int ret = -ENOENT; - - task = get_proc_task(d_inode(dentry)); - if (task) { - unsigned int fd = proc_fd(d_inode(dentry)); - struct file *fd_file; - - fd_file = fget_task(task, fd); - if (fd_file) { - *path = fd_file->f_path; - path_get(&fd_file->f_path); - ret = 0; - fput(fd_file); - } - put_task_struct(task); + unsigned int fd = proc_fd(d_inode(dentry)); + struct file *fd_file; + + fd_file = fget_task(task, fd); + if (fd_file) { + *path = fd_file->f_path; + path_get(&fd_file->f_path); + ret = 0; + fput(fd_file); } return ret; diff --git a/fs/proc/internal.h b/fs/proc/internal.h index 64dc44832808..d31984c3c797 100644 --- a/fs/proc/internal.h +++ b/fs/proc/internal.h @@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ extern struct kmem_cache *proc_dir_entry_cache; void pde_free(struct proc_dir_entry *pde); union proc_op { - int (*proc_get_link)(struct dentry *, struct path *); + int (*proc_get_link)(struct dentry *, struct path *, struct task_struct *); int (*proc_show)(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns, struct pid *pid, struct task_struct *task); -- 2.54.0.563.g4f69b47b94-goog