From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 53868395D8C; Mon, 18 May 2026 21:40:22 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1779140423; cv=none; b=QJG2rL2guSvU4b67nWpKNTdY7FLxmi+8GGZnVWOxjXisoptZ0pTYjP509FYWyBHCT5X+K4R817U2ENC8qBNh//e/4SfgHM+vJZdg3n2wCNJ34LDUoi4Iu6uo7VdDUk+CRHUXrwh1XSiG6+p9DSwVDXICRIWoFVqvPvzJ2EHFgHY= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1779140423; c=relaxed/simple; bh=qybiXIdg78xjCaPCX4qTy9N5tIC+Q8pFhyzLh/Ltlx4=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:Message-Id:In-Reply-To:References: Mime-Version:Content-Type; b=MP/WP3m1IEBj5VeaZFbtDSKwbEYve30D7sAlOMXlUx0bSnKUgcAhrOGcudNxatY6s0yL1uyhBXwcej811oij98y2cQViYynGOiXZFQaqIUpoyirysLhTRRgHvdPRbuGseHRkDp07b3B5PGm9JYSP3k0AmKBwGowYlDvVbjsxM08= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linux-foundation.org header.i=@linux-foundation.org header.b=yVUrCj/8; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linux-foundation.org header.i=@linux-foundation.org header.b="yVUrCj/8" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 877C9C2BCB7; Mon, 18 May 2026 21:40:22 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=linux-foundation.org; s=korg; t=1779140422; bh=qybiXIdg78xjCaPCX4qTy9N5tIC+Q8pFhyzLh/Ltlx4=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=yVUrCj/8v+rbc3HT7LJZAhOz54fg3IiJ3//sp6SJf8w9u2Getzn43fXlkrQFEGQG0 Q/oa6f/TRIYXMTWuRYZbcKXXeEF6c7mXXl8nCMDjGhBC65MYn+AJUOVZv7S8/dLVH2 eFzbX+O7IYZ6ZTgqPEWQzW+/M7QL/p696M/Q8SGY= Date: Mon, 18 May 2026 14:40:22 -0700 From: Andrew Morton To: Michael Bommarito Cc: Joseph Qi , Mark Fasheh , Joel Becker , ZhengYuan Huang , ocfs2-devel@lists.linux.dev, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/3] ocfs2: harden inode validators against forged metadata Message-Id: <20260518144022.4d0d0056d304d5fd9607bc10@linux-foundation.org> In-Reply-To: <20260517111015.3187935-1-michael.bommarito@gmail.com> References: <20260517111015.3187935-1-michael.bommarito@gmail.com> X-Mailer: Sylpheed 3.8.0beta1 (GTK+ 2.24.33; x86_64-pc-linux-gnu) Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit On Sun, 17 May 2026 07:10:11 -0400 Michael Bommarito wrote: > > This series adds three structural checks to > ocfs2_validate_inode_block() that catch attacker-controlled bytes > in a freshly read dinode before ocfs2_populate_inode() copies them > verbatim into the in-core inode. All three checks fire on the > mount, lookup, and read-after-cache-invalidation paths and reject > the block with ocfs2_error(), the same error-propagation > mechanism the existing suballoc-slot, inline-data, chain-list, > and refcount checks use. Thanks. Sashiko review might have found a few issues: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260517111015.3187935-1-michael.bommarito@gmail.com