From: Richard Patel <ripatel@wii.dev>
To: x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@kernel.org>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
David Laight <david.laight.linux@gmail.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>,
Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>,
linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>,
Richard Patel <ripatel@wii.dev>
Subject: [PATCH v2 3/5] x86: expose user IBT via PR_CFI_BRANCH_LANDING_PADS
Date: Fri, 5 Jun 2026 18:47:14 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260605184715.3383415-5-ripatel@wii.dev> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260605184715.3383415-2-ripatel@wii.dev>
Allows userspace applications to enable IBT (forward-edge control
flow integrity protection) using the portable PR_CFI prctl API.
The name 'branch landing pads' is RISC-V specific, but the mechanism
is nearly identical in x86.
This setting enables the following MSR_IA32_U_CET bits:
- CET_ENDBR_EN (enforce endbr as indirect branch target)
- CET_NOTRACK_EN (jump modifier to opt-out of IBT checking)
Kernel-mode IBT (as part of CFI) bans notrack. A future prctl flag
could be introduced to ban notrack in usermode too.
Signed-off-by: Richard Patel <ripatel@wii.dev>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/ibt.h | 14 +++++
arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h | 5 ++
arch/x86/kernel/Makefile | 1 +
arch/x86/kernel/ibt.c | 98 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c | 2 +
5 files changed, 120 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/ibt.c
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/ibt.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/ibt.h
index 5e45d6424722..586e5fadf844 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/ibt.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/ibt.h
@@ -114,4 +114,18 @@ static inline void ibt_restore(u64 save) { }
#define ENDBR_INSN_SIZE (4*HAS_KERNEL_IBT)
+#ifndef __ASSEMBLER__
+
+#include <linux/prctl.h>
+
+#define PR_CFI_SUPPORTED_STATUS_MASK (PR_CFI_ENABLE | PR_CFI_DISABLE | PR_CFI_LOCK)
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_USER_IBT
+void reset_thread_ibt(void);
+#else
+static inline void reset_thread_ibt(void) {}
+#endif /* CONFIG_X86_USER_IBT */
+
+#endif /* __ASSEMBLER__ */
+
#endif /* _ASM_X86_IBT_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
index 67dd932305db..7fbf10410973 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
@@ -504,6 +504,11 @@ struct thread_struct {
unsigned int iopl_warn:1;
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_USER_IBT
+ unsigned int ibt:1;
+ unsigned int ibt_locked:1;
+#endif
+
/*
* Protection Keys Register for Userspace. Loaded immediately on
* context switch. Store it in thread_struct to avoid a lookup in
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile b/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
index 47a32f583930..05c87f014552 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
@@ -169,6 +169,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_CALL_THUNKS) += callthunks.o
obj-$(CONFIG_X86_CET) += cet.o
obj-$(CONFIG_X86_USER_SHADOW_STACK) += shstk.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_X86_USER_IBT) += ibt.o
###
# 64 bit specific files
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/ibt.c b/arch/x86/kernel/ibt.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..682414fde5a4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/ibt.c
@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/cpu.h>
+#include <linux/prctl.h>
+#include <asm/msr.h>
+
+static bool user_ibt_enabled(struct task_struct *task)
+{
+ return task->thread.ibt;
+}
+
+static bool user_ibt_locked(struct task_struct *task)
+{
+ return task->thread.ibt_locked;
+}
+
+static void user_ibt_set_lock(struct task_struct *task, bool lock)
+{
+ task->thread.ibt_locked = lock;
+}
+
+static void user_ibt_set_enable(bool enable)
+{
+ u64 msrval;
+
+ /* Already enabled */
+ if (user_ibt_enabled(current) == enable)
+ return;
+
+ current->thread.ibt = !!enable;
+
+ fpregs_lock_and_load();
+ rdmsrq(MSR_IA32_U_CET, msrval);
+ if (enable)
+ msrval |= CET_ENDBR_EN | CET_NO_TRACK_EN;
+ else
+ msrval &= ~(CET_ENDBR_EN | CET_NO_TRACK_EN);
+ msrval &= ~CET_WAIT_ENDBR;
+ wrmsrq(MSR_IA32_U_CET, msrval);
+ fpregs_unlock();
+}
+
+int arch_prctl_get_branch_landing_pad_state(struct task_struct *t,
+ unsigned long __user *state)
+{
+ unsigned long status = 0;
+
+ if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_USER_IBT))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ status = (user_ibt_enabled(t) ? PR_CFI_ENABLE : PR_CFI_DISABLE);
+ status |= (user_ibt_locked(t) ? PR_CFI_LOCK : 0);
+
+ return copy_to_user(state, &status, sizeof(status)) ? -EFAULT : 0;
+}
+
+int arch_prctl_set_branch_landing_pad_state(struct task_struct *t, unsigned long state)
+{
+ if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_USER_IBT))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (t != current)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (state & ~PR_CFI_SUPPORTED_STATUS_MASK)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (user_ibt_locked(t))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (!(state & (PR_CFI_ENABLE | PR_CFI_DISABLE)))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (state & PR_CFI_ENABLE && state & PR_CFI_DISABLE)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ user_ibt_set_enable(!!(state & PR_CFI_ENABLE));
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int arch_prctl_lock_branch_landing_pad_state(struct task_struct *task)
+{
+ if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_USER_IBT) ||
+ !user_ibt_enabled(task))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ user_ibt_set_lock(task, true);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void reset_thread_ibt(void)
+{
+ current->thread.ibt = false;
+ current->thread.ibt_locked = false;
+}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c
index b85e715ebb30..4b727cc7bccb 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c
@@ -59,6 +59,7 @@
#include <asm/fsgsbase.h>
#include <asm/fred.h>
#include <asm/msr.h>
+#include <asm/ibt.h>
#ifdef CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION
/* Not included via unistd.h */
#include <asm/unistd_32_ia32.h>
@@ -540,6 +541,7 @@ start_thread_common(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long new_ip,
}
reset_thread_features();
+ reset_thread_ibt();
loadsegment(fs, 0);
loadsegment(es, _ds);
--
2.47.3
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-06-05 18:53 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-06-05 18:47 [PATCH v2 0/5] Usermode Indirect Branch Tracking Richard Patel
2026-06-05 18:47 ` [PATCH v2 1/5] x86: add userspace IBT config option Richard Patel
2026-06-05 18:47 ` [PATCH v2 2/5] x86: shstk: don't clobber IBT bits in U_CET MSR Richard Patel
2026-06-05 18:47 ` Richard Patel [this message]
2026-06-05 18:47 ` [PATCH v2 4/5] x86/entry/vdso: build with IBT support Richard Patel
2026-06-05 19:14 ` Florian Weimer
2026-06-05 18:47 ` [PATCH v2 5/5] selftests/x86: test usermode IBT Richard Patel
2026-06-05 19:04 ` [PATCH v2 0/5] Usermode Indirect Branch Tracking Peter Zijlstra
2026-06-05 19:34 ` Florian Weimer
2026-06-05 20:32 ` Richard Patel
2026-06-06 13:40 ` Florian Weimer
2026-06-06 23:05 ` Richard Patel
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