From: David Maximiliano Hermitte <davemadmaxxx@gmail.com>
To: Viacheslav Dubeyko <slava@dubeyko.com>,
Jori Koolstra <jkoolstra@xs4all.nl>
Cc: John Paul Adrian Glaubitz <glaubitz@physik.fu-berlin.de>,
Yangtao Li <frank.li@vivo.com>,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
syzbot+97e301b4b82ae803d21b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com,
David Maximiliano Hermitte <davemadmaxxx@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] hfs: validate corrupt catalog and btree metadata before hfs_write_inode()
Date: Wed, 24 Jun 2026 13:54:12 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260624135412.7208-1-davemadmaxxx@gmail.com> (raw)
Hello Slava, Jori, all,
I am following up with a refined test patch for the same HFS syzbot reproducer.
This variant does not change hfs_write_inode(), hfs_test_inode(), or the BUG() site. It rejects corrupted catalog/B-tree metadata earlier:
- hfs_brec_read(): rejects invalid entry offset/length, caches node_size locally, and uses overflow-safe bounds arithmetic.
- hfs_read_inode(): rejects invalid file/directory CNIDs before writeback.
Local validation on commit 840ef6c78e6a:
- git diff --check: pass
- checkpatch.pl --strict: 0 errors, 0 warnings
- make -j2 fs/hfs/: pass
- bzImage built
- QEMU/TCG with the same public syzbot ReproC:
- BEFORE: repro_started=true, kernel_bug_seen=true
- AFTER: repro_started=true, repro_done=true, kernel_bug_seen=false, hfs_write_inode_seen=false, kasan_seen=false, oops_seen=false
- verdict=REPRO_RAN_NO_BUG_SEEN
I have prepared this refined variant because the hfs_brec_read() bounds check now validates entryoffset before computing node_size - entryoffset, caches node_size locally, and rejects entryoffset >= node_size explicitly. I am including it inline because it avoids potential integer overflow in the bounds check while preserving the same QEMU validation result.
I am sending it as a test patch / direction check, not as a final maintainer-ready fix. The point is that validating corrupt catalog/B-tree metadata before hfs_write_inode() prevents this reproducer from reaching the BUG() endpoint.
I would appreciate your opinion on whether this placement/direction is closer to the expected HFS fix.
Best regards,
David
Patch follows:
diff --git a/fs/hfs/bfind.c b/fs/hfs/bfind.c
index d56e47bdc517..e48a7110e342 100644
--- a/fs/hfs/bfind.c
+++ b/fs/hfs/bfind.c
@@ -170,12 +170,20 @@ int hfs_brec_find(struct hfs_find_data *fd)
int hfs_brec_read(struct hfs_find_data *fd, void *rec, u32 rec_len)
{
int res;
+ u32 node_size;
res = hfs_brec_find(fd);
if (res)
return res;
+ node_size = fd->bnode->tree->node_size;
+ if (fd->entryoffset < 0 || fd->entrylength <= 0)
+ return -EFSCORRUPTED;
+ if (fd->entryoffset >= node_size)
+ return -EFSCORRUPTED;
+ if (fd->entrylength > node_size - fd->entryoffset)
+ return -EFSCORRUPTED;
if (fd->entrylength > rec_len)
- return -EINVAL;
+ return -EFSCORRUPTED;
hfs_bnode_read(fd->bnode, rec, fd->entryoffset, fd->entrylength);
return 0;
}
diff --git a/fs/hfs/inode.c b/fs/hfs/inode.c
index ac4a9055c5c0..7283b9541064 100644
--- a/fs/hfs/inode.c
+++ b/fs/hfs/inode.c
@@ -367,6 +367,9 @@ static int hfs_read_inode(struct inode *inode, void *data)
rec = idata->rec;
switch (rec->type) {
case HFS_CDR_FIL:
+ /* Reject corrupted user file CNIDs before writeback. */
+ if (be32_to_cpu(rec->file.FlNum) < HFS_FIRSTUSER_CNID)
+ return -EFSCORRUPTED;
if (!HFS_IS_RSRC(inode)) {
hfs_inode_read_fork(inode, rec->file.ExtRec, rec->file.LgLen,
rec->file.PyLen, be16_to_cpu(rec->file.ClpSize));
@@ -390,6 +393,10 @@ static int hfs_read_inode(struct inode *inode, void *data)
inode->i_mapping->a_ops = &hfs_aops;
break;
case HFS_CDR_DIR:
+ /* Only the root directory may use a reserved CNID here. */
+ if (be32_to_cpu(rec->dir.DirID) < HFS_FIRSTUSER_CNID &&
+ be32_to_cpu(rec->dir.DirID) != HFS_ROOT_CNID)
+ return -EFSCORRUPTED;
inode->i_ino = be32_to_cpu(rec->dir.DirID);
inode->i_size = be16_to_cpu(rec->dir.Val) + 2;
HFS_I(inode)->fs_blocks = 0;
next reply other threads:[~2026-06-24 13:54 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-06-24 13:54 David Maximiliano Hermitte [this message]
2026-06-30 14:44 ` Viacheslav Dubeyko
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