mirror of https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
To: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
	Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>,
	Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>,
	linux-mm@kvack.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 0/6] seccomp: non-cooperative pinned-memfd argument redirect
Date: Fri, 26 Jun 2026 21:43:45 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260626214345.5590f05f946872a7a9565c41@linux-foundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260627012219.1079851-1-xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>

On Fri, 26 Jun 2026 18:22:13 -0700 Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com> wrote:

> The seccomp user-notification SECCOMP_USER_NOTIF_FLAG_CONTINUE response
> carries an inherent TOCTOU: once the supervisor decides to let a syscall
> continue, the target (or a CLONE_VM peer) can rewrite the memory behind a
> pointer argument before the kernel reads it. This is documented in the
> UAPI header and is why the notifier "cannot be used to implement a
> security policy" today.
> 
> The cooperative way around this is for the target to map a shared memfd
> and mseal() it during a trusted setup window, so the supervisor can hand
> the kernel an immutable buffer. That window does not exist for the common
> fork()+execve() sandbox model, where the supervisor wants to confine an
> uncooperative (or legacy) binary it did not write.
> 
> This series lets the supervisor close the TOCTOU without any target-side
> cooperation:

AI review went crazy over this.  I hope there's something useful in there:
	https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260627012219.1079851-1-xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com

  parent reply	other threads:[~2026-06-27  4:43 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-06-27  1:22 Cong Wang
2026-06-27  1:22 ` [PATCH v4 1/6] mm: add __do_mmap() and vm_mmap_seal_remote() Cong Wang
2026-06-27  1:22 ` [PATCH v4 2/6] seccomp: introduce SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_PIN_INSTALL Cong Wang
2026-06-27  1:22 ` [PATCH v4 3/6] seccomp: add kernel-installed pinned-memfd redirect Cong Wang
2026-06-27  1:22 ` [PATCH v4 4/6] seccomp: re-validate a redirected syscall against outer filters Cong Wang
2026-06-27  1:22 ` [PATCH v4 5/6] selftests/seccomp: cover non-cooperative pinned-memfd install Cong Wang
2026-06-27  1:22 ` [PATCH v4 6/6] docs/seccomp: document pinned-memfd redirect ioctls Cong Wang
2026-06-27  4:43 ` Andrew Morton [this message]
2026-07-01 20:37   ` [PATCH v4 0/6] seccomp: non-cooperative pinned-memfd argument redirect Cong Wang
2026-06-27  8:19 ` Mike Rapoport
2026-07-01 20:40   ` Cong Wang

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20260626214345.5590f05f946872a7a9565c41@linux-foundation.org \
    --to=akpm@linux-foundation.org \
    --cc=brauner@kernel.org \
    --cc=kees@kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-mm@kvack.org \
    --cc=luto@amacapital.net \
    --cc=wad@chromium.org \
    --cc=xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox

all inboxes | Powered by JetHome®