From: Vasiliy Kovalev <kovalev@altlinux.org>
To: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@kernel.org>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>,
Santosh Shukla <santosh.shukla@amd.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, lvc-project@linuxtesting.org,
kovalev@altlinux.org
Subject: [PATCH] KVM: x86: Re-pend NMI in vNMI hardware when injection is blocked
Date: Tue, 28 Jul 2026 04:54:16 +0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260728015416.1371404-1-kovalev@altlinux.org> (raw)
With two NMIs pending and vNMI enabled, process_nmi() hands one NMI to
hardware via kvm_x86_ops.set_vnmi_pending() and leaves the other in
vcpu->arch.nmi_pending for injection via .inject_nmi(). If that injection
is blocked - here by an interrupt shadow set through KVM_SET_VCPU_EVENTS -
kvm_check_and_inject_events() calls .enable_nmi_window() to single-step
the shadow. On the next VMRUN hardware delivers the NMI it was holding and
sets NMI-blocking itself, so svm_get_nmi_mask() becomes true. KVM_REQ_NMI
is not pending on the re-entry, so process_nmi() does not re-run and the
leftover NMI is still queued; .enable_nmi_window() is called again with
NMIs now masked, and svm_enable_nmi_window() hits WARN_ON_ONCE() - which
asserts KVM never opens an NMI window while NMIs are masked under vNMI.
With panic_on_warn this is a host DoS.
WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 1450 at arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c:4004 svm_enable_nmi_window+0x716/0x8f0 [kvm_amd]
CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 1450 Comm: syz.1.86 Not tainted 6.12.85+ #1
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996),
BIOS rel-1.16.3-0-ga6ed6b701f0a-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:svm_enable_nmi_window+0x716/0x8f0 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c:4004 [kvm_amd]
Call Trace:
<TASK>
kvm_check_and_inject_events+0x117a/0x1520 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:10486 [kvm]
vcpu_enter_guest.constprop.0+0x56f/0x40c0 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:10946 [kvm]
vcpu_run arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:11344 [inline] [kvm]
kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x5dc/0x2560 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:11671 [kvm]
kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x459/0x1510 virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:4492 [kvm]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x190/0x220 fs/ioctl.c:893
do_syscall_64+0xf5/0x220 arch/x86/entry/common.c:78
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
</TASK>
Before falling back to a window, retry .set_vnmi_pending() as process_nmi()
does. Hardware has already delivered the NMI it was holding, so the retry
succeeds, nmi_pending drops to zero, and no window is requested; hardware
delivers the re-pended NMI once the guest IRETs. On the first pass hardware
still holds the earlier NMI, so the retry fails and single-stepping is
unchanged. Without vNMI .set_vnmi_pending is NULL and the branch is a nop.
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Syzkaller.
Fixes: fa4c027a7956 ("KVM: x86: Add support for SVM's Virtual NMI")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kovalev <kovalev@altlinux.org>
---
The splat above is from syzkaller fuzzing on 6.12; the bug also reproduces
on kvm-x86/next with the syzkaller reproducer in a KVM guest on an
AMD EPYC 9754 (Zen 4c) with vNMI enabled; the WARN no longer fires with
this patch applied.
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index 960ff7fcd8db..d35f5fd3cb16 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -7724,6 +7724,9 @@ static int kvm_check_and_inject_events(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
can_inject = false;
WARN_ON(kvm_x86_call(nmi_allowed)(vcpu, true) < 0);
}
+ if (vcpu->arch.nmi_pending &&
+ (kvm_x86_call(set_vnmi_pending)(vcpu)))
+ vcpu->arch.nmi_pending--;
if (vcpu->arch.nmi_pending)
kvm_x86_call(enable_nmi_window)(vcpu);
}
--
2.50.1
next reply other threads:[~2026-07-28 2:00 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-07-28 1:54 Vasiliy Kovalev [this message]
2026-07-28 22:40 ` Vasiliy Kovalev
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