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From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
To: Yao Kai <yaokai34@huawei.com>
Cc: tglx@kernel.org, mingo@redhat.com, dvhart@infradead.org,
	dave@stgolabs.net, andrealmeid@igalia.com,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, liuyongqiang13@huawei.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH] futex: Fix missed wakeup during private hash resize
Date: Tue, 4 Aug 2026 11:16:05 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260804091605.GJ49951@noisy.programming.kicks-ass.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260803104313.3393274-1-yaokai34@huawei.com>

On Mon, Aug 03, 2026 at 06:43:13PM +0800, Yao Kai wrote:
> A task performing a custom private hash resize can remain blocked in
> uninterruptible sleep indefinitely.  The hung-task detector reports:
> 
>   INFO: task futex-resizer:314 blocked for more than 10 seconds.
>   task:futex-resizer state:D stack:14824 pid:314 tgid:312 ppid:311
> 
>   Call Trace:
>    __schedule+0x521/0xf30
>    schedule+0x22/0xa0
>    futex_hash_allocate+0x3db/0x490
>    __do_sys_prctl+0x6f5/0xbd0
>    do_syscall_64+0xf9/0x530
>    entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
> 
>   Kernel panic - not syncing: hung_task: blocked tasks
> 
> futex_pivot_pending() allows the resize request to continue when
> either no replacement hash is pending (hash_new == NULL) or the current
> hash reference count has reached zero.
> 
> After the final-reference wake, another futex task can complete the
> pivot between the two observations:
> 
>   T1                                  T2
> 
>   futex_hash_allocate()
>     wait_var_event(mm, ...)
>       futex_pivot_pending(mm)
>         hash_new != NULL
>                                       futex_hash()
>                                         futex_ref_get(old) -> false
>                                         futex_pivot_hash(mm)
>                                           hash_new = NULL
>                                           __futex_pivot_hash(mm, new)
>                                             rcu_assign_pointer(hash, new)
>         fph = rcu_dereference(hash) /* new */
>         futex_ref_is_dead(fph) -> false
>       schedule()
> 
> The pivot changes the state from hash_new != NULL with a dead current
> hash to hash_new == NULL with a live current hash.  The resize task can
> observe hash_new in the pre-pivot state and hash in the post-pivot state,
> causing futex_pivot_pending() to return false even though the pivot has
> completed.  Since a successful pivot does not notify waiters, the task
> can go to sleep after the only preceding wakeup has already been
> consumed.
> 
> Wake waiters after every successful pivot.  A full memory barrier before
> wake_up_var() pairs with set_current_state() in wait_var_event() and
> orders the completed pivot before the lockless waitqueue_active() check
> in wake_up_var().  The waiter therefore either observes hash_new == NULL
> before sleeping or is made runnable.

Hmm, but isn't the problem a lack of serialization on futex_mm_phash
access?

That is, all of this futex_mm_phash::hash_new and futex_mm_phash::hash
swizzling happens while holding futex_mm_phash::lock, except for
futex_pivot_pending(), that is looking at these values without holding
the lock, resulting in it observing that inconsistent state per the
above.

Taking a mutex in a wait loop is sorta yuck, but it should work. If the
mutex is contended, it sleeps and the wait-loop 'spuriously' doesn't. If
the mutex is uncontended, it doesn't sleep, but the wait-loop will.

Does this work for you?

---

diff --git a/kernel/futex/core.c b/kernel/futex/core.c
index f74ede3df161..72d4698e35fb 100644
--- a/kernel/futex/core.c
+++ b/kernel/futex/core.c
@@ -1778,14 +1778,15 @@ void futex_hash_free(struct mm_struct *mm)
 
 static bool futex_pivot_pending(struct mm_struct *mm)
 {
+	struct futex_mm_phash *mmph = &mm->futex.phash;
 	struct futex_private_hash *fph;
 
-	guard(rcu)();
+	guard(mutex)(&mmph->lock);
 
-	if (!mm->futex.phash.hash_new)
+	if (!mmph->hash_new)
 		return true;
 
-	fph = rcu_dereference(mm->futex.phash.hash);
+	fph = rcu_dereference_raw(mmph->hash);
 	return futex_ref_is_dead(fph);
 }
 

  reply	other threads:[~2026-08-04  9:16 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-08-03 10:43 Yao Kai
2026-08-04  9:16 ` Peter Zijlstra [this message]
2026-08-04 11:30   ` Yao Kai

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