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From: Tahera Fahimi <taherafahimi@linux.microsoft.com>
To: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: steffen.klassert@secunet.com, herbert@gondor.apana.org.au,
	raminwo0202@gmail.com, davem@davemloft.net, edumazet@google.com,
	kuba@kernel.org, pabeni@redhat.com, netdev@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, apais@linux.microsoft.com
Subject: [PATCH V1] xfrm: prevent policy_hthresh.work from racing with netns teardown
Date: Thu, 20 Aug 2026 14:14:18 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260820211418.1409602-1-taherafahimi@linux.microsoft.com> (raw)

[ Upstream commit 29fe3a61bcdce398ee3955101c39f89c01a8a77e ]

An XFRM_MSG_NEWSPDINFO request can queue the per-net work item
policy_hthresh.work onto the system workqueue. xfrm_hash_rebuild()
retrieves the enclosing struct net from the work item, so the callback
can dereference freed memory if it runs after net namespace teardown.

Upstream prevents this race with disable_work_sync(), which blocks new
queueing attempts and synchronizes pending or running work. Linux 6.6
does not provide that workqueue API, and cancel_work_sync() alone is not
sufficient because another request could queue the work after it returns.

Provide the same guarantee with an XFRM-local work_disabled flag. Protect
the flag and schedule_work() with the existing policy_hthresh seqlock so
teardown can atomically stop new queueing attempts. Then use
cancel_work_sync() to synchronize work that was queued before the flag was
set. This ensures policy_hthresh.work cannot outlive its struct net.

Fixes: 880a6fab8f6b ("xfrm: configure policy hash table thresholds by netlink")
Assisted-by: GitHub-Copilot:GPT-5.6 Sol
Signed-off-by: Tahera Fahimi <taherafahimi@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Allen Pais <apais@linux.microsoft.com>
---
 include/net/netns/xfrm.h |  1 +
 net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c   | 19 ++++++++++++++++++-
 2 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/include/net/netns/xfrm.h b/include/net/netns/xfrm.h
index 423b52eca908d..99eb5c2ff888b 100644
--- a/include/net/netns/xfrm.h
+++ b/include/net/netns/xfrm.h
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ struct xfrm_policy_hash {
 struct xfrm_policy_hthresh {
 	struct work_struct	work;
 	seqlock_t		lock;
+	bool			work_disabled;
 	u8			lbits4;
 	u8			rbits4;
 	u8			lbits6;
diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c
index 00d9693c13ae7..cc8f4d4b70875 100644
--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c
+++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c
@@ -1384,7 +1384,10 @@ static void xfrm_hash_rebuild(struct work_struct *work)
 
 void xfrm_policy_hash_rebuild(struct net *net)
 {
-	schedule_work(&net->xfrm.policy_hthresh.work);
+	write_seqlock(&net->xfrm.policy_hthresh.lock);
+	if (!net->xfrm.policy_hthresh.work_disabled)
+		schedule_work(&net->xfrm.policy_hthresh.work);
+	write_sequnlock(&net->xfrm.policy_hthresh.lock);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(xfrm_policy_hash_rebuild);
 
@@ -4181,6 +4184,7 @@ static int __net_init xfrm_policy_init(struct net *net)
 	net->xfrm.policy_hthresh.rbits6 = 128;
 
 	seqlock_init(&net->xfrm.policy_hthresh.lock);
+	net->xfrm.policy_hthresh.work_disabled = false;
 
 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&net->xfrm.policy_all);
 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&net->xfrm.inexact_bins);
@@ -4206,6 +4210,19 @@ static void xfrm_policy_fini(struct net *net)
 	unsigned int sz;
 	int dir;
 
+	/* Prevent new policy hash rebuilds before draining the work item.
+	 *
+	 * The upstream fix uses disable_work_sync(), which is unavailable
+	 * in v6.6. Protecting work_disabled and schedule_work() with the
+	 * same seqlock closes the check-to-queue race, while the subsequent
+	 * cancel_work_sync() drains work that was queued or running before
+	 * teardown disabled it.
+	 */
+	write_seqlock(&net->xfrm.policy_hthresh.lock);
+	net->xfrm.policy_hthresh.work_disabled = true;
+	write_sequnlock(&net->xfrm.policy_hthresh.lock);
+	cancel_work_sync(&net->xfrm.policy_hthresh.work);
+
 	flush_work(&net->xfrm.policy_hash_work);
 #ifdef CONFIG_XFRM_SUB_POLICY
 	xfrm_policy_flush(net, XFRM_POLICY_TYPE_SUB, false);
-- 
2.43.0


             reply	other threads:[~2026-08-20 21:14 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-08-20 21:14 Tahera Fahimi [this message]
2026-08-21  4:25 ` Greg KH

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