From: Daehyeon Ko <4ncienth@gmail.com>
To: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Mateusz Guzik <mjguzik@gmail.com>,
Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
syzbot+0aee5e8066eddbbe7397@syzkaller.appspotmail.com,
syzbot+e8b3520b53e78e90034e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Subject: [PATCH v2] exit: hold a reference to thread_pid across proc_flush_pid
Date: Mon, 31 Aug 2026 09:12:21 +0900 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260831001221.3755948-1-4ncienth@gmail.com> (raw)
Commit 0a36bad01731 ("release_task: kill the no longer needed
get/put_pid(thread_pid)") removed the reference around proc_flush_pid().
It assumed that free_pids(post.pids) at the end of release_task() would
keep thread_pid alive until then.
That assumption is wrong. __change_pid() only records a detached PID in
post.pids when pid_has_task() is false for every PIDTYPE. If another task
still uses the exiting task's PID as its process group or session ID,
__unhash_process() removes the exiting task's PIDTYPE_PID link but leaves
the PID out of post.pids. release_task() therefore holds no reference to
it after dropping tasklist_lock.
The other task can then remove the remaining PIDTYPE links. Its
free_pids() call schedules delayed_put_pid(), and the RCU callback can free
the PID before the first release_task() reaches proc_flush_pid().
An unprivileged reproducer races wait4(-1) against setsid() to trigger this
ordering. Three of three fresh v7.2 KASAN boots reported:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in
proc_invalidate_siblings_dcache+0x3e2/0x3f0
Read of size 8 by task h7_pid_reaper/1921
Call Trace:
proc_invalidate_siblings_dcache
release_task
wait_consider_task
__do_wait
do_wait
kernel_wait4
Freed by task 0:
kmem_cache_free
put_pid
delayed_put_pid
rcu_core
Last potentially related work creation:
__call_rcu_common
free_pids
ksys_setsid
KASAN identified a 144-byte object from the pid cache and located the bad
read 80 bytes into the freed object, matching pid->inodes. With an
explicit reference, three of three fresh boots completed without a KASAN
report. The concurrent RCU callback dropped its reference while
proc_flush_pid() was protected, and the balancing put_pid() performed the
final free afterward.
Take a reference before __unhash_process() clears p->thread_pid and release
it after proc_flush_pid() completes.
A tested source reproducer is available privately on request. No
controlled read or write, information leak, or privilege escalation is
claimed. The mainline patch applies directly to v6.19.y and newer;
v6.16.y through v6.18.y need a context-adjusted backport.
Fixes: 0a36bad01731 ("release_task: kill the no longer needed get/put_pid(thread_pid)")
Reported-by: syzbot+0aee5e8066eddbbe7397@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=0aee5e8066eddbbe7397
Reported-by: syzbot+e8b3520b53e78e90034e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=e8b3520b53e78e90034e
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # see patch description, needs adjustments for 6.16.y-6.18.y
Assisted-by: LLM
Signed-off-by: Daehyeon Ko <4ncienth@gmail.com>
---
Changes in v2:
- Rewrite the root-cause explanation around __change_pid(), pid_has_task(),
and the last PIDTYPE detach, as requested by Oleg.
- Explain in the source comment why thread_pid needs an explicit reference.
- Rebase onto current Torvalds master cee9395acd80.
kernel/exit.c | 9 ++++++---
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/exit.c b/kernel/exit.c
index 97686af89501..4e028f157597 100644
--- a/kernel/exit.c
+++ b/kernel/exit.c
@@ -261,8 +261,11 @@ void release_task(struct task_struct *p)
pidfs_exit(p);
cgroup_task_release(p);
- /* Retrieve @thread_pid before __unhash_process() may set it to NULL. */
- thread_pid = task_pid(p);
+ /*
+ * Pin @thread_pid before __unhash_process() clears it. The last
+ * PIDTYPE detach can otherwise free it before proc_flush_pid().
+ */
+ thread_pid = get_pid(task_pid(p));
write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
ptrace_release_task(p);
@@ -291,8 +294,8 @@ void release_task(struct task_struct *p)
}
write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
- /* @thread_pid can't go away until free_pids() below */
proc_flush_pid(thread_pid);
+ put_pid(thread_pid);
exit_cred_namespaces(p);
add_device_randomness(&p->se.sum_exec_runtime,
sizeof(p->se.sum_exec_runtime));
base-commit: cee9395acd8043be0644b25c34bfa86623f2b935
--
2.55.0
next reply other threads:[~2026-08-31 0:12 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-08-31 0:12 Daehyeon Ko [this message]
2026-08-31 14:58 ` Oleg Nesterov
2026-09-04 9:40 ` Christian Brauner
2026-09-01 8:01 ` Bradley Morgan
2026-09-04 9:40 ` Christian Brauner
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